(w) See Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323, which is a leading case on this subject. In this case, the letter of guaranty contained this clause: "The object of the present letter is to request you if convenient, to furnish them" (Messrs. Stephen and Henry Higginson), "with any sum they may want, as far as fifty thousand dollars; say fifty thousand dollars. They will reimburse you the amount, together with interest, as soon as arrangements can be made to do it; and as our embargo cannot be continued much longer, we apprehend there will be no difficulty in this. We shall hold ourselves answerable to you for the amount." It was held, that this was not an absolute original undertaking, but a guaranty; that it covered advances only to Stephen and Henry Higginson (who were then partners), on partnership account, and could not be applied to cover advances to either of the partners separately, on his separate account; that the authority of the guaranty was revoked by the dissolution of the partnership, and no subsequent advances made by the party, after a full notice of such dissolution, were within the reach of the guaranty; that the letter did not import to be a continuing guaranty for money advanced, toties quoties from time to time, to the amount of $50,000, but for a single advance of money to that amount; and that, when once advances were made to $50,000, no subsequent advances were within the guaranty; although, at the time of such further advances, the sum actually advanced had been reduced below $50,000 by reimbursements of the debtors. In Grant v. Ridsdale, 2 Har. & J. 186, a guaranty in the following terms: " I will guarantee their engagements, should you think it necessary, for any transactions they may have in your house," was held an absolute and continuing guaranty, until countermanded. - So where the defendant addressed a letter to the plaintiffs, stating that his brother wished to go into business, and promising to be accountable for such goods furnished by the plaintiffs as his brother should call for, from $300 to $500 worth; in consequence of which the plaintiffs furnished him with divers parcels of goods; it was held, that this was a continuing guaranty to the amount specified, and was not limited to the bill of parcels first delivered. Rapelye v. Bailey, 5 Conn. 149. See also Clark v. Burdett, 2 Hall, 167. - A writing in these words: " I agree to be responsible for the price of goods purchased of you, either by note or account, at any time hereafter, to the amount of $100," is a continuing guaranty to that extent, for goods to be at any time sold before the credit is recalled. Bent v. Hartshorn, 1 Met. 24. - Many of the cases seem to hold with Lord Ellenborough, in Merle v. Wells, 2 Camp. 413, that the