1 Paddleford v. Thacher, 48 Vt. 574.

(y) Pinners case, 6 Rep. 117; Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 288; Smith v. Brown, 8 Hawks, 680.

(z) As if the debtor give his own negotiable note for part of the debt. Sibree v. Tripp, 16 M. ft W. 23, where the cases of Cumber v. Wane, I Stra. 426, and Thomas v. Heathorn, 2 B. & C. 477, are somewhat shaken. Or if the debtor pay a part at a more convenient place than stipulated for in the contract, this will be a good satisfaction for the whole, if so received. Smith v. Brown, 3 Hawks, 680. So if the debtor give and the creditor receive a chattel, in satisfaction of a whole debt, this is a good defence, although the chattel may not be of half the value of the debt. Andrew v. Boughey, Dyer, 76, a; Pinnel's case, 6 Rep. 117; and see Sibree v. Tripp, 16 M. & W. 35, Parke, B.; Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 285, 286, Dewey, J.; Jones v. Bullitt, 2 Litt 49; Douglass v. White, 3 Barb. Ch. 621. So if the debtor render certain services, by consent of the creditor, in full payment of a debt, this is a good discharge, whatever the nature of the services. Blinn v. Chester, 6 Day, 860. Or assign certain property. Watkinson v. Inglesby, 6 Johns. 386; Eaton v. Lincoln, 13 Mass. 424.

(a) Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283; Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76; Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; Le Page v. McCrea, I Wend. 164; Sanders v. Branch Bank, 13 Ala. 363; Lewis v. Jones, 4 B. ft C. 606; Steinman v. Magnus, 11 East, 390.

(b) Ingraham v. Hall, 11 S. & R 78; Smith v. Jones, 16 Johns. 229; Farrington v. Payne, id. 432; Willard v. Sperry, 16 Johns. 121; Phillips v. Berick, id. 136. So assigning a part of his claim will not enable a creditor to subject his debtor to two suits. Ingraham v. Hall, 11 S. ft R. 78; Cook v. The Genesee Mut. Ins. Co. 8 How. Pr Rep. 514; Field v. The Mayor, etc. of New York, 2 Seld. 170; Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282. Nor can a creditor, after having compelled payment of a part of his claim by process of law, avail himself of the residue by way of set-off in an action against him by the other party. Miller v. Covert, 1 Wend. 487. And the same rule applies to torts. If a person by one and the same act convert several of the plaintiff's articles, he cannot have a separate action for each article. Farrington v. Payne, 16 Johns. 432. But the general rule stated in the text must be confined to cases where the claim is single and indivisible. Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johns. 136.

1 So where the debtor pays the coats and expenses of an action brought to recover a liquidated debt in addition to a part payment of the same. Mitchell v. Wheaton, 46 Conn. 816.

the responsibility of the solvency of the bank would seem from some cases to rest upon the payee. (i) But if the debtor knew of the insolvency, and did not disclose it, or if he might have known it, and his ignorance was the result of his negligence, he certainly is not discharged by such payment. (j) And the majority of our cases appear to take the ground, that where bills of a bank that has failed are paid and received in ignorance of such failure, the loss falls on the party paying; putting such bills on the same footing as forged bills, and as equally a nullity. (k) But if such a rule were adopted, it would undoubtedly * be so far qualified, that where both parties were entirely and equally ignorant, and the creditors by receiving and retaining the bills without notice, deprived the debtor of any remedy or indemnity he might have, the debtor was then discharged. (l) son, 4 Gill & J. 468 See also ante, vol. i. p. *264. But such forged notes (and the same applies to forged coin) must be returned by the receiver in a reasonable time, or he must bear the loss. Pindall v. The Northwestern Bank, 7 Leigh, 617; Sims v. Clarke, 11 Ill. 187. But payment made to a bank, bond fide, in its own notes, which are received as genuine, but afterwards ascertained to be forged, is good, and the bank must bear the loss. See ante, vol. i. p. * 264. This seems to be on the ground that the bank; or its officers, having superior means of determining the genuineness of their own bills, are guilty of negligence in receiving them without examination. But payment to a bank by its own notes, which have been stolen from such bank, is no payment. State Bank v. Welles, 3 Pick. 394.

(i) Lowrey v. Murrell, 2 Port. 280; Bayard v. Shank, 1 Watts & S. 92; Scruggs v. Gass, 8 Yerg. 176. Perhaps these cases rest upon the ground that the identical bills given and received were received as payment, per se, whether they were good or bad. Possibly, also, there may be a difference between bills received in payment of an antecedent debt and bills passed in payment at the time of a purchase. In the latter case, perhaps, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to the receiver of the bills, as well as to the purchaser of the goods. Sed quaere.

(j) See Commonwealth v. Stone, 4 Met 43.

(k) Wainwright v. Webster, 11 Vt. 576; Oilman v. Peck, id. 516; Fogg v. Sawyer, 9 N. H. 365; Frontier Bank v.

Morse, 22 Me. 88; Lightbody v. Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 1,13 Wend. 101; Houghton v. Adams, 18 Barb. 545. See also ante, vol. i. p. *264. In Timmins v. Gibbins, 18 Q. B. 722, 14 Eng. L. & Eq 64, M. W. deposited certain country banknotes, payable in London, representing £80 in value, with a banking company, and received the following memorandum, signed by the manager: "Received of M. W. £80, for which we are accountable, £80, at three per cent, interest, with fourteen days' notice." The notes were sent on the same evening by post to the London agents of the banking company, and were presented on the next day, and refused payment. They were transmitted by that night's post to the banking company, who on the following day gave notice of dishonor to M. W., and tendered to him the notes, which he refused. It turned out that the bank which had issued the notes had stopped payment upon the day when M. W. made the deposit with the banking company, but that neither M. W. nor the company were then aware of this. It was held, that under the above circumstances M. W. could not maintain an action, either for money lent, or for money had and received, against the banking company.

(l) Thus, where a banking company paid notes, on which the name of the president had been forged, and neglected for fifteen days to return them, it was held, that they had lost their remedy against the person from whom the notes had been received. Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 38.