(i) Daniel v. Bowles, 2 C. & P. 553.

(j) Cole v. Cottingham, 8 C. & P. 76.

(k) Potter v. Deboos, 1 Stark. 82.

A contract to marry, without specification of time, is, as we have seen, a contract to marry within a reasonable time; each party having a right to reasonable delay, but not to indefinite postponement; nor to delay without reason or beyond reason. 2 If both parties delay the fulfilment of the contract unreasonably, it may be considered as abandoned by mutual consent, in the absence of evidence to negative this inference.3

These contracts, like most others, may be on condition, and if the condition be legal and reasonable, the liability of the parties under it attaches as soon as the condition is satisfied. (o) But it may easily happen that the condition shall be such as to be void, leaving the contract valid; as if it be frivolous or impossible, and evidently introduced by one party in fraud of the other. And it may also happen that the condition shall make the contract void. Thus contracts to marry at the death of parents or relations from whom money is expected, and who are kept in ignorance of the contract, are regarded with great dislike by courts, and would probably be declared void, unless the circumstances cleared them from suspicion. (p) And if the condition were

(l) Philpot v. Wallet, 8 Lev. 66.

(m) Cork v. Baker, 1 Stra. 84, Harrison v. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym. 387.

(n) Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515.

(o) Cole v. Cottingham, 8 C. & P. 75; Atchinson v. Baker, Peake, Ad. Cas. 103.

(p) Woodhouse v. Shepley, 2 Atk.

580; Drury v. Hooke, 1 Vera. 412, was a bill for relief from a marriage brokage bond. The marriage had been brought about without the consent of the woman's parents. The Chancellor "for that reason alone decreed the bond to be delivered up, terming it a sort of kidnapping."

1 See Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29.

2 After a reasonable time elapses, and one party without cause refuses to perform, the other is justified in breaking the engagement and bringing suit. Bennett v. Bean, 42 Mich. 346.

3 Wagenseller v. Simmers, 97 Penn. St 465.

entirely uncertain, or very remote, the contract might be regarded as made in restraint of marriage, as it might prevent either party from marrying for a very long, or for an indefinite period; and it would be held void on that ground. (q)

If the promise is to marry on request, a request should be * alleged and proved; but this is not necessary when the defendant is incapacitated from marrying by his or her own act. (r)

The defences which may be urged against an action to enforce a promise to marry are very numerous. Consanguinity within the Levitical degrees in England, (s) and in this country, those within which marriage is prohibited by the statutes of the several States. So, the bad character of the plaintiff, or his or her lascivious conduct.1 The cases generally exhibit this defence where the woman is plaintiff; but it ought with equal justice, and on moral as well as on public grounds, to be permitted to the woman when she is defendant; it was so held in the case of Baddeley v. Mortlock, (t) and undoubtedly would be so held in this country. If the defence be general bad character, evidence of reputation is receivable; for, says Lord Kenyon,"character is the only point in issue; public opinion, founded on the conduct of the party, is a fair subject of inquiry." (u) 1

(q) Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22. This was an action on a wager that the plaintiff would not be married in six years. It was endeavored to distinguish this from other contracts in restraint of marriage, on the ground that it was not for life, but for a time certain; it was held, however, that a restraint for a time certain falls within the same policy of the law, and makes the contract void.

(r) Short v. Stone, 8 Q. B. 358; Caines v. Smith, 15 M. & W. 189; Harrison v. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym. 386; Millward v. Lit-tlewood, 1 E. L. & E. 408; 8. c. 5 Exch. 775.

(s) In Harrison v. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym. 887, it is said, that consanguinity within the Levitical degrees may be pleaded in bar or given in evidence under non-assumpsit. It has been sometimes intimated that previous marriage would be a defence. This must be on the ground that the promised marriage would in that case be unlawful, as in the case of consanguinity. But I take the true rule to be, that if the marriage would be unlawful, and this unlawfulness was known to the plaintiff when making the contract, then the plaintiff can sustain no action for the breach of it. Now consanguinity within the prescribed degrees may be pre-sumed to be known to both parties. Not so with previous marriage. And certainly a married man who promised to marry a single woman, who did not know his marriage, is liable to an action for the breach of his promise, for it was his own fault that he promised what he could not perform. This seems to be taken for granted by court and counsel in Daniel p. Bowles, 2 C. & P. 558.

(t) Holt, 151. In this case it was proved that charges had been made against the moral character of the plaintiff, which he did not clear away, and the defendant thereon refused to marry him. Gibbs, C. J., said: "Having promised the plaintiff marriage, she must absolve herself upon some legal grounds. If a woman improvidently promise to marry a man, who turns out upon inquiry to be of bad character, she is not bound to perform her promise. But she must show that the plaintiff is a man of bad character. The accusation is not enough. The facts charged were capable of proof. The existence of the rumor is not sufficient to discharge her from her promise. Without proof that the charges were founded she is not absolved from her contract. But it affects the damages." The jury accordingly returned a verdict for the plaintiff, damages one shilling.

1 Van Storch v. Griffin, 77 Penn. St 504; Sprague v. Craig. 51 111. 288.

If the defence rests on specific allegations of misconduct, these must be strictly proved; (v) and if the defendant knew the general bad character, or the specific misconduct, be-fore * making the promise, they constitute no defence. (w)