the buyer a the foot of the entry was held to be a signature by both parties, (g) And a recorded vote of a corporation, founded on a written proposition to them, and in accordance with it, is sufficient (gg)

The fact of the delivery of the instrument, as a promise, would have much weight in determining this question. If one wrote, "In consideration of, etc., I., A. B., promise to C. D. etc," and kept the paper in his own hands without signature, it might be supposed that he delayed signing it because he was not ready to make his promise and bind himself. So, if he gave it to the other party to examine and see if it was acceptable to him, or for any similar purpose, it would not be held to be signed by him. But if he gave the instrument written as above distinctly as his promise, then the signature would be held sufficient Generally, this question could be determined by a construction of the instrument itself, aided however by the res gestae which were admissible as evidence. In some of our States, the word of the statute is not "signed," but "subscribed;" and where this word is used, it is said that the signature must be at the end. (h) One may sign in the place where a witness usually signs, and under that name, and yet intend to sign as principal, and would of course be so regarded; but it has been also held, that if one signs actually as a witness, and with no other intention, yet with a full knowledge of the contents of the paper, and an approbation of them, it would be a sufficient signature to bind the party to the performance of any acts contained in the instrument which were necessarily to be performed by him in order to carry the instrument into effect (i) And where one is in the habit of using instruments with his name printed in them, this will be his signature. (j) And so if *he writes it in pencil; (k) or

{g) Sarl v. Bourdillon, 1 C. 8. (n. s.) 188.

(gg) Johnson v. Trinity" Church, 11 Allen, 123.

(h) Davis v. Shields, 24 Wend. 322, 26 id. 341; Vielie v. Osgood, 8 Barb. 130; James v. Patten, 6 N. Y. 9.

(i) Welford v Beazely, 3 Atk. 503, 1 Ves. 6; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234. But see Gosbell v. Archer, 2 A. & E. 500.

(j) Saunderson v. Jackson, 3 Esp. 180,

2 B. & P. 238. In Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286, it was held, that a bill of parcels in which the name of the vendor was printed, and that of the vendee written by the vendor, was a sufficient memorandum of the contract within the statute of frauds to charge the vendor. And Lord Ellenborough said: "I cannot but think that a construction, which went the length of holding, that in no case a printing or any other form of signature could be substituted in lieu of writing, would be going by initials, where they are confirmed by evidence, (kk) And it is now quite settled, that the agreement need not be signed by both parties, but only by him who is to be charged by it (l)l And he is estopped from denying * the execution a great way, considering how many instances may occur in which the parties contracting are unable to sign. If indeed this case had rested merely on the printed name, unrecognized by, and not brought home to, the party, as having been printed by him, or by his authority, so that the printed name had been unappropriated to the particular contract, it might have afforded some doubt whether it would not be intrenching upon the statute to have admitted it. But here there is a signing by the party to be charged, by words recognizing the printed name as much as if he had subscribed his mark to it, which is strictly the meaning of signing, and by that the party has incorporated and avowed the thing printed to be his; and it is the same in substance as if he had written Norris & Co. with his own hand. He has by his handwriting in effect said,' I acknowledge what I have written to be for the purpose of exhibiting my recognition of the within contract.' I entertained the same opinion at the trial, and cannot say that it has been changed by the argument. It appears to me, therefore, that the printed name thus recognized as a signature is sufficient to take this case out of the statute." Le Blanc, J.; "Suppose the defendant had stamped the bill of parcels with his own name, would not that have been sufficient ? Such a stamping, as it seems to me, if required to be done by the party himself or by his authority, would afford'the same protection as signing."

(k) Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102; 8. c. nom. Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; Draper v. Pattina, 2 Speers, 292; Mc-Dowell v. Chambers. 1 Strobh. Eq. 347; Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 234.

(kk) Sanborn v. Flagher, 9 Allen, 474.

(l) It has been questioned whether the correct interpretation of the statute does not require the signature of both parties. In Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Sch. & L. 13, Lord Redesdale thought, that specific performance of a contract should not be enforced against one party unless the other was bound also. "I confess," said he, " I have no conception that a court of equity ought to decree a specific performance in a case where nothing has been done in pursuance of the agreement, except where both parties had by the agreement a right to compel a specific performance, according to the advantage which it might be supposed that they were to derive from it; because otherwise it would follow, that the court would decree a specific performance where the party called upon to perform might he in this situation, that if the agreement was disadvantageous to him he would be liable to the performance, and yet if advantageous to him he could not compel a performance. This is not equity, as it seems to me. If indeed there was a concealment, or an ignorance of the facts, on the one part,and that thereby the other party was led into a situation from whence he could not be extricated, then he would have a right to have the agreement executed cy pres; that is, a new agreement is to be made between the parties." And see note to Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & G. 462. But it is now well settled, that the signature of the party charged in the action satisfies the requirement of the statute. Hatton v. Gray, 2 Ch. Cas. 164; Colman v. Upcott, Vin. Abr. tit. Contract and Agreement (I), pl. 17; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; Fowle v. Freeman, 9 id. 351; Martin v. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & W. 426; Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. 735; Egerton v. Mathews, 6 East, 307; Allen v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169; Schneider c. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286; Ballard ». Walker, 3 Johns. Cas. 60; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; McCrea v. Pur-mort, 16 Wend. 460; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452; Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87; Douglass v. Spears, 2 Nott & M'C. 207; Barstow v. Gray, 3 Greenl. 409; Cavanaugh v. Casselman, 88 Cal. 543; Cunningham v. Williams, 43 Mo. App. 629. But see contra, Wilkinson v. Heaveu. rich, 58 Mich. 574. In Flight v. Holland, 4 Russ. 298, where a bill was filed by an infant for the specific performance of a contract, Sir John Leach said . "No case of a bill filed by an infant for the specific of the instrument on the ground that it wants the signature of the other party, (m) The note in writing need not be made at the time of making the agreement, it being sufficient if made before the contract was to be carried into effect (mm)1