2 Though this statement is sometimes made, Tremper v. Conklin, 44 N. Y. 58, 61, it is erroneous. Partners are joint tenants, and on the death of one, the title to the partnership property vests absolutely in the survivor, the representatives of the deceased partner having merely a right to an accounting. Davidson v. Weems, 58 Ala. 187; Nicklaus v. Dahn, 63 Ind. 87; Brown v. Allen, 35 Ia. 306; Smith v. Wood, 31 Md. 293; Bush v. Clark, 127 Mass. 111; Bassett v. Miller, 39 Mich. 133; Williams v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333. See also Emerson v. Senter, 118 U. S. 3, 8; Durant v. Pierson, 124 N. Y. 444,452; Bates on Partnership, § 712. And on the surviving partner's death his representative succeeds to his title. Costley v. Wilkerson, 49 Ala. 210; Brooks v. Brooks, 12 Heisk. 12.

If the survivors carry on the concern, and enter into new transactions with the partnership funds, they do so at their peril; and the representatives of the deceased may elect to call on them for the capital with a share of the profits, or with interest. (l)1

After allowing a reasonable time for a settlement, a court of equity will enjoin a survivor from further prosecution of the business, and will appoint a receiver, and direct an account to be taken. (m)

A court of equity will interfere and decree a dissolution, upon * a case distinctly made out, of positive and injurious wrong, done by one or more of the partners, against the interest of the firm; (n) and when called upon to settle the affairs of a partnership, it will respect any stipulations between the partners as to the mode of settlement. In the absence of such stipulations it will be governed by the last settled account, both as to its result and its method, unless the account be set aside for fraud, actual or constructive, or be open to objection, as oppressive and unreasonable. (o) Nor will a partner be allowed compensation for services to the firm, or any peculiar advantage, without express stipulation, or circumstances of equivalent force. (p) The presumption of law is that the losses are to be

(k) In England it seems that he may go at once to the estate of the deceased partner; Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Meriv. 529; Sumner v. Powell, 2 Meriv. 37; Wilkinson v. Henderson, 1 Myl. & K. 582; In re Hodgson, 31 Ch. D. 177. And this doctrine seems to he supported in Fillyan v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72, and Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn. 41; Silverman v. Chase, 90 Ill. 37; Ralston v. Moore, 105 End. 243; Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145, 152; Blair v. Wood, 108 Pa. 278. But see Waldron v. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Pullen v. Whitfield, 55 Ga. 174; Haines v. Hollis-ter, 64 N. Y. 1; First Nat. Bank v. Morf;an, 73 N. Y. 593; Buckingham v. Lud-um, 37 N. J. Eq. 137.

(/) Brown v. Litton, 1 P. Wms. 140; Hammond v. Douglas, 5 Ves. 539; Featherstonaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298; Heathcote v. Hulme, 1 Jac. & W. 122; Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 11; Crawshay v. Collins, 2 Ross. 345; s. c. 15 Ves. 218; 3 Kent, Com. 64; Millard v. Ramsdell, 1 Harring. Ch. (Mich) 373; Bemie v. Vandever, 16 Ark. 616. But a partner appointed receiver is not held as partner to account for profits for partnership money invested in trade. Whitesides v. Lafferty, 3 Humph. 150.

(m) Murray v. Mumford, 6 Cowen, 441; Walker v. House, 4 Md. Ch. 39; Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495.

(x) Tattersall v. Groote, 2 B. & P. 131; Ex parte Broome, 1 Rose, 69; Hamil v. Stokes, 4 Price, 161; 8. c. Daniel, 20; Oldaker v. Lavender, 6 Sim. 239; Green v. Barrett, 1 Sim. 45; Jones v. Yates, 9 B. & C. 532.

(o) Jackson v. Sedgwick, 1 Swanst. 460, 469; Pettyt v. Janeson, 6 Madd. 146; Oldakor v. Lavender, 6 Sim. 239; Desha v. Sheppard, 20 Ala. 747; Story on Part. §§ 206, 349.

(p) Lee v. Lashbrooke, 8 Dana, 214; Coarsen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer, 513; Day v. Lockwood, 24 Conn. 185. But. if some of those who are partners really act as equally borne, and the profits equally divided, even if the money or the labor is provided in different proportions. (q)

1 A survivor mixing firm property with his own is liable for resulting confusion, unless he can distinguish each from the other. Diversey v. Johnson, 93 Ill. 547. - K.

While it is a general rule that every partner is bound to exercise due skill and diligence in promoting the interests of the firm, without reward or compensation, unless it be otherwise agreed between the parties, (qq)1 such agreement may be implied from the course of business pursued between the partners, as disclosed by the evidence; and when a partner renders services which neither the law nor the agreement of the parties imposes upon him, it is said that an agreement that he shall be paid is implied. (r)

A dissolution will be decreed, if the court are satisfied that the whole scheme and purpose of the partnership were absurd and unpracticable; (s) or that the original agreement between the parties was tainted with fraud. (t) In such cases, all the partners must be made parties to the bill. (u) Even after a dissolution, and while the affairs are in settlement, the court will interfere, by injunction or a receiver, if necessary to prevent waste or wrong. (v)

When a court of equity winds up a partnership concern, it is done by a sale of the partnership effects; (w) and either partner may, it is said, insist upon a sale. (x)

Proper notice should be given of a dissolution; for a firm may be bound, by a contract made after dissolution or retirement of one or more, by a former partner, in the usual course of business, with a person who had no notice or knowledge of the dissolution. (y) The requirement of notice in case of dissolution is quite similar to that stated in a previous section in relation to a retiring partner.

trustees for the company, they may have a right to repayment of their advances. See In re German Mining Co. 27 E. L. & E. 158.

(q) Webster v. Bray, 7 Hare, 159; Gould v. Gould, 6 Wend. 263; Donelson v. Posey, 13 Ala. 752; Roach v. Perry, 16 Ill. 37; Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, C. C. 11.

(qq) An attorney at law, who was a partner in a mercantile firm, was not allowed to charge commissions for collecting the debts of the firm, in Vanduzer v. McMillan, 37 Ga. 299. See also Drew v. Ferson, 22 Wis. 651.

(r) Levi v. Kanrick, 13 Ia. 344.

(s) Beaumont v. Meredith, 3 Ves. & B, 180; Buckley v. Cater, 17 Ves. 15; Pearce v. Piper, 17 Ves. 1; Reeve v. Parkins, 2 Jac. & W. 390.

(t) Hynes v. Stewart, 10 B. Mon. 429; Fogg v. Johnston, 27 Ala. 432.

(u) Long v. Yonge, 2 Sim. 369.

(v) Roberts v. Eberhardt, 23 E. L. & E. 245; s. c. 1 Kay, 148; Mayson v. Beazley, 27 Miss. 185; Milliken v. Loving, 37 Me. 408.

(w) Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 495; Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218.

(x) Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, C. C. 11.

(y) Merritt v. Pollys, 16 B. Mon. 355; Clapp v. Rogers, 2 Kern. 283; Devins v. Harris, 3 Greene (Ia.), 186; Pope v. Risley, 23 Mo. 185; Brown v. Clark, 14 Penn. St. 469; Conro v. Port Henry Iron

1 Each partner must work to the extent of his ability for the firm, failing to do which he is chargeable on a settlement of accounts for the value of his services. Marsh's Appeal, 69 Penn. St. 30. - K.