(y) Buchanan v. Rucker, 0 East, 192; Thurber v. Blakbourne, 1 N. H. 242 ; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Shumway v.

Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Curtis v. Gibbs, 1 Penning, 399; Don v. Lippman, 6 Clark & F. 20; Rogers v. Coleman, Hardin, 413; Borden v. Fitch, 16 Johns. 121; Benton v. Burgot, 10 S. & R. 240. And see the reporter's note to Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cowen, 624. From Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, apparently confirmed by Chief Justice Marshall, in Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 284, it might seem to be the established law of this country, that a judgment recovered in one State by a citizen thereof, against a citizen of another, was absolute and final, and perfectly exclusive of all inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment. But this question was very fully considered in Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; and it was there held, that a court of another State must have had jurisdiction of the parties, as well as of the cause, for its judgment to be entitled to the full faith and credit mentioned in the federal Constitution. The same question was again fully considered in Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232, which was debt on a judgment of the Superior Court in Georgia; and it was held, that the defendant, under the plea of nil debet, might show that the court had no jurisdiction over his person. And Parker, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "It cannot be pretended, we think, that a citizen of Massachusetts, against whom a judgment may have been rendered in Illinois or Missouri, he never having been within a thousand miles of those States, should be compelled by our courts to execute that judgment, it not appearing by the record that he received any manner of notice that any suit was pending there against him, and being ready to show that he never had any dealings with the party who has obtained the judgment; and yet this must be the consequence, if the doctrine contended for by some is carried to its full length, namely, that the record of a judgment is to have exactly the same effect here as it would have in Illinois or Missouri; for in those States, if the process has been served according to their laws, which may be in a manner quite consistent with an utter ignorance of the suit by the party without the State, the judgment would be binding there until reversed by some proceedings recognized by their laws. If it be said, that a party thus aggrieved may obtain redress by writ of error or a new trial, in the State if the origin * of this jurisdiction do not appear, or if it be of the ordinary kind admitted among civilized nations, where the judgment was rendered, it is a sufficient answer, that never having been within their jurisdiction, or amenable to their laws, he shall not be compelled to go from home to a distant State, to protect himself from a judgment which never, according to universal principles of justice, had any legal operation against him. The laws of a State do not operate, except upon its own citizens, extra territorium; nor does a decree or judgment of its judicial tribunals, except so far as is allowed by comity, or required by the Constitution of the United States; and neither of these can be held to sanction so unjust a principle. If the States were merely foreign to each other, we have seen that a judgment in one would not be received in another as a record, but merely as evidence of debt, controvertible by the party sued upon it. By the Constitution, such a judgment is to have the same effect it would have in the State where it was rendered, that is, it is to conclude as to every thing over which the court which rendered it had jurisdiction. If the property of a citizen of another State, within its lawful jurisdiction, is condemned by lawful process there, the decree is final and conclusive. If the citizen himself is there, and served with process, he is bound to appear and make his defence, or submit to the consequences; but if never there, there is no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment cannot follow him beyond the territories of the State, and if it does he may treat it as a nullity, and the courts here will so treat it, when it is made to appear in a legal way that he was never a proper subject of the adjudication. These principles were settled in a most lucid and satisfactory course of reasoning by Chief Justice Parsons, in the opinion of the court delivered by him in the case of Bisseli v. Briggs, v Mass. 402. And see Dobson v. Pearce, 2 Kern. 166. This exposition of the constitutional provision respecting the records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as the act of Congress requires, takes a middle ground between the doctrine as held by the court of this State, in the case of Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, and by the court of New York, in the case of Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Caines, 460; in both of which it was held, that the Constitution and act of Congress had produced no other effect than to establish definitively the mode of authentication, leaving in other respects such judgments entirely upon the footing of foreign judgments, according to the principles of the common law. But in the case of Bisseli v. Briggs, the principle settled is, that by virtue of the provision of the Constitution, and the act of legislation under it, a judgment of another State is rendered in all respects like domestic judgments, when the court where it was recovered had jurisdiction over the subject acted upon and the person against whom it was rendered, leaving open for inquiry in the court where it was sought to be enforced the question of jurisdiction, and taking the obvious distinction between the effect of the judgment upon property within the territory, and the person, who was without it. It was thought that this was carrying the sanctity of judgments of other States as far as was consistent with the safety of the citizen who was not amenable to their laws, and as far as is required by the spirit or letter of the Constitution of the United States. The doctrine thus established here has been approved and adopted by the courts of the great States of Pennsylvania and New York, in both of which before, it had been held, that the judgments of the several States were to be treated as foreign judgments. . . . The principle upon which this exception is made to the conclusiveness in every particular of the judgments of other States, is well expressed by Mr. Justice Johnson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, when dissenting from the decision of the court in the case of Mills v. Duryee. He says, it is an eternal principle of justice, 'that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a State over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing them allegiance, or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their limits.' Indeed, so palpable is this principle, that no doubt could exist in the mind of any lawyer upon the subject, but for the construction supposed to be given to the Constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress following it, in the case of Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, and resanctioned in the case of Hampton v. M'Connel. 3 Wheat. 234, in the brief opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. This construction, when first referred to in this court, in the case of the Commonwealth v. Green, was supposed to have put an end to all questions on this subject, and to have established, as the law of the land, that a judgment recovered and established in an * authentic manner, it will be presumed to be legitimate; if, however, it be of unusual origin or character, or not yet certainly established, then its legitimacy must be proved by the party relying upon it. (z) It is not however necessary, that the authority on which the jurisdiction of the tribunal rests, should be proved to be legitimate de jure as well as de facto. * It is generally enough if it be de facto established, and the tribunal be commissioned by the government in which the sovereign power of the country is actually vested. (a) in one State by a citizen thereof, against a citizen of another, was absolute and incontrovertible, and would admit of no inquiry, even as to the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. This court yielded a painful deference to the decision, without that close examination it would have received, if presented to them, otherwise than incidentally, and if its bearing had been of importance in the case then before the court; but the notice taken of the case was merely the expression of opinion arguendo, and not a judicial determination of the question. And as a further reason for not receiving the doctrine implicitly as authority, it may be remarked, that the case to which it was applied was one clearly within the jurisdiction of the court which decided it, so that the point now raised was not brought into question. . . . The case of Mills v. Duryee has, as its importance merited, undergone a revision in almost every State court in the Union, of whose decisions we have any printed account, and the opinion has been unanimous, without the dissenting voice, so far as we can learn, of a single judge, that that case, however unqualified it may appear in the report, does not warrant the conclusion, that judgments of State courts are in all respects the same, when carried into another State to be enforced, as they are in the State wherein they are rendered, but that in all instances the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment may be inquired into. In truth, all of them sanctioning the principles, and some of them by express reference, which were asserted by this court in the case of Bissell v. Briggs, as the only just exposition of the provision in the Constitution of the United States in relation to the records and judicial proceeding of States. . . . With such a cloud of witnesses in favor of the construction given to the clause of the Constitution which is in question by this court, in the case of Bissell v. Briggs, we may well rest upon that as the true construction, if it is not most clearly and explicitly overruled by the only tribunal whose authority ought to be submitted to, the Supreme Court of the United States. But notwithstanding all these decisions, many of which are subsequent in point of time to the case of Mills v. Duryee, and most of them commenting on it, we should be bound to give up the point, if that case settles the question as conclusively as it has been supposed it did. But all the State judges who have considered that case, are of opinion, that it was intended only to embrace judgments where the defendant had been a party to the suit, by an actual appearance and defence, or at least by having been duly served with process when within the jurisdiction of the court which gave it, and they formed their opinion upon the following clause in the opinion of Mr. Justice Story. namely: 'In the present case the defendant had full notice of the suit, for he was arrested and gave bail, and it is beyond all doubt that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York was conclusive upon the parties in that State.' If this is all that was intended to be decided, the case harmonizes with the general course of decisions in the State courts as before cited, and it is in no respect different from the decision of this court, in the case of Bissell v. Briggs " That the doctrine of the two preceding cases is now the established doctrine throughout the country, see the authorities cited at the end of the preceding note. See also Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sandf. Ch. 126. In this very long and interesting case the whole doctrine of the law of foreign judgments is examined with great ability. And see Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met 338; D'Arcy v. Ketchum 11 How. 166.