11 A. & E. 307. And estoppel expires with the term. Bayley v. Bradley, 5 C. B. 396; Ryerss v. Farwell, 9 Barb. 615; Horner v. Leeds, 1 Dutcher, 106; Knowles v. Maynard, 13 Met. 352; Pierce v. Brown, 24 Vt. 165. So where there has been ouster. Morse v. Goddard, 13 Met. 177. And title prior to tenancy may be disputed. Doe v. Powell, 1 A. & E. 531. And where the landlord insists that the lease is void, the tenant may set up an outstanding term. Egremont v. Langdon,

12 Q. B. 711. Payment of rent is an acknowledgment of title which will estop. Cooper v. Blandy, 1 Bing. N. C. 45; Gouldsworth v. Knights, 11 M. & W. 337. Unless it was made through mistake or other rebutting circumstances. Rogers v. Pitcher, 6 Taunt 202; Fenner v. Duplock, 2 Bing. 10; Claridge v. Mackenzie, 4 Man. & G. 143 ; Doe v. Barton, 11 A. & E. 307. And acceptance binds the landlord. Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998. The same relation exists between a trustee and a cestui que trust Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Mylne & C. 41; Pinkaton v. Brewster, 14 Ala. 315; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & L. 607. Between mortgagor and mortgagee. Doe v. Vickers, 4 A. & E. 782; Hall v. Surtees, 5 B. & Ald. 687. Principal and agent. Osgood v. Nichols, 5 Gray, 420; Collins c. Tillou, 26 Conn. 368. Vendor and vendee. Doe v. Edgar, 2 Bine. N. C. 498; Upshaw v. McBride,

10 B. Mod. 202. Where a party uses an invention by permission of the patentee, he is estopped from denying the validity of the letters-patent. Laws v. Purser, 6 Ellis & B. 930. But this has been denied. Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535, 548; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, 513; Page v. Hill, was sufficient opportunity to arrest them; (t) l and gross negligence is equivalent * in its conclusive effect to active * 799

11 Mo. 149. Where one accepts a beneficial interest under a will, he is precluded from setting up any title or claim in himself whereby any of the provisions of the will may be defeated. Benedict v. Montgomery, 7 Watts & S. 238; Smith v. Guild, 34 Me. 443; Denn v. Cornell, 3 Johns. Cas. 174; Hook v. Hook, 13 B. Mon. 526. But see Fitz v. Cook, 5 Cush. 596. Where a tenant accepts a new lease or other conveyance inconsistent with his prior lease, it is a surrender of the latter by operation of law, even though the new lease be for a shorter term. Bac. Abr. Leases, S. 2; Roe v. Archbishop, 6 East, 86; Burnett v. Scribner, 16 Barb. 621. And where there is a parol agreement to surrender, which is within the statute of frauds, if it is acted upon by the re-entry of the landlord, the parties will be estopped from denying the surrender. Grimman v. Legge, 8 B. & C. 324; Dodd v. Acklom, 7 Scott, N. R. 415. But there must be a change of possession. Johnstone v. Huddleton, 4 B. & C. 922; Doe v. Wood, 14 M. & W. 682; Mollett v.

(s) Thus, citizens omitting to make objection to a petition for public improvements when there was opportunity to do so, are thereby estopped from objecting to the action taken on the petition. People v. Rochester, 21 Barb. 656. So of a dedication of property to public uses. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431; Sherman v. McKeon, 8 Bosw. 103; Wilder v. St. Paul, 12 Minn. 192.

Brayne, 2 Camp. 108. Such agreement, however, may be a defence in an action for rent. Gore v. Wright, A. & E. 118. And if the new lease fan to pass an interest it is not a surrender. Doe v. Poole, 11 Q. B. 713. In Thomas v. Cook, 2 B. & Ald. 119, a tenant underlet to a third party, who was accepted by the landlord, with the assent of the tenant; this was held a valid surrender of the original tenant interest, and a defence against the landlord claiming rent. This case was controverted in Lyon v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 285, but affirmed in Nickels v. Atherstone, 10 Q. B. 944. See also Schieffelin v. Carpenter, 15 Wend. 400, ante, vol. i.(k). But the intention of the parties must be clearly made out. Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337. A similar practice where leases have not been registered obtains in some New England States. 4 Greenl. Cruise, 8 n. (1). See for later cases on the subject of Estoppels, Heath v. Derry Bank, 44 N. H. 174; Judovine v. Goodrich, 35 Vt. 9; White v. Walker, 3 Ill. 422; Whitacre v. Culver, 8 Minn. 133; Hazelton v. Batchelder, 44 N. H. 40; Diller v. Brubaker, 52 Penn. 488. But assertions will operate as estoppels, only in favor of those whom they were intended to influence, and not as to strangers who heard them casually. Morgan v. Spangler, 14 Ohio (n. S.), 102; Lexington R. R. Co. v. Elwell, 8 Allen, 371; Lefever v. Lefever, 30 N. Y. 27; Frost v. Koon, 30 N. Y. 428; Ohio, etc R. R. Co. v. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13. One who adopts a signature knowing it to be forged, is estopped from denying its genuineness. Casco Bank v. Keen, 53 Me. 103. An indorser who, after a note is due, induces a party to buy the note without disclosing that he is discharged by want of virtue, is estopped from making that defence. Libbey v. Pierce, 47 N. H. 309. A surety who requests the holder of the note to sue the principal, is not estopped from defending against the action. Bigelow v. Woodward, 15 Gray, 560. The following are cases under wills or codicils: Buchans v. Harwell, 43 Barb. 424; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 1 Mcconduct. (u) So if a person by actual expressions or by a course of conduct, so appears, that another may reasonably infer the existence of an agreement or license, and the other acts upon that inference, whether the former intends that he shall do so or not, the person so expressing or conducting himself cannot afterwards deny or resist the reasonable inference to be drawn from his words or conduct. (v)

Carter, 49; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 47 Penn. St. 478.

Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245. If a person collects money in the character of a guardian, he is estopped from retaining for his own use the money collected. Portia v. Cummings, 21 Texas, 265. A person consenting to a sheriff's sale is estopped from denying the officer's authority. Lay v. Neville, 25 Cal. 545.