(rr) Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180. In an action by a husband for seduction of his wife, it was held, that although he failed in proof of loss of service, he could recover for his mental anguish: in Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 10.

(s) In Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 875, the action was assumpsit on a contract to carry the plaintiff in a ship from London to Sheerness. It was alleged, as a breach, that the defendants, by their agents, caused the plaintiff to be disembarked at an intermediate port, in a scandalous and disgraceful manner, and used towards him contemptuous and insulting language. It was held, that these aggra-vating circumstances could be shown to increase the damages. Parke, B, said: " With respect to what was said by the captain, at the time of turning the plaintiff out of the vessel, I think it was properly received. There can be no doubt that the defendants are liable for everything done in breach of the contract by the captain, acting as their servant. The breach of contract alleged in the declaration, is the refusing to carry the plaintiff in the ship, and turning him out of it in a contemptuous manner, before the termination of the voyage. The turning him out is part of the breach, and the mode of turning him out is part of the evidence in the case. A contract is broken, and it is quite impossible to exclude from the view of the jury the circumstances under which it was broken. Surely it would make a most material difference if the contract were broken because it would be inconvenient to carry him to his journey's end, and if he were turned out under circumstances of aggravation. Suppose, instead of a man landed at Graveseud from a steamboat, this had been the case of a passenger in a ship bound to the West Indies, and that he were put ashore on a desert island, without food, or exposed to the burning sun and the danger of wild beasts, or even landed among savages, would not evidence be receivable to show the state of the island where he was left, and the circumstances attending the violation of the contract? "

(t) 3 Am. Jurist, 391 et seq.; Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raym. 421; James v. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372; Hay v. The Cohoes Co. 3 Barb. 42; M'Bride v. M'Laughlin, 5 Watts, 376.

(u) Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499.

(v) Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb, 647.

1 See ante p. * 157, note I.

constitute the injury, and may thus, in effect, aggravate the damages, although they formed no part of the injury complained of. Thus, in an action of slander, it has been said that the plaintiff may prove, in aggravation of damages, other words than those he sets forth as constituting the slander. This we think very doubtful in point of law and of right. But he may show other words, in order to illustrate and make apparent the meaning, character, and effect of the words which he alleges. These other words may inflict other and further injury, but must not be used or considered by the jury for the purpose of increasing the damages to be rendered in this action, because damages for those very words may be recovered in an action founded upon them. It seems reasonable, however, that a jury may use these other words in explanation of those declared upon, although a distinct action may be brought upon them, provided they are not permitted to be considered as increasing the injury inflicted by the words declared on, and so of increasing the damages, (w)

(w) There is much diversity in the English Nisi Prius decisions, upon the questions arising relative to the introduction of other words than those for which the action is brought, as evidence in suits for slander or libel. The subject was first thoroughly considered in Westminster Hall, in the late case of Pearson v. Lemaitre, 5 Man. & G. 700, 6 Scott, N. R. 607, where the Nisi Prius decisions were cited and commented on by counsel. The action was for libel, and the communication was not equivocal, or prima facie privileged, so that express malice need he shown, in order to maintain the action. It was held, that other communications, containing in substance a repetition of the same libellous matter, and published after the suit was brought, and in themselves actionable, could be introduced to show that the defendant was actuated by malice in fact. Tindal, C. J., said: "And this appears to us to be the correct rule, viz., that either party may, with a view to the damages, give evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a malicious motive in the mind of the publisher of defamatory matter; but that if the evidence given for that purpose establishes another cause of action, the jury should be cautioned against giving any damages in respect of it. And it such evidence is offered merely for the purpose of obtaining damages for such subsequent injury, it will be properly rejected. . . . Upon principle, we think that the spirit and intention of the party publishing a libel are fit to be considered by a jury, in estimating the injury done to the plaintiff, and that evidence tending to prove it cannot be excluded, simply because it may disclose another and different cause of action." The law does not appear to be settled in this country. In Thomas v Crosswell, 7 Johns. 264, and Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602, it was held, in the first case, that in actions for libel the plaintiff may give in evidence other publications which are not libellous; and in the second case, that in actions for verbal slander, the plaintiff may prove other slanderous words, where the statute of limitations has run as to those words. And in Root v. Lowndes, 6 Hill, 518, in a case where malice was implied by law, the court held that the repetition of the same words should be received, but would not allow the plaintiff to prove any words which might be the subject of another action. See Keenholts v. Becker, 3 Denio, 346; Kendall v. Stone, 2 Sandf. 269. In Bodwell v. Swan, 3 Pick. 376, it was held, that a repetition of the words for which the action was brought, or the uttering of words of similar import, might be given in evidence, to show that the first uttering of the words was malicious. But the court also declared that they could go no further, and that they could not permit a distinct calumny, uttered by the defendant, to be given in evidence to prove his malice in speaking the words for which the action was brought. See Watson v Moore, 2 Cush-