(/) Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp. 485; Barlow v. Bishop, 1 East, 432; Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing. 565. His authority to her to make notes in his name cannot, however, be inferred from the mere fact that he knew she was carrying on business, and that she gave the note in the course of such business; and on a note so given the husband is not liable even to a bona fide indorsee. Beakert v. Sandford 5 W. & S. 164.-Whenever the husband authorizes the wife to execute notes in his name, they must purport on their face to be made in his behalf, or by her as agent, or he will not be bound. Minard v. Mead, 7 Wend. 68.- But in the case of Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. 582, where a bill of exchange addressed to " William B." was accepted by his wife, by writing her own name, " Mary B." upon the back, which was presented to the husband after it became due, who said he knew all about it, that it was for a milliner's bill, and that he would pay it shortly, he was held liable as acceptor, although he had not expressly authorized his wife so to accept the bill.

Whether a married woman can borrow money, even for necessaries, and her husband be held liable on his implied authority, seems not to be settled. (m) If the lender can show that the money was used by the husband, then he can hold him. It has been held in

California that a promissory note made by husband and wife jointly does not bind the wife. (mm) The mortgage of a married woman to secure her own promissory note which she had power by law to make, is valid. (mw)

When the cohabitation with the husband ceases, and they live separately, then a new state of things arises, and with it new rules of law. The wife separates from her husband, either by his fault, or by her own, or by mutual consent and agreement. In the first case she carries with her all her rights to necessaries, and he who supplies them to her may hold her husband liable for their price; (n)1 and, as it has lately been held, for the expenses of her burial. (nn)2 And we deem it to be the * same * 353

(m) At law, a husband is not liable for money lent to the wife, unless his request be averred and proved. Stone v. Mac-nair, 7 Taunt. 432; Stephenson v. Hardy, 3 Wils. 388; Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S 83; Grendell v. Godmond, 5 A. & E. 755; Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk.387; Darby v. Boucher, id. 279. In equity, however, the lender will he allowed to stand in place of the tradesmen, and to have satisfaction as far as they could, had they been plaintiffs. Harris v. Lee, 1 P. Wms. 482, Prec Ch. 502; Walker v. Simpson, supra; Marlow v. Pitfield, 1 P. Wms. 558. See May v. Skey, 16 Sim. 588, 18 Law Jour. 308; Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510. And where money was advanced to the wife living with her husband, and he, after the wife's decease, promised to repay the same, "when convenient," hut said he was not privy to the loan, it was held that there was evidence to go to the jury that the wife had borrowed the money with the sanction of her husband, or that he ratified the act, and the plaintiff had a verdict. West v. Wheeler, 2 Car & K 714.

(mm) Brown v. Orr, 29 Cal 120 (mn) Heals v. Cobb, 51 Me. 348; Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78.

(n) Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Sua. 1214; Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41; Rawlyns v. Vandyke, 3 Esp. 251; Hodges v. Hodges, 1 id. 441; Aldis v. Chapman, 1 Selw. N. P. 281; McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281; Houliston v. Smyth, 3 Bing. 127; Howard v. Whetstone, 10 Ohio, 365; Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 506; (lenient v. Mattison, 3 Rich 93; Fredd v. Eves, 4 Harring. (Del.) 385; Allen v. Aldrich, 9 Foster (X 11.), 63. And if a wife is justified in leaving her husband, a request on his part that she will return will not determine his liability for neces-saries supplied to her during the separation. Emery v. Emery, 1 V. & J. 501. Where, however, the person supplying the wife with necessaries relies upon her husband's ill-treatment as good cause for her leaving him, he must show affirmatively that the separation took place in consequence of the husband's misconduct. It is not enough to prove that there were quarrels and personal conflicts between them, unless it be shown that the husband was the offending party. Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46. And see Reed thing in law, as well as in reason, whether he actually expels her from his house without her fault, or compels her to leave his house by cruelty to her, or by his misconduct in it, as by introducing a prostitute into it. (o)1 The dictum of Lord Eldon, that " where a man turns his wife out of doors he sends with her credit for her reasonable expenses, " is undoubtedly law. (p) And we should say that he turned her out of doors, in this sense, when he obliged her to fly by that degree of ill-treatment which would induce and authorize a court of competent jurisdiction to grant her a divorce. Indeed we should say that a less degree of cruelty would authorize her to escape from him and his house, and " carry his credit" with her.

V. Moore, 5 C. & P. 200.

(nn) Cunningham v. Reardon,98 Mass.

538.

1 If the wife has left him for good and sufficient cause, Thorpe v. Shapleigh, 67 Me. 235; Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn. St. 360; but if a husband whose wife left him without her fault makes sufficient provision for her, or which she accepts, he is not then liable, Crittenden v. Schermerhorn, 39 Mich. 661; Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala 89 - K.

2 Whether he is her legatee or not, Sears v. Giddey, 41 Mich. 590; and may remove her remains from one burial-place to another, if he has not freely consented to their interment in the former place, Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 423.- K.

Where husband and wife live together, there is a presumption of law arising from cohabitation, that the husband assents to contracts made by the wife for the supply of articles suitable to their station, means, and way of life. (q) But when this cohabi-tation * ceases, then, by the English authorities, the presumption of law is against his assent; and the husband is not liable unless such presumption be rebutted by showing his authority from the nature and circumstances of the separation, or the conduct of the husband, or the condition of the wife, and the nature of the articles supplied to her. (r) And where the husband there distinctly decided, that if the husband commits adultery, and brings his adulteress into his house, and treats his wife with great cruelty, and then turns her out into the streets, and she afterwards commits adultery, and then, being repentant, offers to return to him, and is wholly without means of subsistence, nevertheless no action for furnishing her with necessaries is maintainable. (u) But this is certainly very severe law, and our courts would be very reluctant to apply it. If the husband rests his defence upon the wife's adultery, it must be very strictly proved, and a verdict in an action for criminal conversation is not admissible as evidence to prove it. (v) If after such adultery the husband receives her back into his house, he must maintain her as before; and cannot discharge himself of his liability for necessaries supplied to her if she leaves him afterwards, or even if he sends her away, but by proof of a new act of adultery; so it has been held. (w)