(g) Holt v. Ward, Stra. 937; Willard v. Stone, 7 Cowen, 22; Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cowen, 476; Pool v. Pratt, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 262.

(gg) Russell v. Cowles, 16 Gray, 682.

(h) In the case of Hutton v. Mansell, 3 Salk. 16, tried before Holt, C. J., the promise of the man was proved, but no actual promise on the woman's side, yet he held, that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the woman likewise promised, because she carried herself as one consenting, and approving the promise of the man. This question was much discussed in the case of Wightman v. Coates, 16 Mass. 1. That was an action of assumpsit on a promise to marry the plaintiff, and a breach thereof by refusal, and having married another woman. At the trial, the evidence of a promise reunder the clause in the 4th section of the statute of frauds, which provides that no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; but the courts of England, after once so deciding, (l) have since taken a distinction, which is certainly a very nice one, between promises to marry, and promises in consideration of marriage. (m) This clause is not generally * contained in the statutes of frauds of our States; but it has been held in this country, that a promise to marry at the end of five years, is within that clause of the statute which requires that a promise not to be performed within one year from the making shall be in writing. (n) 1

1 See Frost v. Vought, 37 Mich. 65; Reish v. Thompson, 55 Ind. 34.

2 Wagenseller v. Simmers, 97 Penn. St. 465. Homan v. Earle, 53 N. T. 267, declared that the promise may be inferred from acts without any formal words; and where the defendant continues in acts by which the plaintiff to the defendant's knowledge has been induced to believe in an engagement to marry, the defendant cannot deny such engagement; whether the latter's acts are intended and regarded as serious being a question of fact for the jury. See Richmond v. Roberts, 98 Ill. 472, where a newspaper article entitled "Love, the Conqueror," given by the defendant to the plaintiff previous to the time of the alleged contract, was allowed to be read in evidence.

* of parents in the presence of a daughter, with the absence of objection on her part, is held to imply her consent; (i) nevertheless language used to third parties, amounting to an expression of intention to marry the plaintiff, but not uttered in the presence of the plaintiff, does not in general prove a promise to marry. (j) But statements made to a father, who had a right to make such inquiries, and to receive a true answer, especially where corroborated by visits and the conduct of the parties, are not only sufficient evidence of a promise, but although the statement of the defendant is of a promise to marry the plaintiff in six months, and the count is upon a promise to marry generally, or in a reasonable time, the jury may infer from the statement a general promise to marry. (k) It has been contended that the promise should be in writing, sulted from sundry letters written to the plaintiff by the defendant, and from his attentions to her for a considerable length of time. It was objected by the defendant, that there being no direct evidence of an express promise, the action could not be maintained. But this objection was overruled by the judge; and the jury were instructed, that if, from the letters of the defendant read in evidence, and the course of his conduct towards the plaintiff, they were satisfied that there was a mutual understanding and engagement between the parties to marry each other, they might find for the plaintiff. To this ruling and instruction the defendant excepted, and the case having been carried up, Parker, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court said: "As to the technical ground upon which the objection to the verdict now rests, we entertain no doubts. The exception taken is, that there was no direct evidence of an express promise of marriage made by the defendant. The objection implies that there was indirect evidence from which such a promise may have been inferred; and the jury were instructed, that if, from the letters written by the defendant, as well as his conduct, they believed that a mutual engagement subsisted between the parties, they ought to find for the plaintiff. They made the inference, and without doubt it was justly drawn. Is it then necessary that an express promise in direct terms should be proved? A necessity for this would imply a state of public manners by no means desirable, That young persons of different sexes, instead of having their mutual engagements inferred from a course of devoted attention, and apparently exclusive attachment, which is now the common evidence, should be obliged, before they consider themselves bound, to call witnesses, or execute instruments under hand and seal, would be destructive of that chaste and modest intercourse which is the pride of our country; and a boldness of manners would probably succeed, by no means friendly to the character of the sex, or the interests of society. A mutual engagement must be proved to support this action; but it may be proved by those circumstances which usually accompany such a connection." In Honyman v. Campbell, 2 Dow. & C. 282, the Lord Chancellor said: "I deny that courtship, or an intention to marry however plainly made out, can constitute, or, in the language of the Scotch law, is equipollent to a promise. There must be a promise, and the promise must be mutual and binding on both parties; for the law attaches on the promise and not on the intention. But still, courtship is a most material circumstance, when we have to consider whether there was a promise. When we consider how natural it is that lovers should marry, and that marriage is usually the result of courtship, and that in these cases mutual promises are so common, although courtship, or intention, will not supply the place of a promise, yet they come so near, that if these are once made out, we get on a good way towards our journey's end." See also, Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cowen, 264; Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Penn. St. 80.