(l) Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met 352. This was an action of trover for a watch, and was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts The plaintiff having lost his watch, advertised it in a newspaper, offering a reward of twenty dollars to whoever would return it to the office of the paper, and signed the adver. tisement A minor son of the defendant found the watch a few days after the advertisement and delivered it to the defendant, who took the custody of it for his son, and left it with the newspaper printer, with directions to deliver it to the owner on his paying the $ 20 reward The plaintiff was absent from home at the time, but on his return refused to pay the $20, and the defendant resumed possession of the watch While thus homing it, the plaintiff demanded it of him. but he refused to deliver it up, unless the twenty dollars were paid for his son The plaintiff refused to pay twenty, but offered to pay ten dollars, which offer the defendant rejected, and this action was then brought by the plaintiff The court held, that an offer of an express reward, either to a particular person, or, in general terms, by a loser of property, to stimulate the vigilance and industry of others to find and restore it. and a return of the property in consequence of such offer, constituted a valid contract If, before the offer is retracted, one so far complies with it as to perform the labor for which the reward is stipulated, it is the ordinary case of labor done on request, and becomes a contract to pay the stipulated compensation. Upon the ground that the acts of performance by the finder in returning the property, and of the loser in paying the reward, so far as appeared from the advertisement, must be taken to be simultaneous, the court considered that the law would im ply a lien from the presumed intention of the parties, arising from the relation in which they stood; and therefore a refusal of the father to deliver up the watch without the payment of the reward in behalf of himself and his son, was not a conversion. Wilson v, Guy ton, 8 Gil], 213. Wood v Pierson, 45 Mich 313; Everman v. Hyman, 3 Ind. App 459

(m) For the distinction between usage and custom, see ante, vol ii. p. * 543

(n) Leuckhart v. Cooper, 2 Hodg. 150, 3 Bing N C. 99

1 But a finder may recover in an action for expenses incurred in the preservation of lost property. Chase v Corcoran, 106 Mass 286.

2 In some States a finder is given by statute a lien for services and expenses. See Jones on Liens, § 497.

* Liens created by statute are usually, in furtherance of the common-law principles, based upon justice and public convenience, and are generally designed to cover cases where the possession is not with the consent of the owner of the property, or where exclusive possession is impossible. Such are the liens of log-drivers, mechanics, builders of houses, ship-builders, and material-men, for supplies or repairs to domestic vessels, of mutual insurance companies, judgment liens, and the like.

Liens by express contract are created sometimes by placing

(o) Naylor v. Mangles, 1 Esp. 109.

(p) Spear v. Hartley, 3 Esp. 81.

(q) Kirk man v Shawcross, 6 T. R. 24.

(r) Domain bray v. Metcalf, 2 Vern 691, Prec in Ch 419.

(s) Ex parte Douglas, 3 Dea & Chit 310, where a security for an annuity was deposited by a party with his bankers, one of whom drew the dividends and placed them to his credit After the death of the party, who died intestate in 1801, the same partner continued to draw the dividends and pay them to the widow of the deceased The banking firm went into bankruptcy in 1810; but the dividends were still drawn by the partner, and paid to the widow up to 1822, when the partner died After this, the assignees of the bankers claimed a lien upon the security, for a debt due from the intestate to the banking-house. But it was held, that, after so long an abandonment of the lien, they could not then support it property in the hands of another for the execution of some particular purpose upon it, with an express agreement between the bailor and the bailee, that it shall be considered as a pledge for the labor or expense which the execution of the purpose may occasion. They are also created by the delivery of chattels in pawn for safe custody, the sole purpose being security for a loan made to the owner on the credit of them, or by their delivery in pledge as security for an existing debt owed by the owner to the bailee. The subject of pledge is treated in the chapter on Bailment

Though a particular lien may be acquired by possession received from an agent of the owner, yet no general lien is thus acquired for the agent's own debt, the bailee knowing the agency. The rule of law is, that general liens are not to affect the rights of third parties, not claiming under those from whom the lien is derived Hence a carrier of goods, holding a particular lien on them for freight to be paid by the consignor, cannot retain them from the consignee for a general balance due by the consignor, (t) Nor can a general lien prevail against a prior common-law right; as that of a carrier for a general balance due by the consignee, against the right of stoppage in transitu by the consignor. If the latter discharge the particular lien for carriage, he may have the goods, (u)

* No lien can be acquired by any fraudulent act; as by paying freight and charges upon property belonging to another, for the purpose of getting wrongful possession of it; nor by acquiring possession of property wrongfully, and expending money or labor upon it, nor, generally, by the voluntary and unauthorized act of the party claiming the lien.1 Nor is any lien acquired where the party has entered into a special agreement which shows that he relied solely upon the personal credit of the bailor.

(t) Richardson v. Goes, 3 B & P. 419, supra.

(u) Oppenheira v. Russell, 3 B & P. 42. The plaintiff had sold goods to his customer, and had forwarded them by the defendant, a common carrier. The customer having failed before the goods came to his possession, the plaintiff claimed them of the carrier by virtue of his right of stoppage in transitu, tendering the latter the price of the carriage of the goods, and offering to indemnify him. The carrier refused to give up the goods unless the amount of his general balance against the insolvent, as well as the special freight on these goods, was paid. The plaintiff sued in trover for the wrongful conversion, and the carrier sought to defend by introducing evidence of usage for carriers to detain for their general balance. The court refused to receive the evidence, and, upon .the hear ing as to the admissibility of such evidence, the full Bench decided unanimously against it. By Alvanley, C. J., " Then the single question in this case is, whether a stipulation between the consignees and carriers on the Western Road, that the latter shall retain as against the former, for their general balance, can take away the common-law right which is now firmly established, namely, that, till goods have reached either the actual or constructive possession of the consignee, the property in them may, on certain events, revert hack to the person by whom they were delivered into the hands of the carrier! The carrier's claim here is in contravention of that right; for there is no third person to whom any right is derived from the consignor." - And see cases supra.