(d) Ex parte Wiggin, Mass. 1 Bank. Reg, 90.

The statute also provides that, if three-fourths of the creditors desire it, the estate may be wound up and settled, and distribution made by trustees, (j)1

The statute says " any person residing " etc., may be made bankrupt There must, of course, be some exceptions to this rule. One wholly and always a lunatic cannot become an insolvent, either on his own application or that of a creditor. But if one who incurs debts, and is unable to pay them, becomes a lunatic, process may now issue, and the usual proceedings be had for the benefit of the creditors, (jj)

(e) Ex parte Magie, South. IX New York, I Bank. Reg. 138.

(f) Ex parte Little, Sooth. D. New York, 2 Bank. Reg. 97.

(q) Ex parte Prankard, South. D. New York, 1 Bank. Reg. 51.

(h) Ex parte Bailly, South. D. New York, 1 Bank. Reg. 177.

(i) Ex parte Perry, North. D. New York, 1 Bank. Reg. 2.

(j) Section 43. (jj) It seems to be well nettled, that a lunatic, while in an insane condition, cannot bind himself by contract, unless the contract be for necessaries. Gore v. Gib-won, 13 M. & W. 627; Neil! v. Morlej, 0 Ves. 478; McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569; Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired. 106; Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C.

170, and the cases cited in them; or where a contract is made with him, under such circumstances that the other party did not know his.lunacy, and took no advantage, and the contract is so far executed as to render it impossible to restore the parties to their original condition. Molton v. Camroux, 4 Exch 17. And see Jackson v. King, 4 Cowen, 207; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33; Stock on Lunacy, p. 38; Browning v. Reane, 2 Phillim. Doc. Com. 69; Ex parte Clarke, 2 Russ. 575; Turner v. Meyers, 1 Hagg Consist 414; Capper v. Dando, 2 A. & £. 458; Sander v. Sander, 2 Collyer, 276; Countess of Portsmouth v. Earl of Portsmouth, 1 Hagg. Eccl. 355; Weaver v. Ward, Hobart, 134; Stephens v. De Medina, 4 Q. B. 422; Biffin v. Yorke, 6

1 An attachment of a debtor's property within four months of bankruptcy proceedings is dissolved by his conveyance of his estate to trustees equally as when conveyed to an assignee in bankruptcy. Moors o. Albro, 129 Mass. 9; Weybosset Bank v. Borden City Mills, U. S. Dist. B. I, May term, 1879; In re Williams', 2 Bankr. Reg. 229. - K.

As all the acts of an infant, in the way of trading, are voidable by him, it follows that a decree declaring him to be a * bankrupt, would be void.(jk)1 But it has been held, that if he had held himself out as of full age, and had traded as such, he might be decreed a bankrupt (l)

If a married woman act, lawfully, as sole, incur debts, give notes, or carry on trade in a way or on grounds to relieve the husband from liability, there seems no reason, and no rule of law, which would prevent her from being proceeded against, or from proceeding, as an insolvent (m)2

Scott, N. R. 233, Woods v. Reed, 2 M. & W. 784; Groom v. Thomas, 2 Hagg. Eccl. 436. We are aware of no case in which it has been sought to charge a lunatic in bankruptcy for such debts. In Layton, ex parte, 6 Ves. 434, Lord Eldon said, making no distinction in the cases, that where one partner is a lunatic, there cannot be a joint commission against the others, but separate commissions must be issued. In this case, however, it does not appear that the debts were contracted by the lunatic partner while compos mentis. It cannot, therefore, be considered an authority against the doctrine of the text. And in Anonymous, 13 Ves. 590, the same Lord Chancellor held, that when the bankrupt had become lunatic, and no affidavit yet provided in support of the petition, a commission of lunacy will not protect the lunatic against an action; and a commission of bankruptcy is a species of action against which the lunacy cannot be a defence. Barnesley v. Powell, Ambl. 102.

(jk) Barwis, ex parte, 6 Ves. 601; Barrow, ex parte, 34 id. 554; Henderson, ex parte, id 163; Ex parte Adam, 1 Ves. & R 494; Stevens v. Jackson, 4 Camp. 164, 6 Taunt. 106; Ex parte Moule, 14 Ves. 603; O'Brien v. Currie, 3 C. & P. 283; Belton v. Hodges, 9 Bing. 366; Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 826; Mason v. Denison, 15 Wend. 64; Ex parte Syde-botham, 1 Atk. 146. " No man can be a bankrupt for debts which he is not obliged to pay. Per Lord Holt, Rex v. Cole, 1 Ld. Raym. 443. Whether an infant may be declared an insolvent on his petition, was doubted, in the matter of Cotton, 6 Law Reporter, 546. Yet we see not why he may not adopt that method of ratifying his obligation as well as any other. The opinion of the court is stated absolutely, and without reasons given It may be that it went on the ground of the invalidity of infants' contracts, or the duty of the court to pronounce them void or binding, according as they were for his benefit. But at this day it is clear that no debts of an infant are void, but simply voidable at his election. See notes and authorities on this subject in the chapter on Infants, and especially the discriminating remarks of Bell, J., on the vague and indefinite use of the words void and voidable, in State v. Richmond, 6 Foster, 232.

(l) Ex parte Watson, 16 Ves. 265; Ex parte Bates, 2 Mont., D. & D. 337.

(m) La Vie v. Philips, 1 W. Bl. 570; Ex parte Carrington, 1 Atk. 206. So the wives of convicts may be deemed bankrupts, and on a similar principle. Ex parte Franks, 7 Bing. 762. In Megrath v. Robertson, 1 Desaus. 445, it was held that a wife may become a sole trader by permission of her husband, even without deeds, and she becomes entitled to all her earnings as her separate estate. King v. Paddock, 18 Johns. 141; Baker v. Barney, 8 id. 72. See also Ex parte How-land, N. D. New York, 2 Bank. Reg 114. The cases are numerous, where it has been held, partly under statute law and partly by decisions of the courts, that a married woman may become trader, and, under certain circumstances, be liable and entitled to the same process as if sole. They will be found collected in the notes to page of the first volume of this work.

1 As an infant cannot be the subject of voluntary or involuntary proceedings, he cannot after his majority ratify a bankruptcy adjudication made during his minority. In re Derby. 8 Bankr. Reg. 106. - K.

2 In re Collins, 3 Bissell, 415. But only where the law of her domicil allows her to contract. In re Goodman, 8 Bankr Reg 380. - K.