(m) Gordon v, Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Seldeu v. Cushman, 20 Cal. 56; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.

(n) In Berry v. Vreeland, 1 N. J. 183, Green, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in an action of trespass quare clausnm fregit, said: *' The court, in actions of trespass, especially for personal torts, when damages can be gauged by no fixed staudard, but necessarily rest in the Bound discretion of the jury, interferes with a verdict on the mere* ground of excessive damages, with reluctance, and never except in a clear case. But when the plaintiff complains of no injury to his person or his feelings; where no malice is shown; where no right is involved beyond a mere question of property; where there is a clear standard for a measure of damages, and no difficulty in applying it; the measure of damages is a question of law, and is necessarily under the control of the court." See also Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. 462, per Jackson, J.; Farrand v. Bouchell, Harper, 87; Alder v. Keighley, 15 M. & W. 117; Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash. C. C. 152: Wylie v. Smitherman, 8 I red 236; Commonwealth v. Sessions of Norfolk, 5 Mass. 437, per Parsons, C. J.

(o) Huckle v. Money, 2 Wilson, 205; Sharp v. Brice, 2 W. Bl. 942; Williams v. Currie, 1 C. B. 841; Cook v Hill, 3 Sandf. 331; Woodruff v Richardson, 20 Conn 238. In Huckle v. Money, 2 Wilson, 206, Pratt, C. J., said: " The law has not laid down what shall be the measure of damages in actions of tort; the measure is vague and uncertain, depending upon a vast variety of causes, facts, and circumstances; torts or injuries which may be done by one man to another are infinite; in cases of criminal conversation, battery, imprisonment, slander, malicious directed the act to be done, or subsequently confirmed it. Railroad Co. t>. Finney, 10 Wis. 388; Craker v. Railroad Co. 36 Wis. 657; Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 42 Wis. 654. In the last case, retention and promotion of the agent was held to amount to such a ratification. But in an action of contract for a breach of a railroad's contract to carry, where it appeared that a passenger was arrested for an alleged evasion of fare, and delivered into custody, it was held that damages for his detention during the night, his discomforts in the place of detention, illness caused by the dampness of the cell, and the indignities which he suffered at the hands of police officers, were not recoverable. Murdock v. Boston, etc. R. Co. 133 Mass. 15. See also as to the difference between the rules for assessing damages in actions of contract and of tort against carriers for their negligent treatment of passengers, Brown v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 54 Wis. 342. - K.

It may be said that exemplary damages may be given for an assault and battery, or other personal injury, wherever the wrongful act of the defendant was accompanied by circumstances of aggravation (oo)

* From all injuries the law implies that damages are sustained. If the injury be nothing more than the invasion of a legal right, the law, usually, at least, implies nothing, more than nominal damages, for these suffice to determine the question of right, and more will not be given unless actual injury be shown. But the actual injuries need, not always be set forth in the declaration. If the injury be one from which actual loss, suffering, or mischief must necessarily ensue, this the law will generally infer, and it need not be specifically alleged. But that which occurs directly, yet not necessarily and as a certain or inevitable consequence, should, as a general rule, be specifically stated; and then, being proved, damages may be founded upon it. (p) Thus, if prosecutions, etc., the state, degree, qual ity, trade, or profession of the party la-jo red, as well as of the person who did the injury, mast be, and generally are, considered by the jury in giving damages: the few cases to be found in the books of new trials for torts, show that courts of justice have most commonly set their faces against them.... It is very dangerous for the judges to intermeddle in damages for torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a tort, and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a court to grant a new trial for excessive damages.' The same rale is acted upon by the courts in actions for breach of promise to marry. Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn 495; Perkins v. Her-sey, 1 R. I. 495. But in all these cases, new trials are granted if the damages are clearly excessive. Chambers v Robinson,

2 Stra. 691; Price v. Severn, 7 Bine 316; Boyd v. Brown. 17 Pick. 453, McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234; Wiggins v. Coffin, 3 Storv, I; Collins v. The A. & S. R. R. Co. 12 6arh.492, Diblinr. Murphy,

3 Sandf. 19. In Sharp r. Brice, 2 W. Bl. 942, I/eGreif, C. J., said: "It has never been laid down that the court will not grant a new trial for excessive damages in any case of tort. It was held so long ago as'in Comb. 357, that the jury have not a despotic power in such actions. The utmost that can be said is, and very truly, that the same rule does not prevail upon questions of tort, as of contract. In contract the measure of damages is generally matter of account, and the damages given may be demonstrated to be right or wrong.

But in torts a greater latitude is allowed to the jury, and the damages must be excessive ami outrageous to require or warrant a new trial." In Letton v Young, 2 Met. (Ky ) 558, the court say, that " it has been repeatedly held by this court that a new trial should not be granted because of excessive damages, and especially in actions of this character (slander), unless the damages should be so great as to strike the mind at first blush as having been superinduced by passion or prejudice."

(oo) Reeder v. Purdy, 48 111. 261; Slater v. Sherman, 5 Bush. 206.

(p) 1 Chitty's PL 332; Stevens o. Lyford, 7 N H. 360; Furlong v Pollevs, 30 Me. 491; Bedell v. Powell, 13 Barb. 183. In Vanderslice r. Newton, 4 Comst. 130. the action was for a breach of a contract to tow the plaintiff's boat. Haggles, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: " With respect to the damages, the general rule in questions of this nature is, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, as a recompense for his injury, all the damages which are the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of. (2 Greenl. Ev. § 256.) Those which necessarily result from the injury are termed general damages, and may be shown under the general allegation of damages, at the end of the declaration. But such damages as are the natural, although not the necessary, result of the injury, are termed special damages, and must be stated in the declaration, to prevent a surprise upon the defendant; and being so stated, may be recovered." one who owes money refuses to pay it, the creditor may sue and declare himself damaged, without specifying in what way, because the law understands, that, when one cannot get money which is due to him, he must sustain loss. So, if in slander, the words charge an indictable offence, or a contagious disease, or impute insolvency to a merchant, or make any other imputation which, if believed, must tend to exclude a man from society, subject him to punishment as a criminal, or interfere with his lawful occupation, the plaintiff need not here say in what way he is damaged, for the law asserts that such slander as this must be injurious, (q) But if * the words charged are of other matters, and the defamation may or may not have been injurious, the plaintiff must now set forth specifically the damages he has sustained, and either prove them as alleged, specifically, or prove facts from which the jury may infer them, (r) These damages are called special damages. They are such consequences of the injury as are both actual and natural, but not necessary.