If the person sought for is not known to the holder to have a residence or place of business, various contingencies may arise. Thus, the city or town where he resides may be known or it may not be known. If the city or town or other locality be known to the holder or be ascertained, or if a former residence or place of business be known, an earnest attempt should be made to ascertain either his residence or his place of business. The sufficiency of this attempt is always a question of reasonable diligence under the circumstances.1 There are various cautions to be suggested, such as a consultation of the directory,2 inquiries at the postoffice,3 inquiries in the neighborhood of the former residence or place of business,4 inquiry at these latter places.5 A number of cases will be found in the notes upon this subject, and the authorities upon the subject of notice should be consulted.6 There are certain presumptions that may be on post-dated checks where the law of the jurisdiction does not forbid, but would not otherwise allow them,7 or to allow a demand upon a note due upon Sunday upon Monday;8 but the proof of a custom to allow demand on Monday, where the customary fourth day of grace fell upon Sunday, failed in another case, but the case impliedly holds that such a custom would be valid.9 But a custom contrary to express statute is not good, such as not to allow days of grace upon a post-dated check,10 though in the same case proof was allowed of a contrary rule of law in a foreign jurisdiction;11 and a custom not to allow days of grace upon bankable paper of any kind,12 or upon a bank's post-notes,13 has been held invalid as contrary to law where the statutory law gave days of grace. The true rule is that, where days of grace are merely given as a part of the law merchant, a custom may destroy them, because the parties may waive them, as they do by agreeing to the custom; but where days of grace are settled by a statute, the custom cannot abolish them, because the parties themselves will not be held to have waived the statute, even if they could do so, except by an express agreement. A usage to give notice to the maker of the maturity of the note and the place where it is deposited for collection cannot be substituted for a demand so as to bind an indorser,14 but in other jurisdictions the custom has been allowed to prevail.15 Other courts have held that the custom of a bank, to be binding upon a party to the l0 Bowen v. Newell, 8 N. Y. 190; Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 25 Wend. 673, 6 Hill. 174 For the principle see Otsego Co. Bank v. Warren, 18 Barb. 290.

25 This is the rule as to notice. Bartlett v. Isbell, 31 Conn. 296.

26 Nicholson v. Barnes, 11 Neb. 452. The change in the address of the maker made by the indorser upon transferring is binding upon him. Nugent v. Mazange, 2 Mart. (O. S.) 264.

1 Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634; Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145.

2 Tate v. Sullivan, 30 Md. 464; Jarvis v. Garnett, 39 Mo. 268. See Packard v. Lyon, 5 Duer, 82. But this is sometimes not necessary (Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634), if the removal be recent. 3 Tate v. Sullivan, 30 Md. 464 4 Ellis v. Commercial Bank, 7

How. (Miss.) 294. .

5 Paton v. Lent, 4 Duer, 231; Peet v Zanders, 6 La. Ann. 364. Inquiry of other parties to the paper. Packard v. Lyon, 5 Duer, 82.

6 Spencer v. Bank of Salina, 3 Hill, 520; Bank of Utica v. Phillips, 3 Wend. 408; Farnsworth v. Mulindulged, such as that the place of the making of a note is presumably the place where the maker resides, unless the note is dated at some other place, when the presumption is that the maker resides there.7 Some courts hold that nothing as to the residence of the maker appearing, a presentment for payment at the place of date of the note is sufficient.8 But this does not mean that the holder is absolved from due diligence in inquiring as to the residence of the maker.9 If the maker reside in another state, a demand at the place of execution has been held sufficient,10 but this rule is not true stated in this way.11 It is true, however, where after execu-tion the maker has removed to another state.12 In such a case a demand at the former residence is sufficient.13 The residence known or stated in the note of the drawee is, without doubt, the proper place to make a demand,14 as we have seen, and if the bill is drawn and dated at the business domilen, 164 Mass. 112; Tarlton v. Miller, 1 I11. 39. In order to understand this decision it would be well to consult the preface to the report, which apologizes for the decisions therein by saying that the judges had no library, were compelled to perform circuit court duties and to act as a part of the council of revision. And see Sec. Sec. 280 and 281, post. paper, must have been known to him, even though the paper was made payable at the particular bank.16 But under no circumstances ought a custom varying from the law to be permitted on paper not payable at the bank, unless he had actual notice of the custom 17 or such constructive notice as would amount to actual notice.18

7 Herrick v. Baldwin, 17 Minn. 209.

8 White v. Wilkinson, 10 La. Ann. 394; Smith v. Philbrick, 10 Gray, 253. But see Hart v. Wills, 52 Iowa, 56. A bill made and dated at the business domicile of the drawer is payable there, wherever it be negotiated. Ex parte Heidelback, 2 Low. 526.

9Galpin v. Hard, 3 McCord, 394; Mason v. Pritchard, 9 Heisk. 793; Haber v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445; Ox-nard v. Varnum, I11 Pa. 193. See Burrows v. Hannegan, 1 McLean, 309.

10 Hepburn v. Toledano, 10 Mart.

(O. S.) 643. See note 21 to last section, and note 13. supra.

11 If the person dated the note in a state where he had no residence, a demand in the state of date is permissible, if diligence to find the address is used.

12 See cases cited in note 21 to last section. Demand is then excused altogether.

13 See cases cited in note 21 to last section. But Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145, shows what the rule is where the maker resides in another state at the time of the making of the note. Demand upon him is not excused, and, if his residence is known, demand must be made upon him at his place of domicile. Mason v. Pritchard, 9 Heisk. 793

14 Glaser v. Rounds, 16 R. I. 235; Nicholson v. Barnes, 11 Neb. 452. If the holder has reason to think he knows the residence, he is not negligent for failing to make incile of the drawee it is payable there, although it may have been negotiated elsewhere.15 "Where no result is attained by reasonable diligence in inquiring, the bill is dishonored and notice must be given.16 If the holder or his agent after inquiring, or from the paper itself, believes in good faith that he has ascertained the place of residence of the party17 or his place of business, he is not wanting in diligence if he acts upon his knowledge and makes demand accordingly.18 Where a demand is made upon a personal representative after death of the party liable, the demand as to place is governed by the foregoing rules.19