(a) Atwood v. Gillett, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 206.

(b) Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445; Harvey v. Crickett, 5 M. & Sel. 336; Gordon v. Freeman, 11 Ill. 14; Major v. Hawkes, 12 Ill. 298.

(bb) Cunningham v. Bragg, 37 Ala. 436.

(be) Lumberman's Bank v. Pratt, 51 Me. 563; Curry v. White, 51 Cal. 530; Montreal Bank v. Page, 98 Ill. 109; Seward v. L'Estrange, 36 Tex. 295; Meyer v. Atkins, 29 La. An. 5S6; Maxey v. Strong, 53 Miss. 280; Floyd v. Miller, 61 Ind. 224; Jenness v. Carleton, 40 Mich. 343; though authorized to wind up affairs, Smith v. Sheldon, 35 Mich. 42; Mauney v. Coit, 80 N. C. 200; contra, Lloyd v. Thomas, 79 Penn. St. 68.

(bd) Thus it is said that notes given by a partner in settlement of the business after dissolution, bind the other partners, in Ward v. Tyler, 52 Penn. St. 393. And that they do not, in Lange v. Kennedy, 20 Wis. 279.

(c) Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns.

1 Nor can he by part payment or acknowledgment remove the bar of the Statute of Limitations, Newman v. McComas, 43 Md. 70; Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339; Maxey v. Strong, 53 Miss. 280; Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 75; Crumless v. Sturgess, 6 Heiskell, 190; Folk v. Russell, 7 Baxter, 591; contra, Merritt v. Day, 9 Vroom, 32; Mix v. Shattuck, 50 Vt. 421; Feigley v. Whitaker, 22 Ohio St. 606.

2 But a demand by or on a former partner, after dissolution, on a firm note will charge an indorser. Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518; Fourth Bank, etc. v. Henschen, 52 Mo. 207. - K.

3 Where a firm is dissolved by war, notice of dishonor of a firm note given to a fee) Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 Howard (N. Y.), 82.

Although the death of a partner operates a dissolution of the partnership, the articles of copartnership may provide for its continuance, by an agreement that the executors, administrators, heirs, or other designated person, shall take the place of a deceased partner. (d) But where executors, in execution of a will, * carry on the business of a partnership for the benefit of the heir, the whole property is liable, and not merely the capital in the business. (c) And if, without such requirement in the will, executors put or leave the funds of the deceased in the partnership, voluntarily, they would be liable personally as partners. (ee)

57; 16 Id. 438. In this case, the authorities and principles governing contracts with persons domiciled in an enemy's country, were fully reviewed by Chancellor Kent, in the Court of Errors. McConnell v. Hector, 3 B. & P. 113; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; Woods v. Wilder, 43 N. Y. 164; New Orleans Bank v. Matthews, 49 N. Y. 12; Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43; Taylor v. Hutchinson, 25 Gratt. 536; Booker v. Kirkpatrick, 26 Gratt. 145; Planters' Bank v. St. John, 1 Woods, 585. See Mc-Stea v. Matthews, 50 N. Y. 166; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U. S. 7. The partnership in such cases will be illegal, notwithstanding one or more partners are resident in a neutral country. The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gallis 268; The Franklin, 6 Rob. Adm. 127. And the property of a house of trade established in an enemy's country is con-demnable as prize, whatever may be the domicile of the partners. The Freund-schaft, 4 Wheat. 105; Story on Part. § 316.

(d) Wrexham v. Huddleston, 1 Swanst. 514, n.; Crawshay v. Maule, 1 Swanst. 520; Pearce v. Chamberlain, 2 Ves. Sen. 33; Balinain v. Shore, 9 Ves. 500; Warner v. Cunningham, 3 Dow, 76; Gratz v. Bayard, 11 S. & R. 41; Knapp v. McBride, 7 Ala. 28. And such express agreement for the continuance of the partnership after the death of one partner is necessary, although the partnership is for a term of years. Gillespie v. Hamilton, 3 Madd. 251; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586; Pigott v. Bagley, McClel. & Y. 575. It is not a settled question whether stipulations in the articles of partnership, providing for its continuance after the death of a partner for the benefit of the heirs, is binding on them. Louisiana Bank v. Kenner's Succession, 1 La. 384. But according to Chancellor Kent, " the better opinion is, that they are not anywhere absolutely binding. It is at the option of the representatives, and if they do not consent, the death of the party puts an end to the partnership." 3 Kent, Com. 57, n; Pigott v. Bagley, McClel. & Y. 569; Kershaw v. Matthews, 2 Russ. 62. - A partner, too, may by his will provide that the partnership shall continue notwithstanding his death; and if it is consented to by the surviving partner, it becomes obligatory; but, in that case, that part of his property only will be liable, in case of bankruptcy, which he has directed to be embarked in the trade. Ex parte Garland, 10 Ves. 110; Thompson v. Andrews, 1 Myl. & K. 116; Vincent v. Martin, 79 Ala. 540; Brasfield v. French, 59 Miss. 632; Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129; Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 307; Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 576. The court in this case said: " By the general rule of law every partnership is dissolved by the death of one of the partners. It is true that it is competent for the partners to provide by agreement for the continuance of the partnership after such death; but then it takes place in virtue of such agreement only, as the act on the parties, and not by mere operation of law. A partner, too, may by his will provide that the partnership shall continue notwithstanding his death; and if it is consented to by the surviving partner, it becomes obligatory, just as it would if the testator, being a sole trader, had provided for the continuance of his trade by his executor, after his death. But then in each case the agreement or authority must be clearly made out; and third persons, having notice of the death, are bound to inquire how far the agreement or authority to continue it extends, and what funds it binds, and if they trust the surviving party beyond the reach of such agreement or authority, or fund, it is their own fault, and they have no right to complain that the law does not afford them any satisfactory redress. A testator, too, directing the continuance of a partnership, may, if he so choose, bind his general assets for all the debts of the partnership contracted after his death. But he may also limit his responsibility, either to the funds already embarked in the trade, or to any specific amount to be invested therein for that purpose; and then the creditors can resort to that fund or amount only, and not to the general assets of the testator's estate, although partner remaining where its place of business was, binds all, including a partner in the hostile territory. Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43. - K.