& 6., and held by B, and bound A to save B harmless from all loss which B might sustain by reason of holding paper indorsed by said firm. The partnership of S. M. & G. was afterwards dissolved, of which B had notice. The partners then executed a power of attorney to M, who had, previously to the dissolution, transacted nearly all the bank business of the partnership with B, authorizing him to sign and indorse notes which might be considered necessary in the management of the concern. M delivered the power to B ; after which M, by virtue thereof, continued to use the name of S. M. & G., as drawers and indorsers of negotiable paper, which was discounted by B, and the proceeds credited to the firm, and applied in payment of their former indebtedness to B. By virtue of such power, M also signed in the name of the firm various other notes which were indorsed by A, with notice of the dissolution, and knowing that these notes were intended to be, as they were in fact, discounted by B, and the proceeds applied in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm. In the course of these transactions, M, by virtue of said power, indorsed two notes, which were discounted by B, and the proceeds credited to the firm. The parties to these notes having failed, B sought a remedy on the guaranty against A; and it was held, that the guaranty, by its terms, contemplated only such paper as should be indorsed by the firm of S. M. & G., as a firm, and during the continuance of the partnership, but that, for the purpose of settling the partnership concerns, the partnership relation between the partners continued to subsist after the dissolution, and the notes so indorsed by M were in legal contemplation indorsed by the firm; consequently they were embraced within the scope and true meaning of the guaranty. And in Staats v. Howlett, 4 Denio, 559, A gave B an undertaking in writing as follows: "I hereby obligate myself to hold you harmless for any indorsement you may make for, or have made for, the late firm of Peck, Howlett & Foster." The firm had previously become dissolved by the death of one of its members. A note subsequently made by one of the surviving partners, in the course of liquidating the business of the firm, and signed "S. R. Howlett, for the late firm of Peck, Howlett & Foster," was indorsed by B. Held, that it was within the terms of the guaranty. The case of Pemberton v. Oakes, 4 Kuss. 154, illustrates the principle of the text. See further, that guaranties are to be construed strictly, and that if any partners be taken into or retire from a firm, the guarantee does not continue. Simson v. Cook, 8 J. B. Moore, 588; Kipling v. Turner, 5 B. & Ald. 261; Wright v. Russell, 3 Wils. 530; Barclay v. Lucas, 3 Dougl. 321; Penoyer v. Watson, 16 Johns. 100; Barker v. Parker, 1 T. R. 287; Dry v. Davv, 2 Per. & D. 249; Place v. Delegal, 4 Bing. N. C. 426; Dance v. Girdler, 4 B. & P. 34; Myers v. Edge, 7 T. R. 254.

(r) Metcalf v. Bruin, 12 East, 405.

In regard to the subject-matter, a guaranty to cover goods supplied to a certain amount, without restriction of time, continues until revoked; although even such continuing guaranty may be discharged by a change of the terms of credit. (u) If the guarantor means to limit his liability to a single transaction, he should so express it. (v) But as no special form or manner of expression is necessary, if this purpose may fairly be gathered from the whole contract, courts will so construe it. (w)

(8) The case of Barclay v. Lucas, 8 Dougl. 321; 8. c. 1 T. R. 291, n. (a), although it has been doubted on some points (see Weston v. Barton, 4 Taunt. 681), is yet an authority for this principle, that if the terms of the contract show it was the intention of the parties that the liability should continue, such will be the case, although the names of the firm change. Such was evidently the court's understanding of the bond in that case, for Lord Mansfield observed : "The question turns, as Lord Chief Justice De Grey observes, in the case which has been cited, upon the meaning of the parties. In endeavoring to discover that meaning, the subject-matter of the contract is to be considered. It is notorious that these banking-houses continue for ages with the occasional addition of new partners. In such establishments clerks are necessary, who now and then succeed as partners, an arrangement very proper and very beneficial to the clerks. The house requires security for their honesty. Now it seems to me to make no difference whether a new partner is introduced or not, for there is no doubt that it is a security to the house. I am glad that there is a distinction between this case and that decided in the Common Pleas; for I thiuk that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover to the extent of the whole sum embezzled, or at all events to the extent of their own share." This principle was the foundation of the decision in Pease v. Hirst, 10 B. & C. 122. (t) Barker v. Parker, 1 T. R 287.

1 A continuing guarantee also for advances, in the absence of express provision, is revoked as to subsequent advances by notice of the death of the guarantor. Coulthart v. Clementson, 5 Q. B. D. 42.

(u) In Barstow v. Bennett, 3 Camp. 220, A gave to B a written guaranty to the extent of £300 for any goods he might supply to C, provided C neglected to pay in one time. B supplied goods to C accordingly, at two months' credit, and C paid in due time to an amount exceeding £300. The account having run for some time on these terms, and there being a balance due to B, a new account was opened on new terms of credit. Held, that the guaranty extended to all goods furnished while the term of credit remained unchanged, but not to those furnished after the term of credit was changed, and a new account opened. See Hatch v. Hobbs, 12 Gray, 447.

(v) Merele v. Wells, 2 Camp. 413. In this case the guaranty was in these words: "Gentlemen, I have been applied to by my brother, William Welles, jeweller, to be bound to you for any debts he may contract, not to exceed one hundred pounds (with you), for goods necessary in his business as a jeweller. I have wrote to say by this declaration I consider myself bound to you for any debt he may contract for his business as a jeweller, not exceeding one hundred pounds, after this date. (Signed) John Wells." And Lord Ellenborough said : " I think the defendant was answerable for any debt not exceeding one hundred pounds which William Wells might from time to time contract with the plaintiffs in the way of his business. The guaranty is not confined to one instance, but applies to debts successively renewed. If a party means to be surety only for a single dealing, he should take care to say so. By such an instrument as this, a continuing suretyship is created to the specified amount. There must be, therefore, a verdict for the plaintiffs for £100." See Brown p. Bachelor, 1 Hurl. & N. 255.