(c) "When there is a devise of the estate purchased of A, or of the farm in the occupation of B, nobody can tell what is given till it is shown by extrinsic evidence what estate it was that was purchased of A, or what farm was in the occupation of B." Per Sir William Grant, in Sanford v. Raikes, 1 Meriv. 653. And see Jackson v. Parkhurst, 4 Wend. 369; Abbot v. Massie, 8 Yes. 148; McCullough v. Wainwright, 14 Penn. St. 171; Newton v. Lucas, 6 Sim. 54; Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201. "Speaking philosophically," says Rolfe, B., "you must always look beyond the instrument itself to some extent, in order to ascertain who is meant; for instance, you must look to names and places. There may indeed be no difficulty in ascertaining who is meant, when a person who has five or six names, and some of them unusual ones, is described in full, while on the other hand, a devise simply to John Smith would necessarily create some uncertainty." Clayton v. Lord Nugent, 13 M. & W. 207. See also Owen v. Thomas, 3 Mylne & K 353. Whether parcel or not, or appurtenant or not, is always matter of evidence. Per Buller, J., in Doe v. Burt, 1 T. R. 704; Doe v.

Webster, 12 A. ft E. 442; Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261; per Barbour, J., in Bradley v. Wash. A. & G. Steam Packet Co. 13 Pet. 89, 97; per Lord Ellenborough, in Good title v. Southern, 1 M.& S. 301; Wilson v. Robertson, Harp. Eq. 66. (d) Bac. Max. Reg. 25. Falsa demonstratio non nocet. Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671. "If the thing described is sufficiently ascertained, it is sufficient, though all the particulars are not true; as if a man conveys his house in D., which was R. Cotton's when it was Thomas Cotton's." Com. Dig. Fait (E. 4). Where one devised all his "freehold houses in Aldersgate street," he having only leasehold houses there, the leasehold were held to pass. Day v. Trig, 1 P. Wms. 286. See also Doe v. Craustoun, 7 M. ft W. 1; Nelson v. Hopkins, 21 Law J. (n. S.) Ch. 410, 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 66. Where premises are sufficiently described otherwise, any reference to the quantity of land may be rejected, as falsa demonstratio. Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey, 11 M. & W. 183; Shep. Touch. 248. So where there was a bequest to "John and Benedict, sons of J. S.," who had two sons, James and Benedict, it was held that James might take. Dowset

1 Evidence is admissible merely to show what was the condition of the document when it became a contract between the parties, or of the paper when the parties agreed that it should be an agreement between them. Stewart v. Eddowes, L. R. 9 C P. 311. Where land is bounded in a deed on the "continuation of the Odlin road, so called," there being in fact no such continuation, evidence is admissible that the parties understood the phrase to refer to a preliminary survey staked out, but never completed. Tyler v. Fickett, 73 Me. 410. Where a county offered a prize for a building plan, and by a resolution accepted the plaintiffs, evidence is inadmissible to show a usage among architects to receive payment in addition for making the plan, and for superintendence of the work, without proof that the building was ever erected. Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 155.

A written contract, of which the memorandum satisfies the statute of frauds, is open to evidence to show that certain essence Sweet, Ambl. 176. See Connolly v. Pardon, 1 Paige, 291; Doe v. Galloway, 5 B. & Ad. 48; Duke of Dorset v. Lord Hawarden, 3 Curteis, 80; Tudor v. Terrel, 2 Dana, 47; Gynes v. Kemsley, Freem. K. B. 298; Chamberlaine v. Turner, Cro. Car. 129; Doe v. Parry, 13 M. & W. 866; Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 M. & S. 299; Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wins. 140. - The characteristic of cases falling under the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet, is, that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject at all, and so far as it is true, to one subject only. Per Alderson, B., in Morrell v. Fisher, 4 Exch. 691, 604; Wigram on Wills, sec. 188. This rule is considered ante, p. *515. - The case of Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 140, if it can be sustained at all, must be sustained as falling under the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet. Before stating the case, it may be well to remark, that evidence may always be given that a testator was accustomed to call particular individuals by peculiar names, other than those by which they were commonly known, and a devise or bequest may take effect in favor of such person who is designated in the devise or bequest by a nickname, provided the application of the nickname is sufficiently certain. Baylis v. Attorney-General, 2 Atk. 239; per Lord Abinger, in Doe v. Hiscocks, 6 M. & W. 368; Rishton v. Cobb, 6 Mylne & C. 146; Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare, 261, 262; Parsons v. Parsons, 1 Yes. 266; per Rolfe, B., in Clayton v. Lord Nugent, 18 M. & W. 207; White v. Bradshaw, 16 Jur. 738, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 296; Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dall. 70. In Beaumont v. Fell, there was a devise of a legacy of £600 to "Catharine Earnley." No person of that name claimed the legacy. It was claimed by Gertrude Yardley. It appeared that the testator's voice, when he gave instructions for writing his will, was very low, and hardly intelligible; that the testator usually called Gertrude Yardley by the name of Gatty, which the scrivener might easily mistake for Katy. The scrivener not well understanding who the legatee was, owing to the feebleness of the voice of the testator, the testator referred him to J. S. and wife, who afterwards declared that Gertrude Yardley was the person intended. So far as this case sanctions the admission of evidence of intention, it is now of no authority. See supra, note (a). The only ground, perhaps, upon which the case can be sustained, is that "Earnley" might be rejected as falsa demonstratio, and that "Catharine" was a sufficiently certain designation of the individual called "Gatty" by the testator. Per Lord Abinger, in Doe v. Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 371. The case of Selwood v. Mildmay, 3 Ves. 806, has been regarded as falling under the maxim, "falsa demonstratio." In this case a testator gave to his wife the interest and proceeds of £1,260, "part of my stock in the 4 per cent annuities of the Bank of England, for and during the term of her natural life, together with all such dividends as shall be due upon the said £1,260 at the time of my decease." At the time he made his will he had no stock in the 4 per cent annuities, but he had had some, which he had sold out, and had invested in Long Annuities. The Master of the Rolls, Sir R. P. Arden, said: "It is clear the testator meant to give a legacy, but mistook the fund. He acted upon the idea that he had such stock. The distinction is this; if he had had the stock at the time, it would have been considered specific, and that he meant that identical stock; and any act of his destroying that subject would be a proof of animus revocandi; but if it is a denomination, not the identical corpus, in that case, if the thing itself cannot be found, and there is a mistake as to the subject out of which it is to arise, that will be rectified." According to the view taken of this case by Tindal, C. J., in Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244, the parol evidence as to the condition of the testator's property was received, for the purpose of showing that the testator, when he used the erroneous description of 4 per cent stock, meant to bequeath the long annuities, which he had purchased with the produce of the 4 per cent stock; and the result of the cause was to substitute another specific subject, in the place of a specific legacy which the will purported to bequeath; - to substitute the long annuities which the testator had and did not purport to give, for the 4 per cent bank annuities, which he had not and did purport to give. But it would seem difficult to support the decree on this ground. The true view of the case seems to be that taken by Lord Langdale, in Lindgren v. Lindgren, 9 Beav. 358, namely, that the parol evidence as to the condition of the testator's property showed that a general and not a specific legacy was intended. After stating, in tials of the actual contract are not in the memorandum, if the the language of the decree, that the evidence was admitted "to prove, not that there was a mistake, for that was clear, but to show how it arose," his lordship continued: "It is very necessary to observe, that in the case of Selwood v. Mildmay, the evidence was received only for the purpose stated by the Master of the Rolls in his judgment, and not, as it has been erroneously supposed, for the purpose of showing that the testator, when he used the erroneous description of 4 per cent stock, meant to bequeath the long annuities, which he had purchased with the produce of the 4 per cent stock, and that the result of the cause was, not to substitute another specific subject in the place of a specific legacy which the will purported to bequeath; - not to substitute the long annuities, which the testator had and did not purport to give, for the 4 per cent bank annuities, which he had not and did purport to give. The absence of the fund purported to be given, showing that a specific legacy was not intended, other evidence was admitted to show how the mistake arose; and this being clearly shown, it was held, that the legatees were entitled to payment out of the general personal estate." And see to the same effect, Sawrey v. Rumney, 16 Jur. 1110, 16 Eng. L. & Eq. 4. In Wrotesley v. Adams, Plowd. 191, it is laid down that, "there is a diversity where a certainty is added to a thing that is uncertain, and where to a thing certain. For if I release all my right in all my lands in Dale, which I have by descent on the part of my father, and I have lands in Dale by descent on the part of my mother, but no lands by descent on the part of my father, there the release is void, and so the words of certainty, namely, which I have by descent on the part of my father, being added to the general words which were uncertain, are of effect. But if the release had been of Whiteacre in Dale, which I have by descent on the part of my father, and I had it not by descent on the part of my father, but otherwise, yet the release is good, for the thing was certainly expressed by the first words, in which case the addition of another certainty is not necessary, but superfluous." In Doe v. Parkin, 6 Taunt. 321, there was a devise of "all my messuages, etc., in T., and now in my own occupation." The testator had two messuages in T., of which he occupied only one. Held, that only that one passed by the devise. In this case there was certainty added to what was uncertain. See per Parke, J.t in Doe v. Galloway, 6 B. & Ad. 61. Words of certainty, however, as they are called in Plowden, following general or uncertain words, will not be construed as restrictive where the effect of doing so would be to render the general or uncertain words wholly inoperative, and where the certain words may be rejected as falsa demonstrate. A testator devised to J. S. "all those my three messuages, with the gardens, close of land, and all other my real estate, whatsoever, situate at Little Heath, in the parish of F., now in the occupation of myself, and A and B." At the date of the will, and at the death of the testator, he was possessed of three messuages with gardens, and a close of land, at Little Heath, which were in the occupation of himself, and A and B. He had also the reversion in a house and garden, situate at Little Heath, which was in the occupation of C, who was entitled to it for life. He had no other property in the parish of F. Held, that the house and garden in the occupation of C passed under the general devise to J. S. Doe v. Carpenter, 16 Q. B. 181, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 307. See also Nightingall v. Smith, 1 Exch. 870. In Morrell v. Fisher, 4 Exch. 691, there was a devise to the following effect: "All my leasehold farmhouse, homestead, lands, and tenements at Headington, containing about 170 acres, held under Magdalen College, Oxford, and now in the occupation of B, as tenant to me." B occupied a farm at Headington, which was leased to the testator by Magdalen College, and there were two parcels of land also held by the testator under Magdalen College, and situated at Headington, but not in the occupation of B. Held, that the description of the lands being in the possession of B could not be rejected as falsa demonstratio, and consequently the two parcels did not pass under the devise. In this case Alderson, B., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "The question is not what the testator intended to have done, but what the words of the clause mean, after applying to it the established rules of construction. One of these rules is,'Falsa demonstratio non nocet;' another is, 'Non accipi debent verba in demonstrationem fulsarn, quoe competunt in limitationem veram.' The first rule means, that if there be an adequate and sufficient description, with convenient certainty of what was meant to pass, a subsequent erroneous addition will not vitiate it. The characteristic of cases within the rule is, that the descripeffect of the evidence is, not to vary the written contract, but to show that no such contract was ever made. (dd)