(c) Thus, if a ship be built upon a special contract, and it is part of the terms of that contract that given portions of the price shall be paid according to the progress of the work, namely, part when the keel is laid; part when at the light plank; and the remainder when the ship is launched; there arises a separate contract for each instalment; and therefore, when the keel is laid, or any other part of the ship for which an instalment is to be paid is completed, it has been held in England, and to some extent here, that an action lies immediately for the one party to recover the instalment, and that part of the ship becomes by the payment the property of the other party. Woods v. Russell, 6 B. ft Ald. 942. See also Clarke v. Spence, 4 A. ft E. 448; Laidler v. Burlinson, 2 M. & W. 602; Cunningham v. Morrell, 10 Johns. 203. But this doctrine is altogether denied in the subject of the * contract is sold by weight or measure, and the value is ascertained by the price affixed to each pound, or yard, or bushel of the quantity contracted for, will not be sufficient to render the contract severable. (d) 1 And if the consideration to be paid is single and entire, the contract must be held to be entire, although the subject of the contract may consist of several distinct and wholly independent items. (e)

Andrews v. Durant, 1 Kern. 86. See also Wood v. Betlt 6 Ellis & B. 772, 34 E. L. & E. 178, 6 Ellis & B. 866; Moody v. Brown, 84 Me. 107; 1 Parsons, Mar. Law, 76, n. 1.

(d) Clark v. Baker, 6 Met. 462. The plaintiff in this case purchased of the defendant a cargo of corn on board a schooner lying in Boston, agreeing to pay 76 1/2 cents per bushel for the yellow corn, and 73 1/2 cents for the white corn; the defendant warranting it to be of a certain quality. The quantity of corn was not known at the time of the purchase, but it afterwards appeared that there were between 2,000 and 3,000 bushels. The plaintiff paid the defendant $1,200 in advance, and after haying received enough of the corn to amount, at the agreed price, to $1,067.02, refused to receive any more, on the ground that the remainder was not such as the cargo was warranted to be. This action was brought to recover the difference between the aforesaid sums of $1,200 and $1,067.02. The defendant objected that the contract was entire, and that the present action could not be maintained, without proof that the plaintiff offered to return the corn which he had accepted; and this objection was sustained. Hubbard, J., said: "The question in the present case resolves itself into this: Was there one bargain for the whole cargo, or were there two distinct contracts for the yellow and white corn, or was there a separate and independent bargain for each bushel of corn contracted for, in consequence of which the receipt of one or more bushels of the warranted quality imposed no duty upon the plaintiff to retain the residue? And we are of opinion that the contract was an entire one. The bargain was not for 2,000 or 3,000 bushels of corn, but it was for the cargo of the schooner Shylock, be the quantity more or less; a cargo known to consist of two different kinds of corn; and the means taken to ascertain the amount to be paid were in the usual mode, by agreeing on the rate per bushel for the two kinds, and take the whole. . . . There is no ground, on the evidence as reported, to maintain that there were two contracts for the distinct kinds of corn; for it does not appear but that the 1,400 bushels that were retained consisted of a part of each. So that the plaintiff, to support his position, must contend as he has contended, that the bargains in this case were separate bargains for each several bushel of a given quality, and for a distinct price. But this separation into parts so minute, of a contract of this nature, can never be admitted; for it might lead to the multiplication of suits indefinitely, in giving a distinct right of action for every distinct portion. As well might a man who sold a chest of tea by the pound, or a piece of cloth by the yard, or a piece of land by the foot or by the acre, contend that each pound, yard, foot, or acre, was the subject of a distinct contract, and each the subject of a separate action." So in Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 286, where the plaintiff agreed with the defendant to work on the farm of the latter for the period of "seven months, at twelve dollars per month," it was held that the contract was entire; that eighty-four dollars were to be paid at the end of seven months, and not twelve dollars at the end of each month; and that the plaintiff, on leaving the defendant's service without good cause before the seven months expired, was not entitled to recover anything of the defendant. See also Baker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. (7 Smith) 397.

1 The sale of a specific number of packages of an article, at a given price a package, is an entire contract: a purchaser cannot rescind it as to some packages and affirm it as to others. Mansfield v. Trigg, 113 Mass. 350. Per Wells, J.: "The entirety of the contract is not destroyed by the circumstance that the subject of the sale is of such uniform character as to be readily divisible proportionally, by weight or measure, or is contained in packages of uniform quantity and value, even with the added circumstance that the consideration is named only by way of fixing the rate or price of the unit of such division." Where several distinct articles are bought at the same time for different prices, even if of the same general description, so that a warranty of quality would apply to each, the contract is not entire, but is in effect a separate contract for each article sold, and a right of rescission exists as to each article, if the warranty in regard to it is broken. Young & Conant Mfg. Co. v. Wakefield, 131 Mass. 91.