* Where the language of an instrument has a settled legal meaning, its construction is not open to evidence. Thus, a * promise to pay money, no time being expressed, means a promise to pay it on demand, and evidence that a payment at a future day was intended, is not admissible. (e)1 If there be a written contract, to deliver a certain quantity of an article every year for five years, the party has by construction of law the whole of each year wherein to deliver the quantity of that year, and evidence is not admissible to prove that it was to be delivered in certain quantities at certain times. (ee) And in tion, so far as it is false, applies to no subject at all; and so far as it is true, applies to one only. The other rule means, that if it stand doubtful upon the words whether they import a false reference or demonstration, or whether they be words of restraint that limit the generality of the former words, the law will never intend error or falsehood. If, therefore, there is some land wherein all the demonstrations are true, and some wherein part are true and part false, they shall be intended words of true limitation to pass only those lands wherein the circumstances are true. Whether these maxims, or rather the first, has been correctly acted upon in some of the decided cases, in which the courts have professed, or intended so to do, need not now be inquired into. They certainly are acknowledged rules of construction. Is there then, in the present case, an adequate and sufficient description of the subject of the devise, so as to enable us to treat the description of the land being in the possession of Burrows, as a false demonstration, and rejected according to the first rule? Now, if we read the language of the devise in its ordinary and obvious sense, it is a gift first of 'all his leasehold farm-house, homestead, lands, and tenements at Headington, held under Magdalen College, and occupied by Burrows.' There is no doubt that the farm-house passed, for it was a 'leasehold, and in the occupation of Burrows;' and if there was one acre, and one only, of that character, and that was not in the possession of Burrows, that would have passed, and the description would have been rejected as inapplicable to any such. The will then professes to give all the testator's lands and tenements at Headington, leasehold under the college, containing about 170 acres, in the possession of Burrows. The description by acreage defines nothing, for it is inapplicable to any subject [whether the two parcels were added or not, the amount would have been very different from 170 acres], and therefore that may be rejected, and then there is nothing to define any lands in particular. The second maxim then applies, and all the demonstrations here being true as to the rest of the land, exclusive of these two parcels, and part only being true as to these parcels, they do not pass" See also Doe v. Bower, 3 B. & Ad. 463; Bac. Max. Reg. 13; Doe v. Hubbard, 15 Q. B. 227; Newton v. Lucas, 6 Sim. 64.

(dd) Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray, 430.

(e) Warren v. Wheeler, 8 Met. 07; Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227; Ryan v. Hall, 13 Met. 520; Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 189; Barry v. Ransom, 2 Kern. 462. But a promise to do something other than to pay money, no time being expressed, means a promise to do it within a reasonable time. Warren v. Wheeler, 8 Met. 97. And in such a case, it seems that a contemporaneous verbal agreement that the matter stipulated for in a written agreement should be done at a particular time, would be admissible as bearing upon the question of reasonable time. Per Shaw, C. J., in Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 231. And see Barringer v. Sneed, 8 Stew. 201; Simpson v. Henderson, Moody & M. 300.

(ee) Curtiss v. Howell, 39 N. Y. 211.

1 And an averment that a note was "duly protested for non-payment" will not include notice to indorsers. Cook v. Warren,"88 N. Y. 37.

* 55S * Massachusetts, one who puts his name on the back of a note (not being a payee) at the time it was made, is not permitted to introduce proof that his contract was conditional only. (f)

There are reasons, although perhaps no direct authority, for applying to the construction of contracts a distinction which is taken in respect of wills. If the presumption is against the apparent and natural effect of an instrument, it may be rebutted by parol evidence; but not so if the legal presumption is with the instrument. As if a testator gives two legacies to the same party, in such a way that the presumption of law is that they are but one legacy, evidence is receivable to show that the testator said what he meant, and that a double gift was intended. But if they are so given that the law holds that what is twice given was meant to be twice given, evidence is not receivable to show that but a single gift was intended. (g)

Where the agreement between the parties is one and entire, and only a part of this is reduced to writing, it would seem that the residue may be proved by extrinsic evidence. (h) 1 And if there are contemporaneous writings between the same parties, so far in relation to the same subject-matter that they may be deemed part and parcel of the contract, although not referred to in it, they may be read in connection with it; (i) but not so as

(f) Wright v. Morse, 9 Gray, 337.

(g) Hall v. Hill, 1 Con. & L. 120, 1 Drury & W. 94. See also Spence on the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, vol. i. p. 565 et seq., where this point is fully examined, and the authori-ties cited.

(h) In Jeffery v. Walton, 1 Stark. 267, in an action for not taking proper care of a horse, hired by the defendant of the plaintiff, the following memorandum, made at the time of hiring, was offered in evidence: "Six weeks at two guineas - Wm. Walton, jun'r." Lord Ellenborough regarded the memorandum as incomplete, but conclusive as far as it went "The written agreement," said he, "merely regulates the time of hiring, and the rate of payment, and I shall not allow any evidence to be given by the plaintiff, in contradiction of these terms, but I am of opinion that it is competent to the plaintiff to give in evidence suppletory matter as a part of the agreement. See