Sec 720

When a stated salary is given, an officer is obliged, as a rule, to give his whole time, and cannot sue for extra compensation on a quantum meruit} Thus, when a salaried officer of a corporation performs the usual and ordinary duties of his office, as defined by the chapter or by-laws, he cannot recover special compensation therefor, unless it has been specially agreed that he should be so compensated.5 It is otherwise as to extraordinary services not in the line of his duties.1 An apprentice, also, cannot recover from his master for extra work, even though there be a promise to pay.2

Nor where there is a stated salary or other fixed compensation.

St. 480; Moist's App., 74 Penn. St. 166. That there is no implied contract to pay even an adult son assisting his father, see Zerbe V. Miller, 16 Penn. St. 488; Mosteller's App., 30 Penn. St. 473.

1 Baxter V. Gray, 3 M. & G. 771; Little V. Dawson, 4 Dall. 111; Walker's Est., 3 Rawle, 243; Neal V. Gil-more, 79 Penn. St. 421. That though there can be no recovery for services rendered on the mere expectation of a legacy, there can be recovery for services to a deceased person who has contracted to pay for them by provision in his will, but has neglected to make such provision, see Miller V. Lash, 85.

N. C. 51.

2 Munro V. Butt, 8 E. & B. 738; Patterson V. Luckley, L. R. 10 Ex. 330; see supra, sec 22.

3 Fitch V. Peckham, 16 Vt. 150; Spring V. Hulett, 104 Mass. 591; supra, sec 22; White V. Corlies,. 46 N. Y. 467. In Taylor V. Laird, 25 L. J. Exch. 329, 1 H. & N. 266, the captain of a ship, after a contract to take command for a certain voyage at fixed wages, abandoned the command during the voyage, but afterwards, without being asked, rendered services in navigating the ship to her home port. He sued for his services, but it was held that as the defendant had not invited or knowingly permitted the services, and had repudiated them when brought to his notice, he could not be made liable. Anson, ut supra, 16; Leake, 2d ed. 59. In a case in New York, in 1880, it appeared that the plaintiff and the defendant who were in the habit of having business transactions together to a large amount, were accustomed from time to time to render each other services of courtesy not to be brought into the accounts. It was held that these services were matters of mutual accommodation, to be regarded as gratuitous. Potter V. Carpenter, 76.N. Y. 157.

4 Supra, sec 500-2; infra, sec 720.

5 New York, etc. R. R. V. Ketchum, 27 Conn. 180; Loan Ass. V. Stonemetz, 29 Penn. St. 534; Kilpatrick V. Bridge Co., 49 Penn. St. 121; Merrick V. Coal Co., 61 Ill. 472; Cheeny V. R. R., 68 Ill. 570; Holder V. R. R., 71 Ill. 106; Franz V. R. R., 55 Iowa, 107. See Condon V. Jersey City, 43 N. J. L. 452; and cases supra, sec 502.

Sec 721

As analogous to the above rulings may be considered those in which it is held that a party who takes land on which there are burdens may bind himself, by the mere fact of taking the land, to pay such burdens. That in such cases the party holding the incumbrance may, in most jurisdictions, sue, we will see hereafter.3 It is now to be observed that a party accepting a deed-poll, binds himself to perform any conditions implied by the deed. "By the law of this commonwealth, affirmed by many decisions, the grantee, by the acceptance of the deed, becomes liable to perform, according to its terms, any promise or undertaking therein expressed to be made in his behalf, although, not having himself signed the deed, he must, while the old forms of action were retained, have been sued in assumpsit and not in covenant."4 "The fact that the defendant has since sold all the lands to a third person affords no reason for denying or limiting his liability on his agreement with the plaintiff."5

Vendee taking land may agree to pay burdens.

1 Frauz V. R. R., ut supra.

2 Bailey V. King, 1 Whart. 113; supra, sec 500.

3 See infra, sec 786 a.

4 Gray, C. J., Locke V. Homer, 131 Mass. 103, citing Fenton V. Lord, 128 Mass. 466; Dickason V. Williams, 129.

Mass. 182; Coolidge V. Smith, 129 Mass. 554; Rogers V. Fire Co., 9 Wend. 611; Rawson V. Copland, 2 Sand. Ch. 251. See Muhlig V. Fiske, 131 Mass. 113.

5 Gray, C. J., Reed V. Paul, 131 Mass. 132.