Sec 678

The dates set out in a deed, though presumed 'prima facie to be true, may be contradicted and varied by parol.2 The deed takes effect from the time of its delivery, and not from its date.3 "The real date of the deed is the time of the delivery."4 Hence, where a tax deed did not mention the year of its execution, but the acknowledgment was fully dated and the deed was shown to have been recorded the same day,it was held, that it should have been received in evidence, and that the statute of limitations began to run thereon from the date of its recording.1 - When two deeds are acknowledged and received for record on the same day, they may be inferred to be delivered simultaneously, irrespective of the dates they bear.2 - The legal effect of delivery, when consummated, is not cancelled by a subsequent return of the deed to the grantor, and its destruction by him.3

Deed takes effect from delivery.

Brown, 66 Me. 316; Cook V. Brown, 34 N. H. 460; Eckman V. Eckman, 55 Penn. St. 269; Hughes V. Easten, 4 J. J. Marsh. 573; see Howard V. Patrick, 38 Mich. 795; Benneson V. Aiken, 102 Ill.

1 Dwinal V. Holmes, 33 Me. 172; White V. Bradley, 66 Me. 254; Johnson V. Farley, 45 N. H. 505; Corbett V. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99; Hedge V. Drew, 12 Pick. 141; Samson V. Thornton, 3 Metc. 275; Fonda V. Sage, 46 Barb. 109; Mitchell V. Ryan, 3 Oh. St. 377; Union Ins. Co. V. Campbell, 95 Ill. 267. See, for other cases, article by Mr. H. W. Rogers in 13 Cent. L. J. 223. In a Massachusetts case in 1880, the issue was whether a deed to a town of a lot of land, on the condition that a library building should be erected on it, had been delivered to and accepted by the town. It was in evidence that the deed, after signature, was left with the grantor, and was acknowledged by him about a month later, and was recorded twelve days after the acknowledgment. It also appeared that the library building, in compliance with a vote of the town, had been erected on the lot. It was held that there was evidence enough to sustain a finding that the deed had been delivered and accepted; and it was also held that the fact that the deed was found among the grantor's papers after his death did not overcome the inference of delivery drawn from the other facts in the case. Snow V. Orleans, 126 Mass. 453.

2 Wh. EV. sec 977; Fowle V. Coe, 63 Me. 245; Cook V. Knowles, 38 Mich. 316.

3 Ibid.; Hall V. Cazenove, 4 East, 477; Steele V. Mart, 4 B. & C. 272; U. S. V. Le Baron, 19 How. 73; Calhoun V. Emigrant Co., 93 U. S. 124; Barn-. cord V. Knhn, 36 Penn. St. 383; Han-ley V. Wilson, 77 N. C. 216; Soloman V. Evans, 3 McC. 274. In Byars V. Spencer, 101 Ill. 429, where a father made and acknowledged a deed to his two minor children, but retained it in his possession until his death, and declined to have it recorded, on the express ground that he would thereby place the title beyond his power or control, and expressed an intention, after he had made and acknowledged the deed, to sell the land if he could get a certain price, and in pursuance of that intention, did offer to sell the land, it was held that the deed was inoperative for want of a delivery.

4 Kent, C. J., Jackson V. Schoon-maker, 2 Johns. 234.