(ee) Love v. Sierra Nevada, etc. Co. 32 Cal. 639.

(ef) Sheehan v. Davis, 17 0. St. 571.

(f) Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 427; Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241.

(g) Osborn v. U S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 830; where this rule of evidence was applied in the case of an attorney assuming to act in behalf of a corporation. See also Jackson v. Stewart, 6 Johns. 34; Denton v. Noyes, id. 296; Hardin v. Hoyoponubby's Lessee, 27 Miss. 567; Henck v. Todhnuter, 7 Har. & J. 275; Huston, J., Lynch v. Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 369; Woodbury, J., Eastman v. Coos Bank, 1 N. H. 23; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8 Foster (N. H.), 302; Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. 544; Leslie v. Fischer, 62 Ill. 118; Hager v. Cochran, 66 Md. 253; Norberg v. Heineman, 59 Mich. 210; Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y. 502; Schlitz v. Meyer, 61 Wis. 418. The authority from the client need not in general be in writing; yet an oral authority to appear in a cause is not sufficient to enable the attorney to release the interest of a witness. Murray v. House, 11 Johns. 464. As to the evidence required to support a claim for services rendered by an attorney to his client, see Burghart v. Gardner, 3 Barb. 64; Wilson v. Wilson, 1 Jac. & W. 457. - Solicitor is the legal designation of one who fills the place in a court of equity corresponding to that of an attorney in a court of law. Maugham c. 1, § 1.

(h) Marshall, C. J., Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 829.

An attorney who places his client's money in the hands of his own banker, on his own private account, though he does this bona fide, and has money of his own in the hands of the same banker, is liable for the loss thereof by the bankruptcy of the banker.(i) But it seems that he is not liable if he deposits the money as the property of the owner, and opens a special account specifying whose it is. (j) His implied duty to use reasonable skill, care, etc., is the same as that of other persons to whose care and skill anything is intrusted; which will be spoken of hereafter. (k) He is not responsible for mistake in a doubtful point of law, (l) or of practice, (m) nor for the fault of counsel retained by him. (n) But the estate of an attorney was held liable after his death, for erroneous advice given to a client in ignorance of a recent change of the law (nn) He is liable for disclosing privileged communications. (o) If discharged by one party,

(hh) In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651.

(hi) People v. Harvey, 41 Ill. 277.

(hj) Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Redman v. State, ib. 205.

(i) Robinson v. Ward, 2 C & P. 59. And see ante, p. *89, n. 1.

(j) Abbott, C. J., Robinson v. Ward, 2 C. & P. 60.

(k) Pitt v. Yalden. 4 Burr. 2060; Baikie v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17, 19; Shilcock v. Passman, 7 C. & P. 289; Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460, Meggs v. Binns, 2 Bing. N. C. 625; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 16 S. & R. 368"; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Var-num v. Martin, 15 Pick. 440; Wilson v. Coffin, 2 Cush. 316; Cooper v. Stephenson, 12 E. L. & E. 403; Parker v. Rolls, 28 id. 424. See ante, p. * 84, note (x). See, for a full discussion of duties of counsel, Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 890.

(l) Kemp v. Burt, 4 B. & Ad. 424; s. c. 1 Nev. & M. 262; Elkington v. Holland, 9 M. & W. 659; Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060.

(m) Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738.

(n) Lowry v. Guilford, 5 C. & P. 234. - Yet an attorney cannot by consulting his counsel, shift from himself the responsibility of a matter presumed by the law to lie within his own knowledge. Tindal, C. J., Godefroy v. Dalton, 4 Mo. & P. 149; S. c. 6 Bing. 460.

(nn) A. B.'s estate, 1 Tuck. 247.

(o) And his liability is not removed by the fact that he was previously retained for the party to whom the disclosures were made, and that his employer knew of that former retainer. Taylor v. Black-low, 3 Bing. N. C. 235. In Thomas v. Rawlings, 27 Beav. 140, a solicitor declined answering on the ground that he had obtained his information while acting as the solicitor of bis co-defendant. - Held, that he had not brought himself within the rule as to profes-sional privilege. His reply that be had obtained his information "either as a creditor or as the solicitor" of his client was taken most strongly against the solicitor; and he was held bound to give the discovery. In Hall v. Renfro, 3 Met. (Ky.) 51, it is held that an attorney is a competent witness for or against his client in all cases except concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation, or bis advice thereon; and in this with the client's consent. Such communications to be

*he may act for an opposite party, provided he makes no improper use of knowledge obtained by him while acting for the first party. (p) But it seems that he may not act for an opposite patry if discharged by his first client for misconduct. (q) If, being employed about a purchase of land, he buys an adverse or outstanding title, he is held to buy it for his client, if his client so elects. (qq)

The law implies a contract on the part of the client, to pay his attorney the legal fees, or statute rate of compensation. (r) And if the client asserts that the services were to be rendered for a less compensation, the burden rests on him to prove this bargain. (s) If a bargain be proved, the attorney cannot recover more by showing that his services were worth more. (t) And even if he shows that the case was deemed, with good reason, a desperate one, this will not sustain his claim for an excessive compensation; as half the sum recovered. (u) If, during the suit, an attorney make a contract with his client, which is void for champerty, he may still recover a proper compensation for services rendered before the illegal bargain. (v)

An attorney cannot maintain an action for compensation for privileged must have been addressed to the attorney in his professional character with a view to legal advice which, as an attorney, it was his duty to give. Borum v. Fouts et al. 15 Ind. 50. See also Shanghnessy v. Fogg, 15 La. An. 330. But in King v. Barrett, 11 O. St. 261, it was held that if a party to a suit offers himself as a witness and gives evidence generally in a case, he thereby loses the privilege, and under the code of civil procedure consents to the examination of his attorney touching such admissions as are pertinent to the issue. In De Wolf v. Strader, 26 Ill. 225, it is said that a retainer or fee paid is necessary to constitute the relation of attorney and client, and that an attorney who is requested to prepare a deed or mortgage, no legal advice being required, is not privileged.