1 Childs V. Monins, 2 Br. & B. 460; Forster V. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Tassey V. Church, 4 W. & S. 346.

2 Hills V. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31.

3 Jones V. Downman, 4 Q. B. 235; Childs V. Monius, 2 Brod. & B. 460; Dutton V. Marsh, L. R. 6 Q. B. 361; Moss V. Livingston, 4 Comst. 208; Rossiter V. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494; Brinley V. Mann, 2 Cush. 337; Taft V. Brewster, 9 Johns. R. 334; Pentz V. Stanton, 10 Wend. 277; Stone V. Wood, 7 Cow. 453; Hills V. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31; Forster V. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Barker V. Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 94; Collins V. Ins. Co., 17 Oh. St. 215; Scott V. Baker, 3 W. Va. 285; Rand V. Hale, 3 W. Va. 495; Wh. on Ag. sec 490, 504. In Baldwin V. Bank, 1 Wall. 234, it was held admissible to prove by parol the bank of which the party signing was cashier, he simply signing as cashier.

that he acts on a principal's behalf.1 - A distinction has been taken in this respect between sealed and unsealed notes. If an unsealed negotiable note is signed by A. as "A. for B.," B. is held to be the party to be sued.2 A different rule, however, has been propounded when the agent executes a sealed note with his own seal, and makes no reference in the body of the instrument to the principal. Thus, in a North Carolina case in 1881, the plaintiff sued upon the following bond: "On or before January 1, 1879, I promise to pay to the order of Albert S. Bryson, one thousand dollars with interest from date, being part payment of a certain tract of land, for which bond has been given, bearing even date with this note. Witness my hand and seal this 2d day of July, 1877. (Signed by H. S. Lucas. [Seal.] For Charles Callender, President of the Chester Mica and Porcelain Co.)" It was held by the supreme court that on this bond Lucas was personally liable.3 - The in the body of the instrument, to pay the money specified and due under it." Bryson V. Lucas, 84 N. C. 680.

1 Dutton V. Marsh. L. R. 6 Q. B. 361; Haverhill Ins. Co. V. Newhall, 1 Allen, 130; Barker V. Ins. Co., 3 Wend. 94; Wh. on Ag. sec 449, 504; and see as to agencies of corporations, supra, sec 134.

2 Ibid.; Story on Agency, sec 144; Bank of Cape Fear V. Wright, 3 Jones, N. C. 376.

3 "In our opinion," said Smith, C. J., " the writing is in effect as well as in form the personal bond of the defendant, notwithstanding the mode of its execution and signature, and this proposition is fully supported by authority. Nowhere in the body of the note is the name of any supposed principal mentioned or referred to. Its language is entirely personal, - 'I promise to pay Albert S. Bryson,' - and it concludes with the words, 'witness my hand and seal,' and then the seal is affixed to the name of the promisor, the defendant. While the consideration recited is the sale of a tract of land of which this is a part of the purchasemoney, it is not stated to whom the sale was made, and this only appears from the plaintiff's covenant, referred to as of the same date, and which when produced bears an earlier date. But waiving the discrepancy in the bonds, there is no incongruity in the defendant's assuming a personal obligation for the payment of the purchase-money for the land sold and to be conveyed to another, nor does this fact change or impair the individual liability incurred. Combe's case, 9 Coke, 76 6; Stone V. Wood, 7 Cowen, 453; Stack-pole V. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27; Wilks V. Black, 2 East, 142; Appleton V. Binks, 5 ib. 148; Tippets V. Walker, 4 Mass. 595; Duvall V. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45; Townsend V. Hubbard, 4 Hill, 351; De Witt V. Walton, 5 Seld. 571; Spencer V. Field, 10 Wend. 87; Quigley V. De Hass, 82 Penn. St. 267; Story on Agency, sec 153 et seq.; 2 Kent Com. 931; Whitehead V. Reddick, 12 Ired. 95; Oliver V. Dix, 1 DeV. & Bat. Eq. 158. These cases lead to the conclusion that the bond now in suit imposes a personal obligation on the defendant, and not on the company nor on its president, neither of whom is named addition by parties executing an agreement, of the word "committee" after their names, does not relieve them from personal liability. Like the addition of the word "executor," it identifies a transaction, but does not divest responsibility.1 sec 811. Where a contract is made with an agent representing an undisclosed principal, the promisee may sue the principal when disclosed, though unknown to be principal at the time of the contract.2 The exception, however, is rather nominal than real. The proposal undoubtedly is made to A., the agent, but Just as it is admissible for C., the creditor, to sue A. under the name of B., and to show on trial by parol that A., named in the contract, was really B., B. being A.'s real name, so it is admissible to sue P. on the contract, and to prove on the trial that A. during the negotiation was the mere representative of P., and that P. was the real party in interest.3 Another apparent exception is found in the cases where the statements made by promoters of a company before it had a legal existence have been held to bind the company.4 But this may be explained on the ground of estoppel, without invading the principle that persons not parties to a contract are not liable to suit for the non performance of its conditions. The companies in question, if they did not authorize, at least adopted statements of their promoters, enjoying the franchises thereby obtained, and may on this ground have been held bound by such statements.5.

Exceptions in case of undisclosed principal and of companies bound by promoters.

1 Ulam V. Boyd, 87 Penn. St. 477.

2 Wh. on Agency, sec 464; Ch. on Pl. 16th Am. ed. (1879), 40; Addison V. Gandasequi, 4 Taunt. 574; Priestly V. Fernie, 3 H. & C. 977; Thomson V. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78; Dutton V. Marsh, L. R. 6 Q. B. 361; Ford V. Williams, 21 How. 287; Baldwin V. Leonard, 39 Vt. 260; Southard V. Sturtevant, 109 Mass. 390; Meeker V. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349; Youghiogbeny Iron Co. V. Smith, 66 Penn. St. 340;.

Thomas V. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248; Wheeler V. Reed, 36 Ill. 82; see Irvine V. Watson, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 414.

3 That undisclosed principal may sue, see supra, sec 802.

4 Pollock, 3d ed. 209, citing Lindlay, I. 395-7.

5 Govett V. Richmond, 7 Sim. 1, rules that in a bill for specific performance of an award, a person not a party to the reference, who had not in any way assented to it, could be made a party, on the ground that he was interested in the subject matter. This decision Mr. Pollock (3d ed. 210) criticizes as.