It is quite certain, that the lender, whether banker or broker, may charge, in addition to the discount, a reasonable sum permitted to discount them; in which cases the interest is always deducted from the money advanced, it certainly has been determined, that such a transaction on a bill of exchange, in the way of trade, for the accommodation of the party desirous of raising money, is not usurious, though more than five per cent. be taken upon the money actually advanced. In such cases the additional sum seems to have been considered in the nature of a compensation for the trouble to which the lender is exposed; and unless that indulgence were allowed, it might not be worth while for any merchant to discount a bill. If, therefore, nothing more has been done in this case than what always has been done by way of accommodation among merchants, the transaction was not usurious; but the rule must be confined strictly to that sort of transaction; for if discount be taken upon an advance of money without the negotiation of a bill of exchange, it will amount to usury, as appears clearly from the cases which were cited in the argument. We must, therefore, consider what was the real transaction between the parties." In Lloyd qui tarn v. Williams, 2 W. Bl. 792, where Hinchliffe borrowed £100 of the defendant, and immediately paid him thereout £6 5*. advanced interest, and gave his note for £100 payable in three months, De Grey, C. J., and Blackstone, J.," inclined to think that the offence was consummated and completely committed on making the cor rupt agreement, and receiving the interest by advance; and that it was not to be considered as merely a loan of £93 15s. The statute 12 Anne is express, that it is usury to take above five per cent. for the forbearing or giving day of payment, which plainly has respect to a taking of the interest or forbearance, before the principal sum is due. And Blackstone conceived, that interest may as lawfully be received beforehand, for forbearing, as, after the term is expired, for having forborne. And it shall not be reckoned as merely a loan of the balance. For, if upon discounting a £100 note at five per cent., he should be construed to lend only £95, then, at the end of the time, he would receive £5 interest for the loan of £95 principal, which is above the legal rate." In Floyer v. Edwards, Cowp. 116, Lord Mansfield said, in reference to the general practice of trade to stipulate for a certain per cent. upon a neglect to pay the price of goods bought: "it is true the use of this practice will avail nothing, if meant as an evasion of the statute, for usage certainly will not protect usury. But it goes a great way to explain a transaction; and in this case is strong evidence to show that there was no intention to cover a loan of money. Upon a nice calculation, it will be found, that the practice of the banks, in discounting bills, exceeds the rate of five per cent.; for they take interest upon the whole sum for the whole time the bills run, but pay only part of the money, namely, by deducting the interest first; yet this is not usury. In Maine Bank v. Butts, 9 Mass. 54. referred to above, in which it was decided that banks had no more right than individuals to receive more than six per cent. legal interest, and that the "banking privileges," given by the legislature, did not confer such a power, the court said: "That expression, if it has any peculiar meaning, is an authority to deduct the interest at the commencement of loans, or to make loans upon discounts, instead of the ordinary forms of security for an accruing interest. But individuals have a like authority, although in both cases the construction is a relaxation of the prohibitions of the statute against usury, and allows a rate of interest, which may be estimated at a small extent beyond six per cent. per annum. Banks, in their discounts never venture to exceed that rate in the deductions which they make from their loans, although this anticipation of interest in effect gives more than the fixed rate upon the sum actually paid out." In Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 354, the court say upon this question: "The next point arising on the record is, whether the discount token in this case

* for his trouble or services, (c) And this principle is not confined to bankers and brokers, but is extended to all cases in which there may be such services as are fairly entitled to compensation, although the lender be neither banker nor broker, nor engaged in trade, and lends his own money, (d)1 was usurious. It is not pretended, that interest was deducted for a greater length of time than the note had to run, or for more than at the rate of six per cent. per annum on the sum due by the note. The sole objection is, the deduction of the interest from the amount of the note at the time it was discounted; and this, it is said, gives the bank at the rate of more than six per cent. upon the sum actually carried to the credit of the Planters Bank. If a transaction of this sort is to be deemed usurious, the same principle must apply with equal force to bank discounts generally, for the practice is believed to be universal, and probably few if any charters contain an express provision, author-izing in terms the deduction of the inter* est in advance, upon making loans or discounts. It has always been supposed that an authority to discount, or to make discounts, did, from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in advance. And this is not only the settled opinion among professional and commercial men, but stands approved by the soundest principles of legal construction. Indeed we do not know in what other sense the word discount is to be interpreted. Even in England, where no statute authorizes bankers to make discounts, it has been solemnly adjudged that the taking of interest in advance, by bankers upon loans, in the ordinary course of business, is not usurious." See also, to the same effect as the foregoing cases, Manhattan Co. v Osgood, 15 Johns. 162; Bank of Utica p. Phillips, 3 Wend 408; Utica Ins Co. v. Bloodgood, 4 Wend. 652; Bank of Utica p. Wager, 2 Cowen, 712, Stribling v. Bank of the Valley, 5 Rand. 132; Thornton v. Bank of Washington, 3 Pet. 36; State Bank v. Hunter, 1 Dev. 100; Cole v. Lock-hart, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 631; McGill v. Ware, 4 Scam. 21; Ticonic Bank v. Johnson, 31 Me. 414; Sessions v. Richmond, 1 R. L 305; Haas v Flint, 8 Blackf. 67; Duncan v. Maryland Savings Institution, 10 Gill & J. 311. See also Hovt v. Bridge-water Co. 2 Halst. Ch, 253, 625.