Not unfrequently courts give to a plaintiff who has recovered what seems to be excessive damages, an election between a new trial, or a remission by him of the excess of damages. Generally, at least, this is confined to cases where the excess of damages can be distinctly discriminated from the rest, by some rule of law, or some unquestioned fact, (rr) And where the verdict for the plaintiff is too small, and he moves for a new trial, the court, at least in some States, may give the defendant the option of increasing the verdict or having a new trial, (rs)

(q) Bacon's Abr. tit. Slander (B); I Stark on Slander, 10. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gallia. 429, per Story, J.; Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cash. 104.

(r) Bacon's Abr. tit. Slander (C). Id Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 309, it was held, that such damages must be pecuniary, and that proof of mere mental or bodily suffering, loss of society, or of the good opinion of neighbors, would not be sufficient. But it has been held that a refusal to receive the plaintiff as a visitor, on account of the slander, was sufficient evidence to support an allegation of special damage. Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; Williams p. HilL 19 Wend. 305. So, where the plaintiff was refused civil treatment at a public-house. Olmsted v. Miller, I Wend. 506. In Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253, the plaintiff, having been called a prostitute, brought her action of slander, alleging a special damage, loss of health, and a consequent derangement of business; the defendant demurred, and there was judgment on the demurrer for the plaintiff. See also Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130.

(rr) Loyd v. Hicks, 31 Ga. 140; Under v. Monroe, 33 111. 388; Carpentier v. Gardiner, 29 Cal. 160; Tilford v. Ramsey, 43 Mo. 410. See ante, p. *68, n. (h).

(rs) Callahan v. Shaw, 24 la. 441 , James v. Morey, 44 I11 352.