* A guarantor or surety has a right to expect that the creditor will not wantonly lose or destroy his claims against the principal debtor, with the intention of falling back upon the liability of the guarantor. (e) For the guarantor promises only to pay the debt of another, in case that other does not pay it; and this contract is held to imply some endeavor and some diligence on the part of the creditor to secure the debt from the principal is not a discharge of the postmasters or their sureties upon their official bonds. And in Bellows v. Lovell, 5 Pick. 307, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held, that a refusal of the creditor to sue the principal upon a mere request of the surety, unaccompanied with an offer of indemnity against the costs and charges of the suit, is not a defence at law to a suit against the surety, notwithstanding the principal may afterwards have become insolvent. 80 in Davis v. Huggins, 3 N. H. 231, where one who had signed a promissory note as surety requested the payee to collect the money of the principal, but the payee neglected so to do until the principal became insolvent ; it was held, that the surety was not discharged. See Strong v. Foster, 17 C. B. 201.

(cc) Shimer p. Jones, 47 Penn. St. 268; Ward v. Stout, 32 Ill. 399; Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Penn. St. 476.

(d) And it has been expressly held, that if the extension of payment is given to a principal, at the instance of the surety or with his consent, the surety is not discharged. Snydam v. Vance. 2 McLean, debtor. (ee) To this the guarantor is entitled; but this does not give him the right to debar the principal debtor from all favor or indulgence. It was once uncertain whether a forbearance of the debt did not discharge the guarantor; but it is now well settled that a mere forbearance, leaving to the creditor the power of putting his claim in suit at any time, does not have this effect. (f)1

99; Solomon v. Gregory, 4 Harrison, 112; New Hampshire Savings Bank v. Colcord, 15 N. H. 119. See also Day v. Ridgway, 17 Penn. St. 303; Weiler v. Hoch, 25 Penn. St. 525. Or if the surety, being informed of such an arrangement, assents to it, it is no defence to him. Tyson v. Cox, Turn. & R. 395; Smith v. Winter, 4 M. & W. 519; La Farge v. Herter, 11 Barb. 159; Woodcock v. Oxford & Worcester Railway Co. 21 E. L. & E. 285; s. c. 1 Drewry, 521; Dubuisson v. Folkes, 30 Miss. 432; Shook v. State, 6 Ind. 113; Bangs v. Mosher, 23 Barb. 478. Or if the surety has been amply secured and indemnified by the principal, even if the extension was made without his consent. Smith v. Estate of Steele, 25 Vt. 427. Otherwise if he assents in ignorance of the real facts. West v. Ashdown, 1 Bing. 164; Robinson v. Offutt, 7 Monr. 541. See also ante, p. * 17, note (m).

(e) N. H. Savings Bank v. Colcord, 15 N. H. 119; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Penn. St. 207; Perrine v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 22 Ala. 575.

1 Where a co-partnership gave a continuing guaranty to a State bank for loans, the bank reorganizing into a national bank, at a time when the loans were not fully paid up, and the corporation then dissolved, and afterwards one partner in writing acknowledged the validity of the obligation, relying on which the bank extended the time of payment, it was held that the indebtedness incurred before reorganization could be recovered from such partner but not from the copartnership, since its dissolution coded the guaranty. City Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484.

(ee) Dyer v. Gibson, 16 Wis. 557.

(f) It is well settled that mere delay without fraud, or agreement with the principal, does not discharge the surety. Hunt v. United States, 1 Gallison, 32; Naylor v. Moody, 3 Blackf. 93; Hunt v. Bridgham, 2 Pick. 581; Townsend v. Riddle, 2 N. H. 448; Leavitt v. Savage, 16 Me. 72; Freeman's Bank v. Rollins, 13 id. 202; Johnston v. Searcy, 4 Yerg. 182; Dawson v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 283; Montgomery v. Dillingham, 3 Sm. & M. 647; People v. White, 11 Ill. 342; Dorman v. Bigelow, I Fla. 281. To have such effect, there must be an actual agreement between the creditor and the principal to extend the time of payment Hutchinson v. Moody, 18 Me. 393; Fuller v. Milford, 2 McLean, 74; Greely v. Dow, 2 Met. 176; Wagman v. Hoag, 14 Barb. 232; Campbell v. Baker, 46 Perm. St. 263. And the agreement must be upon sufficient consideration, and must amount in law to an estoppel upon the creditor, sufficient to prevent him from beginning a suit before the expiration of the extended time; and when such an agreement is made the surety is discharged. Leavitt v. Savage, 16 Me. 72; Lime Rock Bank v. Mallett, 34 id. 547; Bailey v. Adams, 10 N. H. 162; Hoyt v. French, 4 Foster (N. H.), 198; Joslyn v. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Wheeler v. Washburn, 24 id. 293; Chace v. Brooks, 5 Cush. 43; Hoffman v. Coombs, 9 Gill, 284; Payne v. Commercial Bank, 6 Sm. & M. 24; Newell v. Hamer, 4 How. (Miss.) 684; Coman v. State, 4 Blackf. 241; Farmers' Bank v. Raynolds, 13 Ohio, 84; Haynes v. Covington, 9 Sm. & M. 470; Anderson v. Mannon, 7 B. Mon. 217; Sawyer v. Patterson, 11 Ala. 523; Gray's Exr's v. Brown, 22 id. 262; Moss v. Hall, 5 Exch. 46; Phillips v. Rounds, 33 Me. 357; Thomas v. Dow, id. 390; Turrill v. Boyn-ton, 23 Vt. 192; Bangs v. Strong, 4 Comst. 315; Miller v. Stem, 12 Penn. St. 383; Mitchell v. Cotten, 3 Fla. 134; Burke v. Cruger, 8 Tex. 60. Therefore a surety in a specialty is not discharged by a parol

1 Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77; unless it is the creditor's duty to sue, Supervisors v. Otis, 62 N. Y. 88; and is so requested by the surety, Clark v. Sickler, 64 N. Y. 231; or the forbearance is to the surety's injury, McKecknie v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 541; after a like request, Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95. But an agreement for forbearance between the debtor and creditor without the surety's consent will discharge the latter, Albion Bank v. Burns, 46 N. Y. 170; Myers v. First Bank, 78 Ill. 257; Amer., Ac. Co. v. Gurnee, 44 Wis. 49; Buck v. Smiley, 64 Ind. 431; Apperson v. Cross, 5 Heisk. 481; Bonney v. Bonney, 29 la. 448; Rose v. Williams, 5 Kans 483; Brown v. Prophit, 53 Miss. 649; on a valid consideration, Hogshead v. Williams, 55 Ind. 145; if the extended time is definite, however short, Berry v. Pullen, 69 Me. 101; Smith v. Shelden, 35 Mich. 42; per Blackburn, J., in Swire v. Redman, 1 Q. B. D. 636; and barring suit until its expiration, McKecknie v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 541; Howell v. Sevier, 1 Lea, 360; Wright v. Watt, 52 Miss. 634; Hosea v. Rowley, 57 Mo. 357; Byers v. Hussey, 4 Col. 515; but otherwise if the debtor indemnifies the surety, Kleinhaus v. Generous, 25 Ohio St. 667; or if the surety is nevertheless allowed to sue, Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211. An unexecuted or void agreement, however, to extend the time of payment, not creating an extension in fact, does not discharge a surety. Jaffray v. Crane, 50 Wis. 349. - An agreement to extend the time of payment of a note "until after threshing " is for a sufficiently definite time to discharge a non-assenting surety. Moulten v. Posten, 52 Wis. 169. If money is payable in instalments, and the creditor gives time to the principal debtor for the payment of one of them, the surety is not discharged as to the other instalments. Croydon Gas Co. v. Dickinson, 2 C. P. D. 46 ; but if a creditor learns, after the accruing of an action against two or more persons, that one of them is a surety, and then gives time to the principal without the surety's consent, the latter is in equity discharged, Overend, etc Co. v. Oriental Corporation, L. R. 7 H. L. 348. - Joint debtors cannot by mutual arrangement, with notice to creditor, make one of them a surety merely, and deprive the creditor of his right to treat them as Joint debtors. Swire v. Redman, 1 Q B. D. 536. Contra, Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95.