Sec 526

At common law, while the assignment of a debt does not authorize the assignee to sue in his own name,4 it conveys to him the control over the debt, and entitles him to use the assignee's name to sue it out.5 By statute or by local usage suit may be now brought in most jurisdictions by the party beneficially interested.6 This is the case with negotiable paper, and with negotiable securities such as railway bonds and other similar obligations.7 It is sufficient, on this topic, to say that wherever a debt is assignable, its assignment is a good consideration.

Assign-ment of debt a good consideration.

1 Plaskett's Est. in re, 30 L. J. C. 606; cited Leake, 2d ed. 620.

2 Supra, sec 486; infra, sec 532; Linne-gar v. Hodd, 5 C. B. 437; Follit v. Koetzow, 2 E. & E. 730; Smith v. Roche, 6 C. B. N. S. 223.

3 Supra, sec 373, 512. In Wallace v. Rappelye, Sup. Ct. 111. 1881, it appeared that W., the father of an illegitimate child, agreed with the mother, that in consideration of her abandonment to him of all claim for damages, and releasing custody of the child, he would adopt the child as his own, and give her a portion of his estate. This agreement was carried out by both parties, except that no legal form of adoption was ever had, but the child was taken into the family of her father, and ever after treated as his daughter. It was held that the agreement was sufficient in equity to sustain the claim of such child to a portion of her father's estate.

"What was really intended and obviously understood by the parties," said Mulkey, J., "was that Wallace was to adopt such legal measures as would secure to the child the same interest in his estate as she would, on his dying intestate, succeed to, if a legitimate child. If, as is claimed, there was no law at that time by which Wallace could confer upon her the capacity of inheriting his estate upon his intestacy, to give the contract any force at all, it must be construed as an undertaking on his part to secure to her by deed, will, or some other appropriate means, so much of his estate subject to distribution at the time of his death, as she would have been entitled to, if a legitimate child, upon his dying intestate; for it is manifest, to give it the construction contended for, would render it inoperative altogether. This we are not prepared to do."

That an agreement to pay a seduced woman support is without consideration, see supra, sec 512.

4 Infra, sec 836 et seq., 952; Mete, on Cont. 187; Bac. Ab. Assign. D.; Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233; 5 Wheat. 277; Riley v. Taber, 9 Gray, 373.

5 Infra, sec 836 et seq.; Legh v. Legh, 1 B. & P. 447; Dunn v. Snell, 15 Mass. 481.

6 Infra, sec 841; Mete, on Cont. 188; Innes v. Dunlop, 8 T. R. 595; Thompson v. Farden, 1 M. & G. 535.

7 Vertue v. R. R., 5 Exch. 280; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; see infra, sec 838.

Sec 527

Where there are several creditors who agree to re-lease the common debtor on part payment, the release by one creditor is a sufficient consideration for the release by another. "If you will release him, I will." Such a bargain is equitable; and supposing the transaction to be fair, and there be no concealment or reservation, each creditor signing the release, upon his reception of his share of the assets assigned, loses his right to fall back on the debtor except in accordance with the terms of the release.1 But a promise by a particular creditor to accept a part of his debt in satisfaction, although on condition that no other creditor shall receive a larger percentage, is void for want of consideration.2