Where no statute requires an acceptance to be in writing it is well settled that an oral acceptance is sufficient.1 Such an acceptance may be considered as made by words or by conduct. Acceptances by conduct will be considered in the next section as implied acceptances. But the general principle applicable to all acceptances at common law is that an acceptance will be evidenced by any act clearly expressing an intention to honor the document.2 "Written acceptances good at common law are noticed in the last section. Oral acceptances are good at common law whether they be of a bill of exchange,3 a check4 or a non-negotiable order for the payment of money,5 except that even an absolute acceptance of a non-negotiable order, some authority holds, must be supported by a consideration,6 while the acceptance of a bill of exchange or check absolutely imports a consideration.7 The words from which an acceptance is inferred should not be equivocal.8 Thus, a promise to pay accompanied by a refusal to accept ought not to be considered an acceptance.9 But a promise to pay at a future day or generally10 is an acceptance. The statements that the document is correct and ought to be paid,11 or that the acceptor "cannot pay now, but will later,"12 or " it is all right, and I have told (the payee) that I will pay it in thirty or sixty days,"13 are acceptances. But such a promise must be received as an acceptance,14 and such a promise accepted as an acceptance inures to all the holders of the bill.15 If the draft is addressed generally to the drawee, it may be accepted by him payable at a particular place.16

1 Leonard v. Mason, 1 Wend. 522; White v. Dienger, 25 S. W. R. 666 (Tex.); Barnet v. Smith, 30 N. H. 256; Williams v. Winans, 14 N. J. Law, 339; Pierce v. Kittridge, 115 Mass. 374; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt 402; Spalding v. Andrews, 48 Pa. 411.

2 Andressen v. First Nat. Bank, 2 Fed. R. 122; Norton v. Knapp, 64 Iowa, 112. Compare Peck v. Cochran, 7 Pick. 34; Robbins v. Lambeth, 2 Rob. (La.) 304,

3Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 90; Heilschmidt v. McAlpine, 59 111. App. 231; Spurgeon v. Swain, 13 Ind. App. 188

4 See Sec. 150, ante.

5 Bird v. McElvine, 10 Ind. 40; Dull v. Bricker, 76 Pa. 255; Miller v. Neihaus, 51 Ind. 401.

6 Walton v. Mandeville, 56 Iowa, 597. The court in this case did not see the difference between an acceptance and a promise to accept. Contra, Green v. Duncan, 37 S. C. 239. The latter case is right, for an acceptance is not within the statute of frauds; and since it is a promise to perform one's own obligation it is binding without a consideration. See Kelly v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659.

7 See cases cited in preceding notes, and for checks see Sec. 150, ante.

8 Walker v. Lide, 1 Rich. Law, 249; McEwen v. Scott, 49 Vt 376.

9Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 4ia The statement in the opinion is dictum because the want of a writing was fatal.

10 In re Goddard, 66 Vt 415;