Sec 110

Were a monomaniac precluded from executing contracts relating to topics to which his monomania does not extend, the business power of the country would be seriously impaired, since some of the most efficient business men have been monomaniacs on special topics.4 Hence, it has been repeatedly held that the existence of a collateral monomania does not impair capacity to make a contract on a matter to which the monomania does not relate.5 Responsibility, in other words, as to a conscionable, and then it is proper. When it is a pre-existing debt, or money loaned, its measure is certain, and the insane man is liable for no more than the amount of such debt or loan. The holder of a madman's note stands in no better position than the payee. An accommodation maker or indorser, in fact, is a surety for the principal debtor, and when he is an infant or an insane person he or his representative may defend as in other forms of contract. We are not persuaded that commercial or public in-terests require an adjudication that a lunatic who signs a contract as surety, or as accommodation maker or indorser, is liable for the debt of another man." 1 Story on Contracts, sec 74; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605 ; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623 ; Tozer v. Saturlee, 3 Grant (Penn.), 162 ; Blakeley v. Blake-ley, 33 N. J. Eq. 502; Lilly v. Waggoner, 27 111. 395; McCormick v. Littler, 85 111. 62; Curtis v. Brownell, 42 Mich. 165 ; Jones v. Perkins, 5 B.

Business capacity restored in lucid intervals.

Monomania does not avoid contracts on other topics.

Mon. 222 ; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260.

2 Wh. on Ev. sec 1253 ; Attorney Gen. v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 443; Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 454; Amentz v. Anderson, 3 Pitts. 310 ; Rush v. Magee, 36 Ind. 69 ; State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304; State v. Reddick, 7 Kan. 143; McCormick v. Littler, 85 111. 62.

3 Amentz v. Anderson, 3 Pitts. 310; Brown v. Riggen, 94 111. 560; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 8 Bush, 283.

4 See 1 Wh. & St. Med. Jur. sec 53 et seq.

5 Attorney General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 443; Jenkins v. Morris, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 674; Banks v. Goodfellow, L. R. 5 Q. B. 549 ; Hovey v. Hobson, 55 Me. 256 ; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531 ; Somes v. Skinner, 16 Mass. 348; Osterhout v. Shoemaker, 3 Hill, N. Y. 573; Hall v. Unger, 2 Abb. U. S. 507; Lozear v. Shields, 23 N. J. Eq. 509 ; Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65 ; Speers v. Sewell, 4 Bush, 239 ; see Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen, 1. That an insane de-141 particular line of acts, is not impaired by insanity in reference to another line of acts.1 And the same rule applies to insane delusions. They do not affect capacity in reference to subjects to which they do not relate.2 It is sufficient if there be mental capacity enough to transact with intelligence the particular business.3 The proper test is, was the party, at the time of the contract, insane as to the particular thing to which the contract related ? It is not necessary to inquire whether the party in question was generally insane. We have to limit ourselves to the litigated transaction, and inquire what was his capacity in that relation. He may have been of good understanding in reference to other matters, but this will not validate the contract if in reference to its subject matter he was under the influence of insane delusions, of which the other party had notice. On the other hand, no matter how numerous and how strong may have been his insane delusions on other topics, this will not invalidate a contract made by him concerning which he had no insane delusions.4 "It is to be noted," says Mr. Pollock, in 1881,6 "that the existence of partial delusions does not necessarily amount to insanity for the purposes of this rule. The judge or jury, as the case may be, must in every case consider the practical question whether the party was incompetent to manage his own affairs in the matter in hand.".6 lusion as to a particular topic incapacitates as to such topic, see Boyce v. Smith, 9 Grat. 704 ; Lemon v. Jenkins, 48 Ga. 313.

1 Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. sec 37; Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. 142; Samuel v. Marshall, 3 Leigh, 567.

2 Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453; Emery v. Hoyt, 46 111. 258.

3 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 305 ; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531; Mann v. Betterby, 21 Vt. 326; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 220 ; Baldwin v. Dun-ton, 40 111. 188 ; Clearwater v. Kimber, 43 111. 272; Burgess v. Pollock, 53 Iowa, 273.

4 Ball v. Mannin, 1 Dow. & C. 380; 3 Bligh (N. S.), 1. In Jenkins v. Morris,.

L. R. 14 Ch. D. 674, a lease was sustained, though the lessor was under the insane delusion that the land leased was impregnated with sulphur, though he was otherwise sane. See to same effect remarks of Bramwell, L. J., in Drew v. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 669.

5 3d ed. 105.

6 To this are cited Jenkins v. Morris, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 674; Drew v. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 669. To same effect is Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531; Blakeley v. Blakeley, 33 N. J. Eq. 502 ; Miller v. Craig, 36 111. 109. As to the coexistence of insane delusions with general business capacity, see 1 Wh. & St. Med. Jur. 4th ed. sec 53 et seq.