All persons whose concurrence is necessary in order to give to the purchaser the full benefit of the contract, must, of course, be parties to and execute the conveyance.

And if the title be such that judgment creditors could at Law take the property in execution, this alone will entitle the purchaser to require their concurrence; even although Equity might by injunction restrain the exercise of their legal right (u).

And where it is a term of the contract that certain specified persons shall concur, the vendor cannot decline to procure their concurrence on the ground that they are in fact unnecessary parties (v).

Upon a sale by a mortgagee under a valid power of sale duly exercised, the purchaser cannot require the concurrence of the mortgagor (w); although by the mortgage deed the latter agreed to join in any sale, if required (x).

Upon the sale of a bankrupt's estate, he is usually made to convey and covenant for title (y): his covenants, however, are obviously of little value; and it would seem that he cannot be compelled to execute the conveyance (z): but the Court of Bankruptcy is empowered (a) upon the application of the assignees, or of the purchaser, if the bankrupt shall not try the validity of the adjudication, or if there shall have been a verdict at Law establishing its validity, to order the bankrupt to join in the conveyance; and if he do not execute it within the time directed by the order, then he, and all persons claiming under him, will be stopped from objecting to such conveyance; and all estate, right, or title, which he had in the property, will be as effectually barred as if such conveyance had been actually executed by him: the order would appear to be of course if he do not dispute the validity of the adjudication (b). It seems doubtful whether a purchaser can, in ordinary cases require the assignees to procure such an order unless he can throw a doubt upon the validity of the adjudication: if he himself apply for it, the costs would seem to be in the discretion of the Court (c).

Who must be parties to conveyance.

Judgment creditors who might proceed at Law, although they would be restrained in Equity.

Stipulation that unnecessary parties shall concur, is binding.

Purchaser from mortgagee, under power of sale, cannot require concurrence of mortgagor.

As to making bankrupt a party on sale of his estate.

(u) Craddock v. Piper, 14 Sim. 310.

(v) Benson v. Lamb, 9 Beav. 502.

(to) Clay v. Sharpe, Sug. 523; Allen v. Martin, 5 Jur. 239, R.

(x) Corder v. Morgan, 18 Ves.344

(y) Sug. 706.

(z) 3 Dav. Conv. 413.

(a) See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 148; and 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, s. 78.

As respects dower, in cases falling under the new law, the concurrence of the wife is, of course, unnecessary; the conveyance by the husband alone being a sufficient bar: in cases falling under the old law, it has been held that the purchaser could not insist on the wife's concurrence if he could obtain an assignment of a legal term for years created previously to the right of dower attaching upon the estate, and of sufficient duration (d); inasmuch as, if the wife proceeded for her dower at Law, she could recover it only with a cesset executio during the term, and Equity would not remove the bar (e): this, however, does not seem to be a satisfactory reason for the doctrine; as not only was the purchaser obliged to incur the expense of keeping the term on foot, but he would have had to pay at least his own costs at Law in the event of the dowress availing her self of her legal remedy (f): and it would appear that a purchaser can at any rate require the vendor to ascertain, if practicable, whether or no a liability to dower exists, and is not bound to be satisfied with a reply that if such liability exist he may protect himself by means of a term (g). It has been recently decided, by V. C. K. Bruce, that an old term for years which upon a purchase prior to the 1st January, 1846, (when the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 112 (h) came into operation,) was duly assigned to a trustee for the purchaser, is a sufficient protection to a sub-purchaser, purchasing on or after the 1st January, 1846, against the dower of the wife of the original vendor (i); but such a term, it is conceived, would be no protection to the sub-purchaser against any claim to dower by the wife of such first purchaser; supposing him to have been seised in fee on the 1st January, 1846. Where a jointure is relied on in bar of dower, the vendor, it would seem, must produce a satisfactory title to the jointure land (k).

Dowress, when to be made a party.

Assignment of term, whether purchaser must rely on, as a bar.

(b) Ex parte Bradstock, 1 Mon. D. & De G. 118.

(c) See note to 9 Jarm. Conv. by S. 261.

(d) Sug. 541; Mole v. Smith, Jac. 490; Maundrell v. Maundrell, 7 Ves. 567; 10 Ves. 246.

(e) Sug. 541.