This natural obligation, however, is not only a sufficient consideration for an express promise by a father to pay for necessaries furnished his child, hut when taken in connection with various circumstances has been held to be sufficient to raise an implied promise to that effect. But either an express promise, or circumstances from which a promise by the father can be inferred, are indispensably necessary to bind the parent for necessaries furnished his infant child by a third person." - Owen v. White, 5 Port. (Ala.) 435 (1837), seems to deny the legal obligation of the father, except on a contract, express or implied; but admits that such "contract is implied where the father fails in his duty to support the child, or drives him from home. Then the father is liable for a suitable maintenance." In Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. 258 (1839), the court appear to deny altogether that the moral obligation of the father constitutes any legal obligation. Bennett, J., says: " There must be proof of a contract, express or implied, a prior authority, or a subsequent recognition of the claim." So Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H. 187; and Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383. Perhaps the strongest case in the American reports, against the liability of the father, is Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 350 (1845). There the defendant told his minor son in the spring to go out to work, and in the fall he would get him some winter clothes. The son went to service at monthly wages. In June following, the plaintiff furnished him with cloth and trimmings for a suit of clothes. The father knew of this purchase by the son, and furnished him money to pay for making mem up; he also permitted him to wear out the clothes. It did not clearly appear whether the plaintiff furnished the goods upon the son's or the father's credit. And this might have been a sufficient ground for the decision itself; but Redfield, J., went much further, and said: "But there is one defect in the case, which we think must clearly and indisputably preclude any recovery against the father. It does not appear that the father ever gave the son any authority, either expressly or by implication, to pledge his credit for the articles; but the contrary . Ami unless the father can be made liable for necessaries for his infant child, against his own will, then, in this case, the plaintiff must fail to recover. I know there are some cases, and dicta of judges, or of elementary writers, which seem to justify the conclusion that the parent may be made liable for neces-saries for his child, even against his own will. Rut an examination of all the cases upon this subject will not justify any such conclusion." After critically examining the American and English authorities, be concluded: "It is obvious that the law makes no provision for strangers to furnish children with necessaries, against the will of parents, even in extreme cases. For if it can be done in extreme cases it can be done in every case where the necessity exists; and the right of a parent to control his own child will depend altogether upon his furnishing necessaries, suitable to the varying taste of the times. There is no stopping-place short of this, if any interference whatever is allowed. If the parent abandons the child to destitution, the public authorities may interfere, and, in the mode pointed out by the statute, compel a proper maintenance. But this, according to the English common law, which prevails in this State, is not the right of every intermeddling stranger." See also Raymond v, Loyl, 10 Barb. 483; Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502; Shelton v. Springett, 20 E. L. & E.. 281; s. c. 11 C. B. 462; Atkyns v. Pearce, 2 C. P. (n. s.) 763; Brown v. Deloach, 28 Ga. 486; White v. Mann, 110 End. 74; Harris v. Harris, 5, Kan 46; Johnson v. Ousted, 74 Mich, 437; Rogers v. Turner, 59 Mo. 116; Carney v. Parrett, 4 Ore. 171.

So far as the duty of support certainly belongs to the parent as a legal obligation, and is neglected, any other person may perform it, and will be regarded as performing it for him; and, on general principles, the law will raise a promise on the part of the parent, to compensate the party who thus did for him what he was bound by law to do. (m) But this rule is carried no further than its reason extends; and is guarded by many restrictions from becoming the means of injury to the parent. Thus, we have seen, that if the child be living with the parent, or, as it is said in some cases, if he be sub potestate parentis, the law will not presume that the parent neglects the child, but will presume a due care of him, until the contrary is shown; and of the propriety and sufficiency of the clothing, etc., the parents must judge; and if a stranger under such circumstances supplies the child even with necessaries he certainly cannot hold the parent upon the contract implied by his duty, without proving a clear and unquestionable abandonment and neglect of that duty.

If the supplier seeks to make the parent responsible, on the

(m) In the matter of Ryder, 11 Paige, 185, Walworth, Ch., says: "A stranger may furnish necessaries for the child, and recover of the parent compensation therefor, where there is a clear and palpable omission of duty, on the part of the parent, in supplying the child with necessaries."

Equally strong are Van Valkinhurgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480, and Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350. [ See also notes (k) and (/) for other authorities for this proposition and for authorities to the contrary.] ground that his authority was given to the child, then, if the goods supplied were necessaries, it would seem from the cases, as we have said, that slight evidence is sufficient to prove such authority; as that the father saw the son wear the clothes, or knew that he had received them, and made no objection. But if the things supplied are strict and absolute necessaries, needful for the child's subsistence, or if the child is living away from the parent, under circumstances which indicate a desertion by the parent, or that the child has been expelled from his house, or caused to leave it by the wrongful acts of the parents, then the authorities and dicta to which we have referred lead to the conclusion that whoever supplies the wants of the child may recover from the parent. (n)