Sec 256a

Similar observations may be made as to the parties to family negotiations.1 Members of a family, in negotiating with each other in respect to a family settlement, are supposed to disclose all material facts to each other; and if one perceives another to be laboring under an essential misapprehension, the party knowing the truth is bound to correct such misapprehension. Under such circumstances the non-correction of the misapprehension is equivalent to its indorsement. " Full and complete communication of all material circumstances is what the court must insist on." "Without full disclosure, honest intention is not sufficient,"2 and although, as Mr. Pollock well remarks in commenting on this point, this does not make the communication of mere gossip essential, yet it does make essential the communication of whatever a good business man would deem of importance under the circumstances.3 It is otherwise, however, when the parties are not on good terms, and are dealing at arm's length.4 - The rule before us applies to all negotiations in view of marriage.5 Hence all marriage settlements in fraud of marital rights may be avoided.6 But this applies only to settlements in which full disclosure is required. Hence it will require strong proof of active perversion of truth to set aside a release of dower for fraudulent suppression of fact by the party obtaining the release.7

Sec 257

When the parties to a contract have the same thing in view, the contract is not avoided by the fact that one of them makes a promise to do some particular thing (such thing not being a condition precedent So with parties to family negotiations.

False promise not a false statement.

1 See supra, sec 217.

2 Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Sw. 400.

3 Poll. 3d ed. 520; see Fane v. Fane, L. R. 20 Eq. 698; Leonard v. Leonard, 2 B. & B. 180; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2 De G. J. & S. 28.

4 Irvine v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Bell's Ap. Cas. 186; and see Brent v. Brent, 10 L. J. Ch. 84.

5 Kline v. Kline, 57 Penn. St. 120; Kline's Es., 64 Penn. St. 122. " There must he, in ante-nuptial settlements, a full disclosure of the circumstances and property of each. If the provision secured for the wife is manifestly unreasonable and disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, it raises a presumption of intended concealment, and throws on him the burden of disproving that presumption." Mercur, J., Bierer's Est., 92 Penn. St. 266.

6 Infra, sec 266, 399.

7 Stine v. Sherk, 1 W. & S. 195; Cummins v. Hurlbutt, 92 Penn. St. 165; Bierer's Est., 92 Penn. St. 267. 389 to the act), which thing he does not afterwards do. The false statement must go to the quality of the thing contracted for as it actually is, otherwise it does not prevent that concurrence of minds on one thing which is the distinguishing feature of a contract, nor does it expose the party making it to an action for deceit, however much he might be liable on the breach of promise.1 No representation of a probable future state of things can be a false pretence as to an existing fact affecting a particular transaction.2 But a false statement made or implied of a party's intentions at the time may be a fraud that may avoid the contract he may make on the basis of such a statement, or may expose him to an action of deceit. There is no concurrence of minds, and hence there can be no contract. And if a statement of intention to do a particular thing is part of the consideration of a contract, and the party making the statement afterwards changes his intention, he is bound to communicate this fact at the earliest period to the party to whom the representation was made, and is liable for any loss the other party may incur through his change of attitude. A contract made on the basis of such misrepresentation ought not to be enforced when the misrepresentation is material.3 - A party, it should be added, who agrees as consideration of a contract to do certain things in the future for the other contracting party, cannot compel, in equity, specific performance of the contract when the thing he promised to do is unperformed.4.

1 Burrell ex parte, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 552; Feret v. Hill, 15 C. B. 207; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Penn. St. 519; see fully supra, sec 177 et seq. 187.

2 Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; Vernon v. Keys, 4 Taunt. 488; Burrell ex parte, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 552; R. v. Lee, L. & C. 309; R. v. Woodman, 14 Cox C. C. 179; Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. 146; Long v. Woodman, 58 Me. 49; Pedrick v. Porter, 5 Allen, 324; Pike v. Fay, 101 Mass. 134; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217; Coil v. College, 40 Penn. St. 445; Dillingham v. State, 5 Oh. St. 280; Colly v. State, 55 Ala.

85; State v. Evers, 49 Mo. 542; Ryan v. State, 45 Ga. 128; State v. Prather, 44 Ind. 287; Keller v. State, 51 Ind. 111; Gage v. Lewis, 68 111. 604; Haz-lett v. Burge, 22 Iowa, 535; see Fisher v. N. Y. Com. PL, 18 Wend. 608; South-wick v. Band, 84 N. Y. 421; Morrison v. Kock, 32 Wis. 254.

3 Traill v. Baring, 4 D. J. S. 318; Slim v. Croncher, 1 D. F. J. 518; see supra, sec 149 et seq.

4 Peacock v. Penson, 11 Beav. 355; Lamare v. Dixon, L. R. 6 H. L. 414; see notes to Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Smith L. C. 7th Am. ed. 299 et seq.