(y) Boyd v. Plumb, 7 Wend. 309; Rollins v. Stevens, 31 Me. 454 , Butterfield v. Hemsley, 12 Gray, 226

(z) Darling v. March, 22 Me. 188;

A release by one partner is a release by all, both in law and in equity. (a) And a release to one partner is a release to all. (b) *But any fraud or collusion destroys the effect of such release. And the release, to discharge absolutely all the copartners, must be a technical release under seal. (c) And a discharge of one of several joint debtors by operation of law, without the consent or co-operation of the creditor, takes from him no remedy against the other debtor. (d)

The signature or acknowledgment of one partner, in matters relating to the partnership, in general, binds the firm; (e) as notice in legal proceedings, or abandonment to insurers by one

Commonwealth Bank v. Law, 127 Mass. 72; Security Bank v. McDonald, 127 Mass. 82; Lemoine v. Bank of No. America, 3 Dillon, 44; Moynahan v. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329; Bloom v. Helm, 53 Miss. 21.

(a) Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68; Bruen v. Marquand, 17 .Johns. 58; Salmon v. Davis, 4 Binn. 375; Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 567; Halsey v. Whitney, 4 Mason, 206; Smith v. Stone, 4 G. "& J. 310; McBride v. Hagan, 1 Wend. 326; Noyes v N. Haven, N. London & Stonington R. R. Co 30 Conn. 1; Allen v. Cheever, 61 N H. 32 The rule of law and equity is the same, and only collusion for fraudulent purposes between the partners and a debtor destroys the effect of such release. Barker v. Richardson, 1 Y. & Jer. 362; Cram v. Cadwell, 5 Cowen, 489. - And the fraud must be clearly established. Arton v Booth, 4 Moore, 192; Furnival v. Weston, 7 Moore, 356. And see Legh v. Legh, 1 B. & P. 447; Jones v. Herbert, 7 Taunt. 421; Mountstephen v. Brooke, 1 Chitt. 391; Sweet v. Morrison, 103 N. Y. 235; Sloan v. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356. Where one partner signed a general release to a debtor of the firm, and it did not appear whether it was intended to apply to separate or to partnership demands, or whether the subscribing partner had on his separate account any demand against the debtor, the release was held a discharge from debts due the partnership. The release was a part of an indenture of assignment, in trust for creditors. Emerson v. Knower, 8 Tick. 63. - Where such release is for all demands, parol proof that a particular debt was not intended to be released is not admissible. Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68.

(b) Hammon v. Roll, March, 202; Bower v. Swadlin, 1 Atk. 294; Collins v. Prosser, 1 B. & C. 682; American Bank v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 126; Goodnow v. Smith, 18 Pick. 416; Clagett v. Salmon, who has effected insurance for himself and others. (/) And if one of several joint lessors, partners in trade, sign a notice to quit, this will be valid for all; (g) but not if they are not partners in trade. (h) And in general a notice to one partner is binding upon all; (i) as of a prior unrecorded deed, the knowledge of which, by one partner will avoid a subsequent deed to *all the partners. (j) And notice of a want of consideration of a promissory note, received by one partner, affects all. (k)

5 G. & J. 314; Burson v. Kincaid, 3 Penn. 57. - So a discharge of one surety of his whole liability is a discharge to the others. Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675; May-hew v. Crickett, 2 Swanst. 192. - But a release to one partner may, by means of recitals and provisos, be limited in its operations to the partner to whom it is given. Solly v. Forbes, 4 Moore, 448; 2 Br. & B. 38. See Wiggin v. Tudor, 23 Pick. 444. Ex parte Good, 5 Ch. D. 46; Greenwald v. Raster, 86 Pa. 45.

(c) Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305; Walker v. McCulloch, 4 Greenl. 421; Harrison v. Close, 2 Johns. 449; Catskill Bank v. Messenuer, 9 Cowen, 37: Lunt v. Stevens, 25 Me. 534; Shotwell v Miller, Coxe, 81. - It has been held that a composition deed, given by the joint creditors of a partnership upon its dissolution, to that partner who winds up the affairs of the firm, is in the nature of a release, and will discharge the other partner from his liability. Ex parte Slater, 6 Ves. 146 - But a covenant not to sue one of several partners will not have the same effect. Bates on Part. § 385, and cases cited.

(d) Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 152; Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459; 'looker v. Bennett, 3 Caines, 4; Townend v. Kiddle, 2 N. H. 449.

(e) See Corps v. Robinson, 2 Wash. C. C. 388; Bound v. Lathrop, 4 Conn 336; Fisk v. Copelaud, 1 Overt. 383. - During the partnership one may enter an appearance in an action to bind the whole. Bennett v. Stickney, 17 Vt. 531. See contra, Haslet v. Street, 2 McCord, 311; Loomis v. Pierson, Harper. L. 470. But after dissolution one cannot acknowledge service for the firm. Demott v. Swaim, 5 Stew. & P. 293. And service of process upon one partner, after dissolution, will not authorize a judgment against the firm. Duncan v. Tombeckbee Bank, 4 Port. (Ala.) 181.

Where a bill accepted by a firm is dishonored by one partner, notice of the dishonor need not be given to the other partners; (I) and where a bill or note is indorsed by a firm, which is dissolved before the note is due, notice to one of the partners by a holder not having knowledge of the dissolution, is sufficient. (m) And where the drawer of a bill is a partner of the house on which it is drawn, he is chargeable without notice to him of the dishonor of the bill. (n) A partner cannot, merely by the authority given by the partnership, and without the authority of the partners, bind his copartner by his indorsement of negotiable paper not belonging to the partnership. (nn)

Generally, a partner cannot bind his copartners by deed, without express authority.1 But it has been held that if he annex a seal

(/) Hunt v. Royal Ex. Assurance Co. 5 M. & Sel. 47. So if one partner, for himself and partner, sign a note for the weekly payment under the Lords' act, such note would bind the firm. Meux v. Humphry, 8 T. R. 25; Burton v. Issit, 5 B. & Ald, 267.