(e) St urges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 id. 213; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. I. Contra, Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 313.

(f) There seems to be no distinction between a bankrupt and an insolvent law, so far as the interpretation of this provision of the Constitution is concerned. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

But, on the one hand, our several States are distinct and independent sovereignties, and in some respects foreign to each other. Yet, on the other, the intercourse between the citizens of the several States, and the intimacy of their social and business relations, is as close and constant as between fellow-citizens of the same government or the same city. From this circumstance there arises one very great difficulty in regard to the operation of State insolvent laws; and this is much increased when it is complicated with those which spring from the application of this' prohibitory clause of the Constitution. And such has been the singular character of the adjudication upon this subject, - the same courts presenting, in different cases, very different views of the same question; few of them of leading importance being decided with unanimity; and in some instances, different judges being led to identical conclusions by reasons which seem to be antagonistic, - that we * are hardly prepared to say that any one of these questions is as yet finally and positively settled. While a national bankrupt law remains in force, these questions can hardly become practical. But they may again become so.

The distinction is taken between the obligation and the remedy, both in the courts of the United States, and in those of the States. But, as we have remarked in the preceding chapter, in which this topic has been somewhat considered, we can hardly say what it means. If applied only to imprisonment of the person, there is at least no difficulty in understanding it; and then we begin with saying that a State may pass a valid act lessening or abolishing imprisonment for a debt contracted before the act;(g)1 and from this we may go on to sustain an insolvent law, which provides that there shall be no arrest of the person (for, if no imprisonment, it would be absurd to arrest) for any debt of one who comes under the protection of the law. This would suggest, as the next question, whether everything of process as well as imprisonment, comes under the head of rem-edy, and not of obligation. It is not easy to draw, on principle, a distinct and unquestionable line here. Imprisonment is the last and most effectual remedy; but it is only the last of many successive steps, which are linked together in unbroken series. The first step may be arrest of the person, or attachment of the goods, or only the summons or a command to pay the debt, like the old original writ Whatever it may be, it is not easy to see why it is not of the same nature, and under the same category, as the last step to which it leads. In other words, is not all resort to law used for the purpose of obtaining the remedies of the law; and are not civil processes parts of these remedies, differing only as they belong to different stages of the process, and to different degrees in the recusancy of the debtor ? If so, every State has perfect power over all its processes; and, therefore, it may provide, as to any debt, that no process shall ever after issue, by which anything of compulsion shall be exerted upon the debtor, and it shall be left entirely to his own discretion and pleasure as to * the payment of the debt; and this law is protected by this view of the Constitution of the United States, because it does not impair the obligation of that debt It is at least equally difficult to deny, that the courts have made, and perhaps established, this distinction between the remedy and the obligation, or to avoid these conclusions as logical if not legal. But a distinction is taken here, and on so much authority, that it may be regarded as established. It is, that while exemption from arrest, or from imprisonment, affects only remedy, an exemption of the property from attachment, or a subjection of it to a stay-law, or appraisement law, impairs the obligation of the contract And such a statute can be enforced only as to contracts made subsequently to the law. (h) At the same time, * however, l A State statute abolishing imprisonment for debt does not, within the meaning of the Constitution, impair the obligation of contracts which were entered into before its enactment. Penniman's case, 103 U. S. 714; Ware v. Miller, 9 S. C. 13. - K.

Marshall, C. J.: "The difficulty of discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent and bankrupt laws, should lead to the opinion that a bankrupt law may contain those regulations which are generally found in insolvent laws; and that an insolvent law may contain those which are common to a bankrupt law." Both of these subjects have been considered in the preceding chapter.

(g) Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Mason v. Hailie, 12 id. 370; Beers v. Horton, 9 Pet. 359; Gray v. Munroe, 1 McLean, 528; Starr v. Robinson, 1 D. Chip. 257; Fisher v. Lacky, 6 Blackf. 373; Woodfin v. Hooper, 4 Humph. 13; Bronson v. Newbury, 2 Doug. 38.

(h) There has of late been a tendency, in the court* of the United States, to render the distinction between the obligation and the remedy to a great extent inoperative, by regarding the remedy to be so connected with the obligation, as in many repects to be a part of it, and holding unconstitutional such legislation on remedies existing at the time the contract was made, as by a change of the remedy, takes away or materially impairs the creditors' rights. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 341. See Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 75. Thus, a law of the State of Illinois, providing that a sale shall not be made of property levied on under an execution, unless it would bring two-thirds of its valuation according to the appraisement of three householders, was held, as regards contracts made prior to its passage, unconstitutional. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 612. Per Baldwin, J.: " In placing the obligation of contracts under the protection of the Constitution, its framers looked to the essentials of the contract, more than to the forms and modes of proceeding by which it was to be carried into execution; annulling all State legislation which impaired the obligation, it was left to the States to prescribe and shape the remedy to enforce it. The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force on the party who makes it it is admitted that a State may make partial exemptions of property, as of furniture, food, apparel, or even a homestead, (i)l It is to be observed, that, as to the remedy,2 there can be no