Sec 57

Supposing that there be no fraud on the part of the other contracting party, it is not necessary to the validity of an affirmance, that the person making it should be aware of its legal effects. He may have as little knowledge of these effects the day after as he had the day before he comes of age. But the line drawn by the law is necessarily arbitrary; and, as soon as he becomes of age, a knowledge of the legal character of his acts is imputed to him. It is true that there have been intimations that a ratification will not be recognized by the courts unless made with a knowledge of the consequences.1 If by this is meant that loose talk by a person just coming of age, or concessions induced by misstatements or suppressions of the other side, will not be regarded as ratification, the conclusion may be accepted as true. But to say that a knowledge of the legal consequences of a ratification is necessary to validate a ratification, not only interposes a condition it would be difficult to establish, and which would often be made dependent upon the testimony of the party himself long afterwards when his views may have changed, but would invalidate all ratifications, since there is no ratification all of whose legal consequences can be foreseen. Hence the better opinion is that a ratification, made by a person of sound mind, on arriving at his majority, will be held valid, if untainted with fraud or undue influence, though the party making it was not at the time aware that it bound him in law.2 If, however, the ignorance of the party ratifying be in any way induced by the other side, then the ratification will not be regarded as operative.3

Knowledge of law is not necessary.

1 Supra, sec 28.

2 Infra, sec 114. As sustaining the text, see Gibbs v. Morrill, 3 Taunt. 307; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617 ; Boody v. McKenny, 23 Me. 517 ; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58 ; Heath v. West, 26 N. H. 101; Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Met. 519 ; Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539 ; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 120 ; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107 ; Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Ohio, 251; Phillips v. Green, 3 Marsh. 7; McGill v. Woodward, 3 Brev. 401; Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McC. 241 ; and cases cited supra, sec 31.

3 1 Cont. 11th Am. ed. 216.

4 To this is cited Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35. See to same effect cases cited, supra, sec 28; infra, sec 58.

5 Infra, sec 63 ; Hoit v. Underhill, 9 N. H. 436, 10 N. H. 220 ; Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. 48 ; Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen, 95; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479 ; Millard v. Hewlett, 19 Wend. 301 ; Alexander v. Hutcheson, 2 Hawks, 535 ; and cases cited, infra, sec 57 et seq. As to continuing considerations, see infra, sec 515. As to continuing offers, supra, sec 9.

Sec 58

A contract by an infant, not in itself unreasonable, is ratified by a continuance on his part, after he arrives at age, to intelligently enjoy its fruits.4 Hence acceptance of rent, after majority, is a ratification of a lease made during minority, and even a recognition of the lessee's status as such has been held to have this effect.5 This is also the rule with regard to partnership contracts;6 with regard to the retention of shares of 8tock on which there is a burden;1 with regard to the holding and using of cattle ;2 and with regard to a settlement of indebtedness acquiesced in for several years.3 A conveyance in fee, after majority, reciting and providing for a mortgage of the same land made during minority, is a ratification of the mortgage.4 Acquiescence for a series of years in a sale cannot be excused on the ground of forgetfulness.5 But mere temporary retention of goods is not sufficient to sustain the inference of ratification ;6 nor will an assumption of a debt unless specifically pointed to such debt.7 Continuance by a servant in a contract of service, after he is of full age, is-a ratification of the contract.8

Ratification to be inferred from facts: continued enjoyment of profits.

1 Harmer v. Killing, 5 Esp. 103; Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 57; Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 64 ; Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 311; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428; Norris v. Vance, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 168 ; Febrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357.

2 Benj. on Sales, 2d ed. sec 27; Mete. on Cont. 59; Stevens v. Lynch, 12 East, 38 ; Morse v. Wheeler, 4 Allen, 570; Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. 320. That mistake as to law does not usually avoid, see infra, sec 198.

3 See Turner v. Gaither, 83 K. C. 357 ; and infra, sec 168.

4 Boody v. McKenny, 23 Me. 517; Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Mete. 519 ; Aid-rich v. Grimes, 10 N. H. 194; Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85 ; Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526; Pursley v. Hays, 17 Iowa, 311 ; Deason v. Boyle, 1 Dana, 45 ; Alexander v. Heriot, 1 Bailey Eq. 243; Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 McCord, 241.

5 Supra, sec 56; Smith v. Low, 1 Atkins, 489 ; Thing v. Libbey, 16 Me. 55.

6 Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35.