Sec 346

Even supposing that out of a sale of goods or loan of money, illegal acts spring, these acts are not imputable to the party furnishing the supplies unless designed by him at the time the supplies were furnished. His position is that of an accessory before the fact; and an accessory before the fact is not responsible for crimes collateral to and not involved in the act which he specifically counsels.1 The unlawful act, in other words, in order to infect him with complicity, must be part of a scheme to which he designedly contributes. There must be "a unity of design and purpose, such that the agreement" of sale or loan, " is really part and parcel of one entire unlawful scheme."2 Hence, a bill for an account of partnership profits cannot be barred by the fact that in some particular transaction in which these profits were augmented, there was collateral illegal conduct.3 Nor is an actor, who, unaware that a theatrical exhibition is unlicensed, contracts to perform with the managers of the exhibition, barred from recovery on the contract.4

Sec 347

The taint of illegality, as far as concerns a contract, only affects the parties to the contract, not reaching, unless proceedings by way of confiscation are directed, to the thing which is the object of the contract.5 Hence, a party who has smuggled goods can recover the price of them on a contract of sale with a third party who was not implicated in the smuggling.6 A purchaser, also, as a general rule, of personal property fraudulently obtained, is not, if he buys without notice, and for a valuable consideration, infected by the fraud.1 And a note given for intoxicating liquors is good, under the Maine statute, in the hands of a bona fide endorsee for value.2 On the other hand, an assignee or endorsee is subject to all equities of which he has notice.3

Complicity in collateral matter not to be imputed.

Illegality does not attach in rem, or to parties without notice.

1 Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. sec 212, 229; Waugh v. Morris, L. R. 8 Q. B. 202; Sewell v. Ins. Co., 4 Taunt. 856; People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112; Sawyer v. Taggart, 14 Bush, 727.

2 Pollock, Wald's ed. 322, citing Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232; Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wal. 421. To same effect, see Emery v. Kempton, 2 Gray, 257.

As to what is collateral, see Fisher . Bridges, 2 E. & B. 118; 3 E. & B. 642.

3 Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phill. 801.

4 Roys v. Johnson, 7 Gray, 162; see supra, sec 343.

5 See Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bro. & P. 3; Fisher v. Bridges, 3 E. & B. 642.

6 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 271.

Sec 348

We will elsewhere see that a landlord cannot recover the rent of a house leased by him to be used as a house of ill-fame.4 On the same reasoning, rent cannot be recovered when the object was to establish what the lessor at the time of the lease knew would be an illegal nuisance, in whose profits he was to share;5 as where the house was to be used to sell intoxicating liquors in violation of license laws.6 Nor when a building is let in violation of a statute can the lessor recover on any covenant in the lease.7 But it is not enough, to vitiate such a lease, that the landlord should regard it as probable that illegal acts would be done in the premises demised, for if so, few leases could escape impeachment. The lease, to be thus void, must have been made for the express illegal purpose, and with the intention of sharing the illegal profits.8 Nor is a lease avoided by the lessee, subsequently to the execution of the lease, using the premises for an illegal purpose, even though he may have intended this at the time of the lease.9