Sec 80

In England, under the divorce statute, a wife, when judicially separated from her husband, becomes, for business purposes, a feme sole; and "a wife deserted by her husband who has obtained a protection order, is in the same position while the desertion conof the real estate of a deceased person, it shall be competent for her, either in person or by attorney, to sign, seal, and deliver a refunding bond in pursuance of the act of assembly in such case made and provided, and also to execute all such other instruments, and to perform all such other acts, as may by law be necessary to be done, or may be lawfully required by the executor or administrator upon the payment to her of the moneys to be distributed as aforesaid, with the same effect in binding her separate estate as if she was a feme sole. The object of this act is not to give a married woman general powers, nor the power to transact business generally, but to bind herself by such acts and instruments as may be necessary, or be lawfully required by the executors or administrators, 'upon the payment to her of the money to be distributed.' It is to protect them and give them a legal voucher for what they have actually paid toher."-That under the New York statute a married woman is personally bound on her oral engagement to pay for necessaries which are sold to her on her credit, although she has no separate estate, see Tierney v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516.

Divorce creates independent liability.

In Massachusetts a married woman may now generally by statute contract. Major v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 108 ; Kennedy v. Sawyer, 125 Mass. 28.

1 "Even in a case where a widow claims property as against her husband's estate, it has been held ' that she must show by evidence which does not admit of a reasonable doubt, either that she owned it at the time of her marriage, or else acquired it afterwards by gift, bequest, or purchase. In case of a purchase after marriage, the burthen is upon her to prove distinctly that she paid for it with funds which were not furnished by the husband.' (Black. J., in Gambier v. Gam-bier, 18 Penn. St. 363.) Again it was said by the same learned justice in Keeny v. Good (21 Penn. St. 242), ' To bring the property of a married woman under the protection of the act of 1848, it is made necessary by the letter, as well as by the spirit of the statute, to prove that she owns it. She must identify it as property which was hers before marriage, or prove how she came by it afterwards. Evidence that she purchased it amounts to nothing unless it be acconpanied by clear and full proof that she paid for it by her own separate funds. In the absence of such proof, the presumption is a violent one that her husband furnished the means of payment.' Like doctrine will be found in Gault v. Saffin (44 Penn. St. 307), and many other cases to which we need not revert." Wilson v. Silkman, 97 Penn. St. 509, and see Horton v, Dewey, S. C. Wis. 1-881, 13 Rep. 224, and other cases cited infra, sec 91.

tinues."1 The same rule exists in France, in reference to judicial separations, not, however, amounting to divorces from the bond of matrimony. By the latter kind of divorce, it need scarcely be added, the wife's incapacities are removed in all cases of which the divorcing court has internationally jurisdiction of the cause.2 And as a general rule, the wife, after divorce, is entitled to do business as a feme sole.3 Even after a divorce from bed and board she has been held so entitled.4 sec 81. The mere fact that a woman is separated from her husband, living apart from him by agreement, can no more, at common law, confer on her business capacity, than could at common law an agreement between a parent and an infant confer business capacity on the infant.5 That she lives and trades as it sui juris does not make her sui juris.6 But absolute desertion by the husband, compelling her to take an independent position, and to do business for her own support, may enable her to acquire an independent domicil for divorce purposes, and to sue and be sued.7