Where the day upon which notice should have been given is a holiday, assuming that day to be the day of demand and refusal, if that day had not fallen upon Sunday or a holiday, there is no question but that a notice on the following day would be a good notice.1 Thus, where the third day of grace falls upon Sunday, notice may be given upon Monday.2 But it is also true that notice may be given upon Saturday, the day of demand,3 and suit may be begun upon that day.4 But if the third day of grace falls upon Saturday, the question is a different one. The Supreme Court of the United States, in one of those Homeric slumbers in which it has occasionally indulged, seems to hold that if the third day of grace were Saturday, and by custom demand was permissible on Monday, notice upon Monday was too late.5 But all the authority and all the reason of the matter is that, if Sunday follow the day of demand, notice may be given on Monday.6 This rule should be that the intervening holiday is simply eliminated and notice cannot be given thereon.7 Holidays under this rule may exist by custom,8 if the indorser or other party to be charged had actual or constructive knowledge of the fact.9 The suspension of business during the Christmas season excused notice,10 but it was also excused because there were no mails.

7 See Sec. 277, ante, and City Nat. Bank v. Clinton Co. Nat. Bank, 49 Ohio St. 351; West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128.

8Etting v. Schuylkill Bank, 2 Pa. 355; Simpson v. Turney, 5 Humph. 419.

9 Shelburne Falls Bank v. Towns-ley, 102 Mass. 177; Warren v. Gil-man, 17 Me. 360.

10 See Sec. 272, ante, note 19.

11See Sec. 272, ante, note 19, and note 16, infra.

12 See Sec. 285, ante, notes 15 and 16, and note 16, infra.

13 Haskell v. Boardman,90 Maas.38.

" See Sec. 278, ante. 15SeeSec. 278, ante.

16 Flack v. Green, 3 Gill & J. 474; Barker v. Whitney, 18 La. 575. But the real owners who have indorsed the paper for collateral security may give notica Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 1 Sandf. 416.

17 First Nat. Bank v. Farneman, 93 Iowa, 161. But it is difficult to conceive of a more erroneous case. The indorsements were canceled after transmission of the notices. That fact was therefore immaterial. They existed when the notices were transmitted.

1 Burckmeyer v. Whiteford,6 Gill, 9; Colms v. Bank of Tennessee, 4 Baxt422; Barlow v. Planters'Bank, 7 How. (Miss.) 129; Irwin v. Brown, 2 Cranch, C. C. 314

2 See the cases in the last note.

3 Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat. 102. But a note was due July 1st, last day of grace July 4th, which was not a holiday, but was so observed; it was held that July 4th was the day for notice and July 3d was premature. See Lewis v. Burr, 2 Caines' Cas. 195.

4 Mandeville v. Rumney, 3 Cranch, C. C. 424

5 Adams v. Otter back, 15 How. 539. If the demand was good the notice ought to be good. The above is what the decision says. But the demand was not in time and the question of notice was immaterial.

6 Crawford v. Milligan, 2 Cranch, C. C. 226; Canonge v. Cauchoix, 11 Mart. (O. S.)452;SeventhWardBank v. Hanrick, 2 Story, 416; Williams v. Matthews, 3 Cow. 252; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Pa. 322. Contra, if mail on Saturday would reach indorser on Saturday, mailing on Monday is too late. King v. Foyles, 2 Cranch, C. C. 30&

7 Rheim v. Carlisle Deposit Bank, 76 Pa. 132. The English authority is contra, and so is Deblieux v. Bul-lard, 1 Rob. (La.) 66. Notice may be given on Sunday, but indorser need not act until Monday.

8 See Sec. 256, ante. 9 See Sec. 256, ante.