Sec 25a

Circular letters, with no specific drawee mentioned, may be placed in the same category. There is a proposal, and when the conditions of the proposal are complied with, there is an acceptance.4 A written promise, also, to accept a bill binds the promisor to any persons who may bona fide take the bill on the faith of the promise.5 And it is further held that a promise by P. to accept any bills that D. may draw binds P. to any person who buys D.'s bills on faith of P.'s promise6 These rulings may be explained on the ground that the payee acts as the agent of the drawer, and the medium of completing the contract. By Mr. Pollock7 the explanation is that the "undertaking must be considered as addressed to any one who shall so advance money." The case is aualogous, in that view, to a general proposal to any one fuller report appearing in 25 L. J. Q.

So of letters of credit.

B. 129

1 Hamlin v. R. R., 1 H. & N. 408.

2 Gordon c. R. R., 52 N. H. 596.

3 Crocker v. R. R., 24 Conn. 249; see as to right to revoke, Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 73, cited supra, sec 24.

4 Asiatic Banking Co. ex parte, L. R. 2 Ch. 391 ; Maitland v. Bank, 38 L. J.

C. 363 ; though see Seott v. Pilkington, 2 B. & S. 11. As to whether a guarantor is entitled to notiee of acceptance by guarantee, see infra, sec 570. Any one may act upon a letter of credit when it is generally addressed. Birck-head v. Brown, 6 Hill, 634, 2 Denio, 375 ; Wheeler a. Mayfield, 31 Tex. 395; Mayfield v. Wheeler, 37 Tex. 256; Drummond v. Prestman, 12 Wheat. 515; Lowry v. Adams, 22 Vt. 160. When it is sent to A. with intent that it should be shown to B. to induce B. to act on it, it may be sued on by B. Lonsdale v. Bank, 18 Ohio, 126. Where B. sent a letter of credit to D., as follows: "As you request, we are willing to help you in the purchase of a stock of goods. We will, therefore, guaranty the payment of any bills which you may make under the letter of credit in Baltimore not exceeding $1500;" it was held that a party advancing goods to D. on this letter could sue B. as guarantor. Griffin v. Rembert, 2 Rich. S. C. L., N. S. 410 ; and see Manning v. Mills, 12 Up. C. Q. B. 515, cited Brandt, Suretyship, sec 96.

5 Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 111; Central Bank v. Richards, 109 Mass. 413 ; Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 414.

6 Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46 ; Bank of La. v. Coster, 3 N. Y. 203 ; Lonsdale v. Bank, 18 Ohio, 126 ; Dor-Ian v. Mulhollan, 10 Ohio St. 192; Nelson v. Bank, 48 111. 36 ; and cases cited, Wall's Pollock, 136.

7 Op. cit. 3d ed. 21.

who should do a particular act, and the acceptance is the doing of that act in conformity with the proposal.

Sec 25b

In the same relation are to be considered auction So of auc- sales, in respect to which it has been held that a tion sales. mere announcement of an auction sale at a particular day does not bind the auctioneer to sell on that day;1 but that advertisements of sales without reserve mean "that neither the vendor nor any other person in his behalf shall bid at the auction, and that the property shall be sold to the highest bidder, whether the sum be equivalent to the real value or not."2 The reason for the distinction between announcements of sales and announcements of sales without reserve, is thus stated by Sir W. Anson3: "The substantial difference between the cases seems to lie in this, that not merely the number, but the intentions of the persons who might attend the sale must be unascertainable; nor could it be certain that their legal relations would be eventually altered by the fact of their attendance. A. might come, intending to buy, but might be outbid. B. might come with a half-formed intention of buying if the goods went cheaply. C. might come merely for his amusement. It would be impossible to hold that an obligation could be established between the auctioneer and this indefinite body of persons, or that their losses could be ascertained so as to make it reasonable to hold him liable in damages. The highest bidder, on the other hand, is an ascertained person, fulfilling the terms of a definite offer. This.distinction, therefore, bears out the propositions laid down at the commencement of this discussion."4 The offer of a party desiring to buy at auction, as we have seen, is made sometimes by a bid, sometimes by a nod in approval of a price suggested by the auctioneer ; and the falling of the hammer indicates the auctioneer's acceptance of the proposal, which can be withdrawn until the hammer falls.1 "A bid at a sherifFs sale,before the hammer falls, is like an offer before acceptance. In such a case there is no contract, and the bid may be withdrawn without liability or injury to any one."2 Nor can a sheriff impose any limitation on this right.3

1 Harris v. Nickersou, L. R. 8 Q. B. 286.

2 Warlow v. Harrison, 1 E. & E. 295 ; in Ex. Ch. 1 E. & E. 309. In this case Watson and Martin, BB., and Byles, J., held that the case was not to be distinguished from that of a reward offered by advertisement, or of a statement in a time-table, holding that in such case the contract is completed by the bidding itself, subject to the condition that no higher bona fide bidder appear. See criticism in Pollock, 3d ed. pp. 16 et seq. As to mode of signifying proposal and acceptance, see supra, sec 6. As to the employment of puffers at auctions, see infra, sec 267 ; as to agreements to suppress competition at auctions, in-fra, sec 443.

3 Cont. p. 28.

4 Mr. Pollock holds the dicta in War-low v. Harrison, as above stated, to "overstep the true principles of contract." Pollock, 3d ed. 18. As to offer to subscribe to charities, see infra, sec 528.