If a father does any specific act, from which it may reasonably be inferred that he has authorized his son to contract a debt, he may be liable in respect of the debt so contracted; but the mere moral obligation on the father to maintain his child affords no inference of a legal promise to pay his debts; and we ought not to put upon his acts an interpretation which abstractedly, and without reference to that moral obligation, they will not reasonably warrant. In order to bind a father, in point of law, for a debt incurred by his son, you must prove that he has contracted to be bound, just in the same manner as you would prove such a contract against any other person; and it would bring the law into great uncertainty if it were permitted to juries to impose a liability in each particular case, according to their own feelings or prejudices." Parke, B., added: " It is a clear principle of law that a father is not under any legal obligation to pay his son's debts." - And in Shelton v. Springett, 20 E. L. & E. 281, the same principles are reiterated; and the law declared to be well settled, that without some contract, express or implied, the father is not liable for necessaries supplied to the sou. Jervis, C. J., says: " If a father turns his son upon the world, the son's only resource, in the absence of anything to show a contract on the father's part, is to apply to the parish, and then the proper steps will be taken to enforce the performance of the parent's legal duty."

(j) This may be inferred from some of the cases we have already cited; but it was doubted in Mortimore v. Wright, whether Law v. Wilkin, and Blackburn v. Mackey were law. And in Shelton v. Springett, where the father had given his son £5 and sent him to London to look out for a ship, telling him to put up at a particular hotel, but the son put up at another, upon which evidence the jury had found a verdict against the father for the son's board, the verdict was set aside and a nonsuit ordered on the ground that there was no evidence to warrant a jury in holding the father liable. In Forsyth v. Milne (1808), cited in McPherson on Infants, p. 511, the defendant's wife, in his absence and without his knowledge, contracted with a third person for the board of their minor daughter. The defendant paid the bill, but expressed some disapprobation of it. The mother removed the daughter to another situation, it was held that the first payment so far acknowledged the necessaries supplied to an infant actually incapacitated by want of age, or by disease of mind or body, from making any contract, or acting in any way as the agent of any person, the father cannot be made liable except on the ground of his parental obligation; and there are eases, or rather dicta in some cases which might indicate, perhaps, that the question would be decided in England in favor of this liability on his part, if it were necessary. It will be noticed, that where it is most distinctly denied that this moral obligation of the parent constitutes a legal obligation, the denial is confined to a liability for the contracts of the child. The reason is said to be, the danger of permitting a father to be bound in this way, and it is variously illustrated in the cases; discretionary power of the wife to contract, as to make the father liable to the plaintiff upon the second contract. - In Bryan v. Jackson, 4 Conn. 288 (1822), where the defendant's minor son had taken up goods of the plaintiff, which the defendant paid for, without objection, or giving notice not to trust his son any further, and the son afterwards took up other goods of a similar nature, it was held that the payment so made by the defendant was equivalent to a recognition of his son's authority, and rendered the defendant liable for the goods subsequently taken up, although hee had (but without the plaintiff's knowledge) given positive orders to his son to contract no more debts, and had placed him under the care of a friend, with instructions to furnish him with everything necessary and suitable for him. See also McKenzie v. Stevens, 19 Ala. 691. - It was held in Nichole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36 (1827), that if a parent knew that a third person was maintaining his minor child, although illegitimate, and expressed no dissent, he is Gable, unless he show that the child is there against his consent; but this case was afterwards denied in Mortimore v. Wright. - In Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. II 571 (1835), it was held, that if a husband, living in a state of separation from his wife, suffers his children to reside with the mother, he is liable for necessaries furnished them, and she is considered as his agent to con-tract for this purpose. And see Rawlyns v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 250 (1800). In Deane v. Annis, 14 Me. 26 (1836), the defendant's minor son left his father's home against his will, and refused to return to it upon his father's commands. Being afterwards taken sick, however, he did return, and remained until his death. During his sickness his father went with him to the plaintiff's house to obtain medical advice, and the plaintiff afterwards visited the boy professionally at his father's house.

No express promise was proved to pay the plaintiff, nor did the father notify him that he did not expect to pay him. The father was held liable for the plaintiff's services. - And in Swain v. Tyler, 26 Vt. 1, where the father had given his minor son leave to act for himself, and bad made publication of the fact, and that he would not thereafter pay any debts of his sou. The son returned to his father's house sick, and the plaintiff's charges were for necessary medical services rendered the son, upon the credit of the father, and in good faith charged to him at the time, and the father knew of the services being rendered and did not object, it was held that the law implies a promise to pay, though the father did not assent to the services being done on his credit, either expressly or impliedly, in fact. - The case of Thayer v. White, 12 Met. 343 | 1847), has an important bearing upon the point of implied liability. It does not appear in that case that the defendant's son was a minor, nor were the goods bought by the son necessa-ries, but the facts were thai a son, who had several times, with his lather's express consent, bought goods of T. in the name and on the credit of his father, again bought goods of T. in the name of his father, on six months' credit; '1'. charged the goods to the lather, and immediately wrote a letter to him, informing him thereof, and stating that he supposed it was correct, but thought proper to give him notice. The father made no reply to this letter. Held, in a suit by T against the father, for the price of the goods, that the jury were warranted in inferring, from the father's silence, his consent to the transaction thus notified to him Held, also, that such consent was proof cither of an original authority to the son, or of a subsequent affirmance by the father, which bound him to pay for the goods but this reason fails where the infant can make no contracts, and must be supplied or suffer.