1 Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & Cr. 269 ; Billage p. Southee, 9 Hare, 534; Ahearne v. Hogan, Dru. 310; Greenfield's Est., 14 Penn. St. 489 ; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; Cadwallader v. West, 40 Mo. 483; though see Blackie v. Clarke, 15 Beav. 595, Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1, 4 Russ. 507, as showing that such gifts freely and intelligently made will be sustained.

"A medical attendant who makes with his patient a contract in any way depending on the length of the patient's life is bound not to keep to himself any knowledge he may have professionally acquired, whether by forming his own opinion,. or by consulting with other practitioners, as to the probable duration of the life." Pollock, 532, citing Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8. But mere professional relationship of this class does not invalidate a contract otherwise fair. Dog-gett v. Lane, 12 Mo. 215.

And in a case before the Court of Appeal in 1881 (Selborne, L. C, Bram-well and Baggally, L. J., affirming a judgment of Stephen, J.), where it appeared that alter a gift by a lady to her medical adviser, not made under undue influence, three years elapsed between the donor's death and the close of the relation of patient and medical man between the parties, and where after that relationship had come to an end, and any effect produced by it had been removed, she intentionally abode by what she had done, it was held that the gift was not void but voidable ; and as she must be taken upon the facts to have known that it was voidable and not to have avoided it, the defendant was entitled to judgment. Mitchell v. Hornfrey, 45 L. T. N. S. 694, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 587. As to ratification, see infra, sec 168. "Repeated decisions," said Baggallay, L. J., " have settled that the relation of a medical man towards his patient is confidential. Therefore the gift in this case being from a patient to her medical man, and without any independent advice, was originally either void or voidable. But then the jury have found that the relation of medical man and patient ceased when Jane Geldard went to Barnard Castle in 1872, and that after that relation had ceased, and any effect produced by it had ceased, she intentionally abode by what she had done. That gets rid of a second principle laid down in Rhodes v. Bate (L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 257), that, where a confidential relation has once existed, the court will presume its continuance unless some positive act or some complete case of abandonment is shown. Here the jury find that the confidential relation had ceased for more than three years before Mrs. Geldard's death. Then they find that she, during that period, 'intentionally abode by what she had done.' Now no doubt we have to take that finding with the admission that Mrs. Geldard had no independent advice at any time. But the finding of the jury contains the word ' intentiona parishioner or penitent applying to him for counsel;1 and, generally, by a person of authority, applied to for advice, over the person to whom the advice is given.2 And, as a general rule, a person occupying a position of trust and confidence will not be permitted to use that position to make money out of those whom it is his duty to protect.3 "I take it to be a wellally.' That must be taken to mean that she knew what she had done, that she approved of what she had done, and that she determined to abide by it. It was an adoption of what she had done, after the confidential relation had ceased for three years, sufficient to take it out of the cases where gifts have been invalidated on the ground of confidential relationship coupled with absence of independent advice."

1 Hugenin v. Bazely, 14 Ves. 273; but see Greenfield's Est., 24 Penn. St. 232; Welsh in re, 1 Redf. 238. In Lyon v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655, a gift of £24,000 by a woman of seventy-five years to a spiritualistic director was set aside. As to religious advisers, see further; Huguenin v. Bazely, 14 Ves. 273; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 556: Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch. 329; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278; Everitt v. Everitt, L. R. 10 Eq. 405 ; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. U. S. 183; Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. 397 ; St. Le-ger's App., 34 Conn. 434; Stewart v. Hubbard, 3 Jones Eq. 186 ; Graham v. Little, 3 Jones Eq. 52; Davis v. McNalley, 5 Sneed, 583. Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246, was the case of a woman who held that a deposed English clergyman, who had set up an institution called Agapemone, or Free Love, was an incarnation of divinity. Under this belief (she being sane in other respects) she conveyed large amounts of property to him, she living at the time at the Agapemone where she died. It was decreed that the defendant had obtained the property by undue influences, and he was ordered to convey the property to her heirs, notwithstanding he declared in his answer that the conveyance was made without his knowledge or solicitation.

2 "It is not," said Lord Kingsdown, in Smith p. Kay, 7 H. L. C. 750, as adopted in Anson on Contracts, 160, "the relation of solicitor and client, or trustee and cestui que trust, which constitutes the sole title to relief in these cases. . . . The principle applies to every case where influence is acquired and abused, where confidence is reposed and betrayed.".

See also Brown v. Kennedy, 33 Beav 133; Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch 61; Turner v. Collins, L. R. 7 Ch 329; Moxon v. Payne, L. R. 8 Ch 881; Beynon v. Cook, L. R. 10 Ch 389 ; Everitt v. Everitt, L. R. 10 Eq 405 ; Smith v. Kay, 7 H. L. C. 750 Selden v. Myers, 20 How. U. S. 506 Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C 397 ; Wistar's App., 54 Penn. St. 63 Persch v. Quiggle, 57 Penn. St. 247 Hetrict's App., 58 Penn. St. 477 Spencer's App., 80 Penn. St. 317 Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. 509 ; Rockafellow v. Newcomb, 57 111. 185; Bayliss v. Williams, 6 Cold. 440; Deaton v. Munroe, 4 Jones Eq. 39; Turner v. Turner, 44 Mo. 535. As to the duty of full disclosure under such circumstances, see infra, sec 254 et seq.

3 Infra, sec 378; Tyrrell v. Bank of London, 10 H. L. C. 26 ; Poillon v.

established principle of this court, that persons standing in a confidential relation towards others cannot entitle themselves to hold benefits which those others may have conferred upon them, unless they can show to the satisfaction of the court that the persons by whom the benefits have been conferred had competent and independent advice in conferring them. This, in my opinion, is a settled general principle of the court, and I do not think that either the age or capacity of the person conferring the benefit, or the nature of the benefit conferred, affects this principle."1 But the term "undue influence" is not to be applied to cases where a party under the influence of well-considered purposes makes settlements on relatives or friends to whom he is bound by peculiar duty or affection.2