Considerations may be of the past, of the present, or of the future. When the consideration and the promise founded upon it are simultaneous, then the consideration is of the present time; the whole agreement is completed at once, and the consideration and the promise are concurrent. When the consideration is to do a thing hereafter, it is of the future, and is said to be executory; when the promise to do this is accepted, and a promise in return founded upon it, this latter promise rests on a sufficient foundation, and is obligatory. When the consideration is wholly past, it is said to be executed; and in relation to considerations of this kind many nice questions have arisen.

It may be stated, as the general rule, that a past or executed * consideration is not sufficient to sustain a promise founded upon it, unless there was a request for the consideration previous to its being done or made. This request should be alleged, in a declaration which sets forth an executed consideration, as that on which the promise is founded that is sought to be enforced. Without such previous request a subsequent promise has no force; because the consideration being entirely completed and exhausted, it cannot be considered that it would not have been made or given, but for a promise which is subsequent and independent. A familiar illustration is afforded by the case of a guarantor. If one lends money to another, and at a subsequent time a third party, who did not request the loan, and is not benefited by it, promises to see that it is repaid, such promise is void, because no consideration passes from the promisee to the promisor. But if the promisor requests the loan, or if his promise is made previous to the loan, or at the same time, then it will be supposed that the loan is made because of the promise. It will also be supposed, that the promisor is benefited by the loan because he requests it, or, at least, that the lender parts with his money in consequence of the promise, and this is a detriment to him, at the instance of the promisor, which is equally good by way of a consideration.

But this previous request need not always be express or proved, because it is often implied. As, in the first place, where one accepts or retains the beneficial result of such voluntary service. Here, the law generally implies Loth a previous request and a subsequent promise of repayment. No one can compel another to accept a gratuitous and unrequested service; no one can make himself the creditor of another, without his consent, or against his will. But if that other chooses to accept such service or, the service being rendered voluntarily, chooses to retain all the benefit thereof to himself, this puts the service on the same footing, in the law, as one rendered at request, and for which a promise is made. The cases where goods are supplied to an infant, and the father is held responsible, often fall within this rule. (a) And, in the second place, where one is compelled to do for another what that other should do, and was compellable to do. Here also the law implies, not only a previous request that the thing should be done, but also a promise to compensate for the doing of it. (b) As where one is surety for another,

(a) Thus, in Law v. Wilkin, 6 A. & E. 718, which was an action against a father for goods supplied to his minor son, who was away at school. The only evidence to charge the father was, that the boy, when he went home for the holidays, took the clothes with him, but was not wearing them; and that he returned to school with them. Coleridge, J., said: " The defendant's son was sent to school in want of clothes. When they were supplied, and he went home with them, we are not to assume that he concealed them. My brother Storks admits that, if the father had seen them, an implied authority would be shown." So in the Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson, 5 Man. & G. 192, Tindal, C. J., said, that if persons receive a benefit from a contract on which they would not be originally bound, this would bind them, and render them liable for the fulfilment of the contract. Doe v. Taniere, 13 Jur. 119. So where one built a school-house, under a contract with persons assuming to act as a district committee, but who had in fact no authority, yet a district school was afterwards kept in it by direction of the authorized school agent, this was held to be an acceptance of the house by the district, and they were held liable to pay the reasonable value of the building. Abbot v. Hermon, 7 Greenl. (Bennett's ed.) 118, n. See also Roberts v. Marston, 20 Me. 275; Hayden v. Madison, 7 Greenl. 76; Weston v, Davis, 24 Me. 374; Hatch v. Purcell, 1 Foster (N. H.), 544; Newell v. Hill, 2 Met. 180. So if a conveyance of an interest in land be made in the common form of a quit-claim deed, containing this stipulation, " provided said grantee shall pay said grantor or his assigns, twenty-two dollars annually from this date on demand," until the happening of a certain event; and the grantee holds under the deed, but fails to make the annual payments when demanded, the grantor may sustain an action of assumpsit against the grantee, to recover the money. Huff v. Nickerson,27 Me. 106. - But if one build a house for his own convenience on the land of another, by his permission, there is no implied agreement on the part of the owner of the land to pay the value of such house. Wells v. Banister, 4 Mass. 514. Neither can a school district be held liable for unauthorized repairs upon their school-house, from the fact that they afterwards used the house; for this acceptance and holding of the repairs cannot be considered as voluntary, because the house could not well be used without making use of the repairs. Davis v. Bradford, 24 Me. 349. - So the law will not imply a promise on the part of a pauper to pay from his estate moneys expended by the town of his settlement for his support. Charlestown v. Hubbard, 9 N. H. 195; Deer Isle v. Eaton, 12 Mass. 328.