(c) Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52,60.

(d) Hickok v. Buck, 22 Vt. 149. in this case the defendant leased to the plaintiff a farm for one year, and, by the conthe thing hired, as a horse hired for a journey, although the owner may then, as it is said, repossess himself of the thing, if he can do so peaceably, he may not do so forcibly, but must resort to his action. (e) And if such misuse of the thing hired terminates the original contract, the owner may demand the thing, and, on refusal, bring trover; or, in some cases, he may bring this action without demand. (f) The owner is said to be bound to keep the thing in good order, that is, in proper condition for use; and, if expenses are incurred by the hirer for this purpose, the owner must repay them. On this subject, however, there is some uncertainty in the cases. The cases usually referred to on this point relate to real estate; (g) but the hirer of land, or of a real chattel, has neither the same rights nor obligations as the hirer of a personal chattel. Perhaps the conflicting opinions may be reconciled, by regarding it as the true principle, that the owner is not bound (unless by special agreement, express, or implied by the particular circumstances) to make such repairs as are made necessary by the natural wear and tear of the thing, or by such accidents as are to be expected, as the casting of a horse-shoe after it has been worn a usual time; but is bound to provide that the thing be in good condition to last during the time for which it is hired, if that can be done by reasonable care, and afterwards is liable only for such repairs as are made necessary by unexpected causes. (h) tract, was to provide a horse for the plaintiff to use upon the farm during the term. At the commencement of the term he furnished a horse, but took him away and sold him before the expiration of the term, without providing another. It was held, that the plaintiff acquired a special property in the horse, by the bailment, and was entitled to recover, in an action of trover, for the horse so taken away, damages for the loss of the use of the horse during the residue of the term.

1 So held in Fowler v. Lock, L. R. 10 C. P. 90, where a cab-driver recovered for injuries received in consequence of the unfitness of a horse furnished him.

(e) Lee v. Atkinson, Yelv. 172.

(f) See the case of Fouldes v. Wil-loughby, 8 M. & W. 640, as to what will amount to a conversion.

(g) Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 821; Taylor v. Whitehead, Dougl. 744; Cheetham v. Hampson, 4 T. R. 318; Fergunson v.-----, 2 Esp. 690; Horsefall v. Mather, Holt, 7. (h) There is very little direct authority in our books upon this question. In Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Wms. Saund. 821, Lord Hale says: "If I lend a piece of plate, and covenant by deed that the party to whom it is lent shall have the use of it, yet if the plate be worn out by ordinary use and wearing without my fault, no action of covenant lies against me." But this is only a dictum. So in Taylor v. Whitehead, Dougl. 744, Lord Mansfield says, in general terms, that by the common law he who has the use of a thing ought to repair it. Bat he probably had his mind upon real property. In the case of Isbell v. Norvell, 4 Gratt. 175, it is held, that where the hirer of a slave pays a physician for attending on the slave while he is hired, he is entitled to have the amount repaid him by the owner of the slave. But in the case of Redding v. Hall, 1 Bibb, 686, the same question was decided the other way, after a careful examination of the authorities. It is impossible to say with certainty what the true rule of law is, until we have further adjudication. But it seems to be certain, that the hirer of an animal is bound to bear the expense of keeping it, unless there is an agreement to the contrary See Handford v. Palmer, 2 Br. & B. 869.

On the part of the hirer there is an implied obligation to use the thing only for the purpose and in the manner for which it was hired. (i) And if he uses it in a different way or for a longer time, it is held that he may be responsible for a loss thence occurring, although by inevitable casualty. (ii) In general, the hirer must in no way abuse the thing hired. (j) But where hired chattels are lost during a * misuser, it seems that trover will not lie, unless the owner can show that the misuser caused the loss. (k)

The hirer must surrender the property at the time appointed; and if no time be specified in the contract, then whenever called upon after a reasonable time; and what this is will be determined in each case by its nature and circumstances. (l)

By the contract of hire, the hirer acquires a qualified property in the thing hired, which he may maintain against all persons except the owner, and against him so far as the terms and conditions of the contract, express or implied, may warrant. (m) During the time for which the hirer is entitled to the use of the thing, the owner is not only bound not to disturb him in that use, but if the hirer returns it to the owner for a temporary purpose, he is bound to return it to the hirer. (n) But if a bailee of any chattel, without authority, mortgage it to secure his own debt, and the mortgagee takes possession, the owner may have an action therefor without any demand. (o)

(i) Duncan v. Railroad Co. 2 Rich. L. 613; Columbus v. Howard, 6 Ga. 218.

(ii) Lewis v. McAfee, 32 Ga. 466.

(j) Homer v. Towing, 3 Pick. 492; Botch v. Hawes, 12 id. 136; Wheelock v. Wheelwright, 6 Mass. 104; De Tollenere v. Fuller, 1 So. Car. Const. Rep. 116; Duncan v. Railroad Company, 2 Rich. L. 613; Columbus v. Howard, 6 Ga. 213; Harrington v. Snyder, 3 Barb. 380; Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20. In the case of Mullen v. Ensley, 8 Humph. 428, the defendant having hired a slave of the plaintiff, for general and common service, set him to blasting rocks, and the slave while so engaged was severely injured. The court held the defendant liable. And Truly, J., said: "We are of opinion that the employment of blasting rocks is not an ordinary and usual one; that it is attended with more personal danger than it common to the usual vocations of life; and that a bailee, who has hired a negro tor general and common service, has no right to employ him in such an occupation without the consent of his owner." But in the case of McLauchlin v. Lomas, 3 Strob. L. 85, where a negro was let to hire as a house carpenter, and was employed by the hirer in his shop, where he carried on the business of a house carpenter, and where his workmen were accustomed to use a steam circular-saw, when necessary for their work at the business, and the negro, while at work at the saw, received wounds of which he died, and in an action by the owner to recover the value of the slave from the hirer, the jury gave a verdict for the defendant, the court refused to grant a new trial. Richardson, J., dissented.