This depends on the laws in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one Party and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the contract indicate, accord-ing to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other the right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any law which in its operation amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution." And, again, pp. 613,614: " The obligation of the contract between the parties in this case, was to perform the promises and undertakings contained therein; the right of the plaintiff was to damages for the breach thereof, to bring suit and obtain a judgment, to take out and prosecute an execution against the defendant, till the judgment was satisfied, pursuant to the existing laws of Illinois. These laws, giving these rights, were as perfectly binding on the defendant, and as much a part of the contract, as if they had been set forth in its stipulations in the very words of the law relating to judgments and executions. If the defendant has made such an agreement as to authorize a sale of his property which should be levied on by the sheriff, for such price as should be bid for it at a fair public sale on reasonable notice, it would have conferred a right on the plaintiff, which the Constitution made inviolable; and it can make no difference whether such right is conferred by the terms or law of the contract. Any subsequent law which denies, obstructs, or impairs this right, by superadding a condition that there shall be no sale for any sum less than the value of the property levied on, to be ascertained by appraisement, or any other mode of valuation than a public sale, affects the obligation of the contract, as much in the one case as the others; for it can be enforced only by a sale of the defendant's property, and the prevention of such sale is the" denial of a right. The same power in a State legislature may be carried to any extent, if it exists at all; it may prohibit a sale for less than the whole appraised value, or for three-fourths, or nine-tenths, as well as for two-thirds; for if the power can be exercised to any extent, its exercise must be a matter of uncontrollable discretion, in passing laws relating to the remedy, which are regardless of the effect on the right of the plaintiff. These cases have been the subject of much comment in the State courts." See cases cited in the next note.

(i) It has lately been held in New York (overruling Quackenbush v. Danka, 1 Denio, 128, 3 id. 594, 1 Comst. 129). that a law exempting property of the debtor from execution, which was liable to execution when the debt was contracted, merely modifies the remedy for enforcing contracts, and does not destroy or substantially modify its efficiency, and is therefore constitutional. Morse v. Gould, 1 Kern 281. So it is held in Michigan, that property may be exempted from execution for debts contracted before the law of exemption was enacted. Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Doug. 197. See Bronson v. Newberry, 2 id. 38; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 Watts & S. 218; Bumgardner v. The Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Tarpley c. Hamer, 9 Smedes & M. 310.

1 A constitution or law which increases the amount of property exempted over the amount previously exempted is, to debts contracted before the increased exemption, unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts. Gunn c. Barry, 15 Wall. 610; Jones v. Brandon, 48 Ga. 593. An act of Congress, approved March 3,1873, exempted the amount allowed by State exemption laws in 1871, and declared such exemption to be valid as against debts contracted before as well as after the passage of such laws. Re Smith, 2 woods, 458, decided that this act was uniform and constitutional. But see Re Deckert, 2 Hughes, 183. - K.

2 Any alteration in a remedy for enforcing a contract, which neither withholds a remedy nor seriously impairs the value of the right, does not impair its obligation, difference between a debt existing before, and one contracted after the law is made. There may be a difference as to the pro-priety or expediency of the law, but none as to the right of the State to pass the law; for this right is perfect, except so far as it is controlled by this clause in the Constitution And on this ground it has been held (before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment), that nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevented a State from passing a valid law to divest rights which had been vested by law in an individual, because this was not a contract (j) And it has been decided in Connecticut, that a State law making valid a void contract, does not impair the obligation of a contract within the intent of the Constitution of the United States, (k).

* Most of our State insolvent laws were in the nature, or used the language, of a cessio bonorum, leaving the debt still existing; some, however, discharged it altogether. And perhaps it may be gathered from the adjudications as to these statutes that an insolvent law of a State, which discharges the debt, is valid only as it refers to contracts made after the law was passed; and that, if an insolvent law makes no distinction in this respect, it would be construed as intended only to apply to subsequent debts, and therefore as valid; but, if it purports expressly to discharge existing and antecedent debts, it is for this reason void, and of no effect whatever. (l) And if it does not discharge the debt, but only exempts the person from imprisonment, if he surrenders all his property for all his debts, this is valid, because it affects only the remedy; and it would seem to be valid equally whether it applies to all existing debts or only to subsequent debts, (m) On the other hand, if it not only exempts the person from imprisonment, but also the property from attachment on mesne process and on execution, as by what are termed "stay -laws, "(mm) this would be held void as against the Constitution, because it impaired the obligation of the contract But, as we have already intimated, we say this on authority, without undertaking either to maintain or to define this distinction, on reason or on principle, any further than to remark, that a doctrine which would go far to reconcile the cases, and which might have a practical value, though not much logical precision, would be this: legislation on the remedies of prior contracts would be constitutional, provided its modification of these remedies still leaves substantial and efficient means of enforcing them. This doctrine we consider to be substantially the doctrine of a number of authoritative cases, (n)