Sec 432

It is, therefore, no objection to such an agreement that it is unlimited as to time.1 So far from the public interests being impaired by the substitution of the industry of one man for that of another by the sale of good-will, they are promoted, as has been noticed, by business capacity acquiring a merchantable value, just as the public interests are promoted by the alienability of other branches of labor and enterprise. It is no objection, therefore, to a sale of good-will that the party selling is permanently restrained by it from returning to do business in the community over which the good-will extends;2 and if there be no limitation in such a sale as to time, the alienation will be construed to be for the vendor's life.3 Yet, when the question is whether an agreement is void for the reason that it is too unlimited as to space, the fact that it is unlimited as to time is a factor to be taken into consideration.4 - An assignment of a patent, it should be added, does not extend beyond the term of the patent, unless it be so expressly provided.5

Sec 433

Whether a restraint is reasonable, so far as concerns space, is a question of law, to be decided in view of all the circumstances of the particular case.6 It may be reasonable, in a business that permeates a community for two hundred miles from a particular site, for a manufacturer, in selling out, to agree that he will not engage in manufactures of the same line within two hundred No objection to such agreement that it is unlimited as to time.

Reasonableness of restraint is a question of law.

1 Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 659; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H. 518.

2 See Querand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15.

3 Leake, 2d ed. 736; citing Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438; Pember-ton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B. 87; Hastings v. Whitley, 2 Ex. 611; Elves v. Crofts, 10 C. B. 241; Carnes v. Nisbett, 7 H. & N. 778.

4 Proctor v. Sargent, 2 M. & G. 20. 5 Wetherill v. Zinc. Co., 6 Fish. Pat. Ca. 50. .

6 Catt v. Tourle, L. R. 4 Ch. 659; miles.1 It would not, however, be reasonable for a medical man, whose practice is ordinarily limited to a circuit of ten miles in diameter, to be bound by an agreement not to practise within one hundred miles of a particular place;2 though an agreement not to practise within what is under the circumstances the ordinary bounds of practice will be sustained.3 The area over which a solicitor practises is larger, and an agreement by a solicitor, selling his good-will, not to practise in London or within one hundred and fifty miles, has been held good.4 A similar limitation was held good on the sale of the business of a publishing house.5 The vendor of a business limited in its operation to a small neighborhood, such as may be personally visited for sale and delivery of perishable provisions, may bind himself, on selling his good-will, not to resume the business within that neighborhood, bounding it, for instance, by five miles of his old stand.6 On the other.

Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 349; Perkins v. .Clay, 54 N. H. 518; Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray, 356; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen, 370; Treat v. Melodeon Co., 35 Conn. 543; Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561; Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Oh. St. 349; McAlister v. Howell, 42 Ind. 15; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 111. 75; Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa, 137. See remarks of Bronson, J., in Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; and see Jones v. Heavens, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 636.

1 Harms r. Parsons, 32 Bear. 328; see Jones r. Lees, 1 H. &N. 189; Clark-son r. Edge, 33 Bear. 227; Oregon St. Nav. Co. r. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64; Morse Drill Co. r. Morse, 103 Mass. 73.

2 Horner r. Graves, 7 Brag. 735. See Longr.Towl.42Mo.545: Bern's App., 10 Weekly Notes, 431, where the supreme court of Pennsylvania enjoined on a radius of fire miles.

3 Paris v. Mason, 5 T. R. 118; Sainter r. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716; Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653; Atkyns v. Kin-nier, 4 Ex. 776; Grarely r. Barnard, L. R. 18 Bq. 518; Perkins v. Clay.

N. H. 518; Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176; Pierce. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175; Treat v. Melodeon Co.. 35 Conn. 543; Sander v. Hoffman, 64 H. 1 v. Mott, 11 Barb. 127; Van Marter v. Bibcock, 23 Barb. 633; Erie R. R. v. Express Co.,6 Vroom, 240; McClurg's App., 58 Penn. St. 51; McNutt v. McEwen, 1 Weekly Notes.552; Palmer v. Graham, 1 Pars. 476; Betts's App., ef supra; Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561; Warfield v. Booth. 33 Md. 63: Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 344; Heichew v. Hamilton, 4 Greene (Iowa), 317; Hubbard v. Miller. 27 Mich. 15; Jenkins v. Temple, 39 Ga. 655; Thompson v. Means, 11 Sm. & 11. 604; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251.

4 Bonn v. Gny, 4 Bast, 190. See Den-dy v. Henderson, 11 Ex. 194. where a limitation of twenty-one miles was held not excessive. In Smaller v. Greene, 52 Iowa, 241, an agreement by a lawyer not to practise in a particular town was held valid. In Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Bear. 383, an agreement not to practise for twenty years in any part of Great Britain was upheld.

5 Tallis v. Tallis, 1 E. A B. 391.

6 Etres v. Crofts, 10 C. B. 241: Proctor v. Sargent, 2 M. & G. 20; Benwell v. Inns, 24 Bear. 307; Pierce v. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206; Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307. See Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Penn. St. 194; Grasselli v. Lowden. 11 Oh. St. 349; Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503; Laubenheimer v. Mann, 17 Wis. 542 hand, a person conducting a business which may be extended over the whole United States, may bind himself not to exercise this business within a particular state or considerable section of such state;l and in cases in which there would be breach of trust if a defendant were allowed to violate an agreement not to do business anywhere, he may be generally restrained.2 - Distances, also, in such cases, are to be measured by a radius on the map, and not according to lines of travel.3 But when such an agreement goes to deprive an entire state of competition in transportation, it will be held invalid; and this was held to be the case with an agreement not to run steamboats in the state of California for ten years;4 though an agreement not to compete for seven years with the northwest trade has been sustained,5 and so of an agreement not to run an opposition stage between Boston and Providence;6 and of an agreement not to run an opposition on the Connecticut river.7 An agreement of this class may be divisible; if so - as where the restriction is as to London, which was valid, or as to any place within six hundred miles of the same, which is invalid - the invalid condition may be stricken out as sur-plusage.8 - A contract by a dealer in New Jersey not to ship poultry to New York or Washington has been held not to contain an unreasonable restriction.9.