Thus, the neglect of postmasters to sue for * balances due them does not discharge their sureties. (g) Nor does the continuance in office of a cashier or treasurer, by a corporation after discovery of his default, or non-notice thereof to the surety, necessarily discharge the surety. (gg) Where a creditor received the interest in advance for sixty days, this did not discharge the surety; for though it undoubtedly signified that the debt was not to be demanded within that period, yet it might have been at any moment. (h) So where a bank renewed a note on receiving twenty-five per cent, and the interest on the remainder for a certain period, the note lying in the bank overdue, the surety was not discharged. (i) 1 agreement between the creditor and the principal on the day the debt became due, to allow the principal one year more for payment. Tate v. Wymond, 7 Blackf.

240. But the agreement for extension must not only be valid and binding in law, but the time of the extension must be definitely and precisely fixed. Miller v. Stem, 2 Penn. St. 286; Parnell v. Price,

3 Rich. L. 121; Waddlington v. Gary,

7 Sm. &. M. 522; Gardner v. Watson,

13 Ill. 347; Waters v. Simpson, 2 Gilman,

570; People v. McHatton, id. 638; McGee p. Metcalf, 12 Sm. & M. 535. And the sureties are not discharged by the giving of time to the principal, if a right has been reserved in the contract to proceed against the sureties at any time. Wyke v. Rogers, 12 E. L. & E. 162; s. c. 1 De

Gex, M. & G. 408; Viele v. Hoag, 24 Vt.

46; Hubbell v. Carpenter, 1 Seld. 171;

Wagman v. Hoag, 14 Barb. 232.

(g) See Locke v. United States, 3 Mason, 446; cited ante, note (c), p. *25.

(gg) Pittsburgh, etc R. R. Co. v. Shaef-fer, 59 Pa. St. 350.

(A) Oxford Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 458.

(i) Blackstone Bank v. Hill, 10 Pick. 129. And the ground of this decision is thus stated by the court: "The first objection that an extension of credit was given to the principal without the consent of the surety, if made out, would be a good defence, but it is not supported in point of fact. The principle is stated in Oxford Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 458, that to discharge the surety, the contract for new credit must be such as will prevent the holder of the note from bringing an action against the principal. The plaintiffs were not precluded, (luring such supposed renewed term of credit, from suing the principal in the case under consideration. As to the understanding that the plaintiffs were not to collect the notes unless they should want money, that was a matter of courtesy rather than of legal obligation. The strongest circumstance showing a renewed credit is the receiving of interest in advance; but in the case of Oxford Bank v. Lewis, where that point was directly adjudged, it was held, that that circumstance did not tie the hands of the plaintiffs, if at any time they thought it necessary for their security to bring an action." See also Strafford Bank v. Crosby, 8 Greenl. 191. But these cases seem to rest on the ground of usage of the bank, and that the same was known to the sureties, and acquiesced in by them. And it was accordingly held in Crosby v. Wyatt, 10 N. H. 318, that if a note is made payable to a bank, where a regular usage exists to receive payment by instalments, at regular intervals, with the interest on the balance in advance, there is presumptive evidence of the assent of a surety that payment may be delayed, and received by instalments according to such usage, until the contrary is shown. But this principle cannot be held to apply to any delay beyond such regular usage, and no assent to any other course can be presumed. A similar doctrine was held in Savings Bank v. Ela, 11 N. H. 336. So in Gifford v. Allen, 3 Met. 255, it was determined, that if the holder of a note payable on demand makes a valid agree1 An agreement, not under seal, to extend the time of payment of a note, interest to be paid at the original rate, a portion of it to be applied to the extinguishment of the debt, is without consideration, not binding on the holder, and does not discharge a surety. Wilson v. Powers, 130 Mass. 127.

It seems to be settled, that an express covenant not to sue the principal debtor within a limited time does not discharge the surety; because a suit may nevertheless be commenced at any time, and such a covenant is no bar, but only gives to the covenantee an action for damages. (j) But where there is an entry * on the docket of the court, made by counsel to the effect that no action shall be brought on the original debt, this discharges the surety, because it will be enforced by the court, and no such action will be permitted. It is therefore equivalent to a discharge of the debt by the creditor, which of course operates as a discharge of the guarantor. (k) Such an arrangement made with the principal debtor without the consent of the surety, although innocently done, may work an injury to the surety.

It is obvious that a surety is discharged by indulgence to a principal, only when the creditor knows the relation of the parties. Hence if two or more are promisors of a note, and some are principals and others are sureties, but this does not appear on the note and is not known to the holder, and he gives time to the promisor who is principal, this does not discharge those who are sureties. (l) Any valid extension of the credit, made in such a way as to be binding on the creditor, and made without the assent of the guarantor, is held to discharge him. (m) 1