1 In a few States it is required that the memorandum of a sale of land shall be signed by the vendor to give it validity against either party. Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213, Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545; Champlin v. Parish, 11 Paige, 405; Frazer v. Ford, 2 Head, 464; Lowber v. Connit, 36 Wis. 176. And if such a memorandum is expressly assented to by the vendee, he is bound as well as the vendor. Gartrell v. Stafford, supra: Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Lee v. Cherry, 85 Tenn. 707; Willes v. Smith, 77 Wis. 81,86. But not otherwise. Bamber v. Savage, 52 Wis. 100.

The signature may be made by an agent; (n) and the agent performance of a contract made by him has been found in the books. It is not disputed, that it is a general principle of courts of equity to interpose only where the remedy is mutual. The plaintiff's counsel principally rely upon a supposed aualogy afforded by cases under the statute of frauds, where the plaintiff may obtain a decree for specific performance of a contract signed by the defendant, although not signed by the plaintiff. It must be admitted that such now is the settled rule of the court, although seriously questioned by Lord Redesdale, upon the ground of want of mutuality. But these cases are supported, first, because the statute of frauds only requires the agreement to be signed by the party to be charged; and next, it is said that the plaintiff, by the act of filing the bill, has made the remedy mutual. Neither of these reasons apply to the case of an infant." In Fenly v. Stewart, 5 Sandf. 101, the principle of the decisions upon this point was thus stated by Mason, J.: "This construction," said he, "has proceeded, not on the ground that contracts need not be mutual, but that the statute, in certain enumerated cases, has taken away the power of enforcing contracts, which would otherwise be mutually binding, unless the parties against whom they are sought to be enforced have subscribed some note or memorandum thereof in writing. If a mutual contract is made, and one of the parties to it gives the other a memorandum in pursuance of the statute, but neglects to take from that other a corresponding memorandum, he has but himself to blame if he is unable to compel its performance, while he is bound to the other party. The difficulty is not, that the contract as originally entered into, is not mutual, but that one of the parties has not the evidence, which the statute has made indispensable to its enforcement. It necessarily follows, how-ever, from the provision of the statute, that all inquiry as to whether or not a contract was originally mutual, is immaterial. It may be enforced against the party who has subscribed a note or memorandum of it, though the other party, by not having signed, is, by the express words of the statute, freed from its obligation." By the New York Revised Statutes, part 2, c. 7, tit. 1, § 8, it is enacted, that " every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing, and be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made." For the construction of this section, see Miller v. Pelletier, 4 Edw. Ch. 102; Coles v. Bowne, 10 Paige, 526; Champlin v. Parish, 11 Paige, 405; National Fire Insurance Co. v. Loomis, 11 Paige, 431; Worrall v. Munn, 1 Seld. 229.

(m) See cases cited in preceding note.

(mm) Webster v. Zielly, 52 Barb. 482. See also Gibson v. Holland, L. R. I C. P. I.

(n) Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502; Hanson v. Rowe, 6 Foster, 327. And where a testator from illness was unable to write, and his signature was made by having his hand guided, this was held a signature. Wilson v. Beddard, 12 Simons, 28. The law, however, will not presume the authority to sign, but the agent must have an authority directly deducible from his employment, or a special authority to do that particular thing. Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502; Dixon v. Broom-field, 2 Chitt. 205; Hodgkins v. Bond, I N. H. 284; Pitts v. Beckett, 13 M. & W. 743. In Graham v. Musson, 5 Bing. N. C. 603, the defendant, the purchaser of goods, requested one Dyson, the agent of the seller, to write a note of the contract in the defendant's book. Dyson did so, and signed the note with his own name. Held, that such note was not sufficient, under the statute of frauds, to bind the defendant. And per Vaughan, J.: "The plaintiffs' case fails in their not showing that Dyson was the defendant's agent; it is unnecessary, therefore, to enter into the authorities which have been cited. Dyson, as agent for the may write his own name instead of his principal's; (o) and a * ratification of the signature would have the same effect as an original authority, (p) But the agency must be an agency for this purpose; for it would not be deemed the signature of a principal by an agent, although the 'party actually writing the name was for some purposes the agent of the other, if it was apparent from the paper itself that it was intended to complete the paper by the actual signature of the principal himself. (q) Nor can one of the contracting parties be the agent of the other for this purpose, (r) Though an auctioneer (s) plaintiffs, and the defendant, in request-ing him to make the entry in his book, probably sought to fix the plaintiffs, but not to appoint Dyson as agent for him-self" And the agent cannot delegate his authority to sign. Blore v. Sutton, 3 Meriv. 237; Henderson v. Barnewall, 1 Young & J. 387.

1 In Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337, it was held that a memorandum made even after breach of the contract was sufficient.

(o) And in such case parol evidence is admissible, to show the authority and bind the principal. Truman v. Loder, 11 A. & £. 589. In this case Lord Denman said: " Parol evidence is always necessary to show that the party sued is the person making the contract, and bound by it. Whether he does so in his own name or in that of another, or in a feigned name, and whether the contract be signed by his own hand or by that of an agent, are inquiries not different in their nature from the question who is the person who has just ordered goods in a shop. If he is sued for the price, and his identity made out, the contract is not varied by appearing to have been made by him in a name not his own." And see Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray, 387.