It may also be laid down as a very general rule, that where proceedings between parties, even of a public nature, written document by a party is legal evidence against him, not to supply the absence of the instrument, but superseding the necessity of any evidence. Slatterie v. Pooley, 6 M. & W. 664; Regina v. Basinstoke, 14 Q. B. 611. As we have seen, the doctrine of equitable estoppels has been introduced into our system of jurisprudence for the purpose of protecting one party from loss arising from the fraud or negligent conduct of another, and there is hardly a limit to the applications, of the principle. Representations and admissions, or a course of conduct which would lead a reasonable man to infer the existence of certain facts, if these have formed the basis of any action, constitute a ground for estoppel. Passive acquiescence in the conduct of another, whether in deceiving a third party or himself, when he should have been informed of the true state of affairs, estops equally with active interference. He who is silent, it is said, when conscience requires him to speak, shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent. Niven v. Belknap, 2 Johns. 573; Cambridge Savings Inst. v. Littlefield, 6 Cush. 210; Queen v. L. & S. Railway, 10 A. & E. 3. In Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. 654, Parke, B., is reported to say: "In most cases to which the doctrine [of equitable estoppel] is to be applied, the representation is such as to amount to the contract or license of the party making it." Thus George v. Clagett, 7 T. R. 359, is a leading case for the doctrine, that one dealing with a factor, and ignorant of the existence of a principal, shall be allowed to set off, in a suit by the principal, demands against the factor; and this has since been followed. Coates v. Lewes, 1 Camp. 444; Taylor v. Kymer, 3 B. & Ad. 320; Sims v. Bond, 5 id. 389 ; Purchell v. Salter, 1 Q. B. 197; Stackwood v. Dunn, 3 Q. B. 822. So where one of the plaintiffs was a sleeping partner. Stacey v. Decy, 2 Esp. 469 (n), 7 T. R. 361 (c). So a person suffering himself to be held out as a partner in a firm will be liable like a partner. Hicks v. Cram, 17 Vt. 449. But where there is knowledge of the real state of affairs, the reason and the rule cease. Maanes v. Henderson, 1 East, 325; Hutchins v. Hebbard, 34 N. Y. 24. So where notice is given, before the contract is complete. Moore v. Clementson, 2 Camp. 22. Or where, from the nature of the business, knowledge may be presumed. Baring v. Corrie, 2 B. & Ald. 137. Of the same character is the rule laid down in Gregg v. Wells, 10 A. & E. 90, and in Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 Comst. 303, that a party who negligently or culpably stands by and allows another to contract, on the faith and understanding of some fact which he can contradict, cannot dispute that fact in an action against the person whom he has assisted in deceiving. Thus, where a vendor is held out, or is suffered to hold himself out, as authorized, the owner is concluded. Stephens v. Baird, 9 Cowen, 274; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. The authority may be inferred from the conduct of the owner. Dyer v. Pearson, 3 B. & C. 38. In Davis v. Bradley, 24 Vt. 55, a bill of sale and order for the delivery of goods was held conclusive on one party; a consignment to vendee and drafts on account conclusive of a sale; and a receipt by one as forwarding merchant concluded him from disputing title. See also Brewster v. Baker, 16 Barb. 613; Whitaker v. Williams, 20 Conn. 98; Cox v. Buck, 3 Strobh. 367. Where a husband had received proceeds of wife's choses in action, a future title in him inures to his assignee. Commonwealth v. Shuman, 18 Penn. St. 343. In Stephens v. Baird, the plaintiff pointed out and receipted to a sheriff as the property of a debtor, property in which the debtor had an inchoate right only; a sale followed, and by these admissions the plaintiff was estopped from showing that the debtor's interest had never ripened into title. So goods attached as property of another were rewill discharge such surety. The owner's neglect to sue for his property for more than five months after learning of its attachment as the property of another, does not estop the owner from claiming it, although such other has been at the expense of keeping it. Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250. Steel v. Smelting Co. 106 U. S. 447, decided that the principle that the owner of land who allows another to make improvements on the land under the mistaken idea that it belongs to him, cannot deny such other's title, does not apply where the latter knows or has means of knowing the true state of his title. But where a judgment debtor, with knowledge of facts sufficient to render illegal a sale of his property by a trustee, allows without objection a purchaser at the sale to expend large sums in improvements, he cannot maintain ejectment against the purchaser. Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68. See Turner v. Thomas, L. R. 6 C. P. 610.

[past ii.

sequent interference. (s) * Still more is this the case where the proceedings are between private persons only, and there

But in Rangely v. Spring, 28 Me. 127, and Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482, such doctrine is declared to be no departure or violation of the statute of frauds; and in Boyd v. Graves, 4 Wheat. 513, that it is not in the statute. Prominent among estoppels is that which precludes a tenant from denying the title of the landlord under whom he entered, and from setting up a paramount title in himself or another. Doe v. Smythe, 4 M. & 8. 347; Doe v. Wiggins, 4 Q. B. 367; Doe v. Foster, 3 C. B. 215; Sharpe v. Kelley, 5 Denio, 431; Oakes v. Munroe, 8 Cosh. 282; Henley v. Bank, 16 Ala. 552; Pope v. Harkins, id. 321; McIntire v. Patton, 9 Humph. 447; Cooper v. Smith, 8 Watts, 536. This depends upon the tenant's agreement, express or implied, that he will at some time or in some event surrender the possession. Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, 513. Estoppel applies wherever one party is let into possession by another. Doe v. Foster, supra. An unknown landlord is protected where the premises are let by an agent. Fleming v. Gooding, 10 Bing. 549. The rule applies to all in privity with the landlord. Rennie v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 147; Blantin v. Whitaker, 11 Humph. 313. And the tenant's assignees are equally bound. Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cowen, 123. As is even an adverse party led in by the tenant. Doe v. Mills, 1 Moody c. R. 385. And in Doe v. Baytup, 3 A. & E. 188, a hostile party, who, obtaining possession by license, set up his adverse claim, was estopped. But a tenant may show the landlord's title expired, which is not a denial of title, but an avoidance by matter ex post facto. Hopcraft v. Keys, 9 Bing. 613; Doe v. Barton,