1 Where a married woman made a conveyance of land by a false statement that she was single, a note for the price was cancelled as without consideration, notwithstanding her claim that the payee had obtained an estate by estoppel. Mason v. Jordan, 13 R. I. 193.

(x) See note (q), supra. In Howard v. Hudson, 2 Ellis & B. 1, Campbell, C. J., states the rule, that the party setting up such a bar to the reception of truth, must show both that there was a wilful intent to make him act on the faith of the representation, and that he did so act. And if the party induce another to act by misrepresentations innocently made, he must yet bear the injury. Thus, in Waller v. Drakeford, 1 Ellis & B. 749, a woman's goods were sold to an innocent party, with her concurrence, by a man to whom she supposed she was married, and on discovering her mistake she was precluded from disputing the sale. So in Wells v. Pierce, 7 Foster, 508, an owner was concluded by a sale which he had induced another to make, although at the time he was ignorant of his own interest. See also Howard v. Tucker, 1 B. & Ad. 712; Doe v. Lambly, 2 Esp. 635; Carnes v. Field, 2 Yeates, 241. But see Steele v. Putney, 15 Me. 327. But if the conduct or representation be not intended as an inducement to another to act, or be such that a reasonable man would anticipate no action from it, there is such an absence of the first element of estoppel, that none is raised, though another is in fact induced to act upon it. Thus, where admissions were made to third persons: Regina v. Ambergate, etc. B. Co. 1 Ellis & B. 372; Pennell v. Hinman, 7 Barb. 644, and notes (q) and (r), supra; nor where the admission sought to be set up was an answer to an incidental question: Pierce v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 4. In that case an execution creditor, without disclosing bis purpose, obtained an admission that a horse in plaintiff's possession was the property of his debtor, and a seizure was thereupon made; but the plaintiff was not precluded from showing that the horse was his own. So members of a corporation, acting innocently, are not personally estopped from asserting their private rights. Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544.

(y) Moran v. Miami Commissioners. 2 Black 722.

(z) Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 193; Phila. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How.

1 The obligors of a bond given to stay execution in pursuance of a statute passed in aid of secession are estopped to deny the constitutionality of the statute. Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415. A town having issued bonds unconditional on their face can not escape liability by showing that by a popular vote the bonds were subject to certain conditions which have not been complied with. Insurance Co. v. Bruce, 105 U. S. 328.

2 In Warder v. Baker, 54 Wis. 49, the false statements of a garnishee that he was

The difficulty attending this class of estoppels, may be stated thus: Is it necessary that there shall be some default of duty, by act or neglect, as a ground for the estoppel ? We are not willing to admit, that a person entirely innocent, in a moral point of view, may not be bound by his acts or sayings, where, if he be not bound, he will be permitted to cast an injury upon some one as innocent as he is, but who has been misled merely by a justifiable confidence in what was said or done to him with the intent that he should rely upon it. (a) But where this confidence and dependence were not expected, and still more where they do not exist, we apprehend that an estoppel must be founded upon fault. It seems to be settled that an estoppel cannot be founded upon acts, or words, or silence, unless they were intended to lead the party who seeks to set up the estoppel, to act upon them. (aa) 1 And that only he can set up the estoppel, who trusted to it in some business transaction. (ab) The whole doctrine of estoppels in pais originated in courts of equity, and passed from them into courts of law; and the doctrine of equity is often asserted in respect to them, by courts of law; (b) and where there is no violation or neglect of duty, of any kind, we apprehend that it must be a very strong case which comes within the law of estoppel. (c) 2

307, 336, per Curtis, J.: "When a party asserts what he knows is false, or does not know to be true, to another's loss and his own gain, he is guilty of a fraud; a fraud in fact, if he knows it to be false; fraud in law, if he does not know it to be true." But the applications of the rule will be found to bear the qualifications in vol. i. p.* 66.

(a) Newman v. Edwards, 34 Penn. St. 32; Water's Appeal, 35 Penn. St. 523; Manufacturers' Bank v. Schofield, 39 Vt. 590; Gillespie v. Carpenter, 1 Rob. 65; Cloud v. Whiting, 33 Ala. 57; Hailey v. Franks, 18 La. An. 559; Ballon v. Jones, 37 Ill. 95.

(aa) Turner v. Coffin, 12 Allen, 401.

(ab) Garlinghouse v. Whitwell, 51 Barb. 208.

(b) Thus, in Wetland Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480, Nelson, J., limits estoppels to cases where a party, "in good conscience and honest dealing, ought not to be permitted to gainsay" his own acts or admissions. See Davis v. Davis, 28 Cal. 23; Andrews v. Lyon, 11 Allen, 349; Davidson v. Young, 38* Ill. 145; Langdon v. Doud, 10 Allen, 433.

(c) We apprehend that this is the doctrine of Downs v. Cooper, 2 Q. B. 256, quoted ante, in note (a), as qualifying Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469. Perhaps, however, no cases illustrate this principle better than B. & W. Railroad Co. v. Sparhawk, 5 Met. 469, and Brewer v. B. & W. Railroad Co. 5 Met. 478. These cases are in substance as follows: A and B own adjoining land; they desire to establish a indebted to a defendant was held not to estop him from denying such indebtedness, where in reliance on such a statement the plaintiff has only incurred the expense of service.

1 The grantee of an unrecorded deed, made prior to a judgment against the grantor, is not estopped to set up his title against the judgment creditor without proof that the grantee's failure to record was fraudulent. Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N. Y. 221.