Where conduct of the drawee is relied upon as an acceptance, it must be in a jurisdiction where oral acceptances are valid.1 The acts of the acceptor may be proven just as his words may be proven.2 Mere retention of the instrument, it is said, is not sufficient,3 but a retention which injures the holder may become an acceptance,4 just as retention of a check may amount to an acceptance.5 It has been held that a retention of an order, even when the drawee writes his name upon it, is not an acceptance where the fact of writing the name is not communicated to the holder.6 At any rate the drawee is entitled to a reasonable time in which to examine his accounts to ascertain whether he will accept or not;7 and a retention from Saturday until the following Monday is not an acceptance.8 But if a drawer retains the bill and discounts it, his conduct amounts to an acceptance.9 There is considerable authority for saying that the receipt and disposal of property with knowledge that a draft has been drawn against it is an acceptance of the draft,10 but this is denied.11 If a letter of advice accompanies the shipment, and the direction is known to the holder of the draft, it is held that the drawee is bound to apply the proceeds as indicated in the letter.12 And if the drawee settles with the drawer, reserving enough to pay the draft, the drawee, it has been held, must pay the draft, though it be not accepted;13 yet if the drawee interpleads the payee and attaching creditors of the drawer, his act will not be an acceptance where the drawer has recovered the fund from him.14

Hatcher v. Stall worth, 25 Miss. 376: Edson v. Fuller, 22 N. H. 183; Mc-Pherson v. Walton, 42 N. J. Eq. 282; Short v. Blount, 99 N. C. 49; Fisher v. Beckwith, 19 Vt. 31. 11 Ward v. Allen, 2 Met. 53.

12 St Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. O'Reilly, 85 111. 546.

13 Mason v. Dousay, 35 111. 424

14 Vermont Marble Co. v. Mann, 36 Vt. 697.

15 Spalding v. Andrews, 48 Pa. 411. This promise, however, should be made to or at least known to the holder. Martin v. Bacon, 2 Const. R. 132; Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37; Rogers v. Union Stone Co., 130 Mass. 581; Clement v. Erie, 130 Mass. 585. See Sec. Sec. 299, 302, post, as to such promises on part of in-dorser.

16 See Sec. 229, post.

1This may be modified by the statement that a man may by his conduct estop himself from insisting upon a written acceptance. See the cases cited in note 1, Sec. 213, upon the general principle.

2 Bruner v. Nisbet, 31 111. App. 517; McCutchen v. Rice, 56 Miss. 455.

3 Colorado Nat. Bank v. Boettcher, 5 Colo. 185; Hall v. Steel, 68 I1L 231; Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass. 383; Briggs v. Sizer, 30 N. Y. 647. Under a statute, see Dickenson v. Marsh, 57 Mo. App. 566; Matteson v. Moul-ton, 11 Hun, 268, 79 N. Y. 627.

4 Taggart v. First Nat. Bank, 12 Wash. 538. See also Dunavan v. Flynn, 118 Mass. 537.

5See Sec. 146, ante.

6 Dunavan v. Flynn, 118 Mass. 537.